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ABSTRACT 
 
The continuing increases in annual greenhouse gas emissions, in the absence of stringent 
mitigation measures, will produce a doubling of pre-industrial atmospheric concentrations 
in the second half of this century and a concomitant risk of serious disruption of the 
climate system, unless less carbon-intensive energy technologies are introduced. The 
nuclear power option is being discussed much more actively as part of this greenhouse gas 
challenge.  Deployment on the necessary scale must entail establishment of nuclear power 
and a supporting infrastructure and workforce in many regions of the world, including 
developing nations.  We shall be concerned here with the nonproliferation issues raised by 
such a nuclear power global growth scenario.  In revisiting the issue of nonproliferation 
and the nuclear fuel cycle, we address two central questions: 
1. If a robust nuclear growth scenario is realized, what might it look like, both 
geographically and technologically? 
2. What are the relevant proliferation pathways in the context of this growth scenario, 
and what actions and studies might be taken to reduce the risk? 
 
Our analysis has three components: development of a mid-century demand scenario; 
discussion of proliferation technology pathways; recommendations that derive from these 
results.  Some of the key recommendations entail: 
1. Strengthening of the international safeguards regime, for example by integration of 
safeguards surveillance and security functions with fuel cycle design and operation. 
2. Enhanced focus on enrichment technologies. 
3. Timely closure of the back end of the fuel cycle through geological isolation of 
spent fuel or high-level waste. 
4. Focus on fuel cycles that do not yield separated plutonium during normal operation, 
and control over international cooperative R&D programs. 
5. Implementation of suitable international fuel cycle architectures. 
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Introduction 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Worldwide anthropogenic carbon emissions are more than six billion tonnes of carbon 
(equivalent) annually, and atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have now increased 30% 
above pre-industrial levels.  This is shown in Figure 1-1.  The continuing increases in annual 
greenhouse gas emissions, in the absence of stringent mitigation measures, will produce a 
doubling of pre-industrial concentrations in the second half of this century and a concomitant 
risk of serious disruption of the climate system. 
 
Avoiding such an outcome requires an order of magnitude increase in non-carbon-
emitting energy production and use.  The four basic technology pathways for accomplishing this 
are much higher efficiency, renewables, carbon sequestration, and nuclear power.  Non-hydro 
renewables have a very small market share because of costs and operational considerations, and 
hydropower is severely limited in terms of growth opportunities.  Efficiency continues to 
improve slowly each year, a trend already incorporated in out-year projections of energy use per 
unit of economic activity.  Sequestration remains unproved on a very large scale.  Thus, although 
each of these pathways merits continuing research, development, and deployment, the 
uncertainties are such that the nuclear power option is being discussed much more actively as 
part of the greenhouse gas challenge for the decades ahead. 
 
 
FIGURE 1-1: Trends in Atmospheric Concentrations and Anthropogenic Emissions 
 
 Nuclear power currently accounts for about 17% of global electricity production.  To 
make a significant impact on the greenhouse gas challenge, it would need to maintain or increase 
its market share, with a deployment in the range of 1000 to 1500 GWe by mid-century 
(compared with about 360 GWe today).  However, deployment on this scale raises significant 
issues, particularly since the deployment must entail establishment of nuclear power and a 
supporting infrastructure and workforce in many regions of the world, including developing 
nations.  We shall be concerned here with the nonproliferation issues raised by such a nuclear 
power global growth scenario. 
 13
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 The importance of the developing world in such discussions is founded on their 
anticipated rapid growth in energy use and carbon emissions.  Whereas electricity growth and 
carbon emissions are anticipated by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) to grow 
annually in the industrialized world by 1.8% and 1.2%, respectively, the comparable growth 
rates in the developing world are 4.2% and 3.7%, respectively.  Thus, electricity supply needs 
will be immense in the developing world, and nuclear power may look attractive as a means to 
address those needs without significant atmospheric emissions.  On the other hand, 
nonproliferation challenges would likely be significant if nuclear power is established in a 
multitude of new places.  However, we should emphasize that proliferation risks are not limited 
to developing nations, as changing geopolitical imperatives (e.g., in the Far East) could lead 
industrialized non-nuclear-weapons states to change their security policies1. 
 
 In revisiting the issue of nonproliferation and the nuclear fuel cycle, we address two 
central questions: 
 
1. If a robust nuclear growth scenario is realized, what might it look like, both 
geographically and technologically? 
2. What are the relevant proliferation pathways in the context of this growth scenario, and 
what actions and studies might be taken to reduce the risk? 
 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
We start in Chapter 2 by constructing a global electricity “demand map” for the year 
2050.  This demand map is not a forecast or an economic model.  Rather it is a scenario 
organized around the expectation that nations will invest in their power infrastructures in order to 
lift their populations to a decent standard of living and economic activity.  United Nations 
projections for mid-century population in each country are an important part of determining 
demand levels.  With this overall determination of electricity production and use, the range of 
nuclear capacity is estimated based upon current use and a set of judgments about possible 
market share.  We emphasize that the judgments are taken in the context of a world that has re-
committed to nuclear power as an important part of environmentally-responsible energy supply, 
a context that does not represent today’s reality in many parts of the world.  This distribution of 
nuclear power has significant implications for our nonproliferation considerations. 
 
 We then turn to a representative set of technologies that may form the basis for the 
growth scenario.  These include both fuel cycles in widespread use today (thermal light water 
reactors (LWR) with and without plutonium recycle) and technologies that need further 
development (including fast spectrum reactors with recycle of plutonium and other actinides).  
Chapter 3 emphasizes the structure and content of the assessment method used, derived from the 
national academy and DOE studies based upon material, technical, and institutional barriers to 
proliferation.  Chapter 4 presents the results of assessing various nuclear fuel cycles, together 
with recommendations that flow from the consideration of proliferation pathways.  Chapters 2 
and 4 present the main results of the analysis.  Chapter 5 provides a summary and revisits key 
results from chapters 2 and 4. 
 
1 These nations might decide that it is in their best interest to develop nuclear bombs to protect themselves. 
Global Demand Map: A Scenario for Nuclear Power at Mid-Century 
2 GLOBAL DEMAND MAP: A SCENARIO FOR NUCLEAR POWER AT 
MID-CENTURY 
 
 
In providing the context for assessing proliferation risks in a robust global growth 
scenario for nuclear power, we take a long-term view out to mid-century.  By any means of 
modeling or projection, energy use – and especially electricity use – is expected to rise 
dramatically.  For example, the EIA 2000 International Energy Outlook projections to 2020 are 
shown in Table 2-1 (EIA, 2000)1.  Continuation of growth in global electricity use as shown in 
the table would lead to nearly 50 trillion kWh by 2050, a four-fold increase in half a century; 
while it is unlikely that this growth rate would be sustained for so long, the scale of the supply 
challenge is considerable.  With the growth rates in Table 1, the developing world would use 
over 60% of the world’s electricity, about double its share today. 
 
TABLE 2-1: EIA 2000 Projections 
EIA2000 KEY INDICATORS AND PROJECTIONS:  1997 to 2020 
 
                 WORLD          INDUSTRIALIZED           EE/FSU                DEVELOPING             
                                               COUNTRIES                                                COUNTRIES 
 
TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION/YR (QUADS) 
                380 to 608              204 to 260                      53 to 76                     123 to 272 
 
                  2.1%/yr                  1.1%/yr                         1.5%/yr                       3.5%/yr 
 
ELECTRICITY USE/YR (TRILLION KW-HRS) 
                12.3 to 21.6             7.3 to 10.3                      1.5 to 2.1                    3.5 to 9.2 
 
                   2.5%/yr                  1.5%/yr                           1.6%/yr                     4.3%/yr 
 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (TRILLIONS OF U.S. $) 
                28.7 to 53.9            22.4 to 36.6                     0.97 to2.4                   5.3 to 14.9 
 
                    2.8%/yr                  2.2%/yr                         4.0%/yr                       4.6%/yr 
 
CARBON EMISSIONS/YR (BILLION TONS) 
                  6.1 to 10.0              3.0 to 3.9                        0.88 to 1.15                2.3 to 4.9 
 
                     2.1%/yr                  1.1%/yr                           1.2%/yr                      3.5%/yr 
 
 
 
The scale of capital investment needed to reach this global capacity is on the order of ten 
trillion dollars, not including associated infrastructure costs.  Nevertheless, the central role of 
electricity in enhancing quality of life, because of its convenience and lack of pollution at the 
                                                 
1 A more recent version of this table can be found in Moniz, E., Kenderdine, M. (2002) Meeting Energy Challenges: 
Technology and Policy Physics Today, April 2002. 
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point of end use, suggests that governments will assign high priority to such investments if at all 
possible, and conversely will gauge the significant investments called for to the level needed for 
serving citizens’ needs.  This provides the basic framework for our scenario construction and 
suggests the first task: associating levels of individual electricity use with well-being. 
 
The United Nations annually compiles statistics on the human development and 
environment of 175 countries.  These statistics relate to energy use, life expectancy, nutrition and 
health, income and poverty, education, and other relevant factors.  In particular, the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) uses three of these indicators to calculate the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which it defines as “a process of enlarging people’s choices.”  They 
note that: “the three essential capabilities (indicators) for human development are for people to 
lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable and to have a decent standard of living (UNDP, 
2003).”  They measure longevity by life expectancy, knowledge by educational attainment (a 
combination of adult literacy and collective primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment), and 
standard of living by a discounted gross domestic product per capita2. 
 
The starting point for our scenario is the correlation between HDI and per capita 
electricity use.  Benka (2002) adapted the results of Pasternak (2000) to produce Figure 2-1.  The 
figure shows HDI and annual per capita electricity use for sixty countries accounting for 90% of 
the world’s population. 
 
 
FIGURE 2-1: Correlation between HDI and Per Capita Electricity Consumption 
                                                 
2 Although specifics are neglected here, a great technical reference for understand the details of the Human 
Development Index can be found at the following website: 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/pdf/backtwo.pdf 
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The HDI reaches a high plateau (approximately 0.9 on a scale of 0 to 1) when a nation’s 
annual per capita consumption of electricity is roughly 4000 kWhrs.  All of the countries on this 
plateau are industrialized (developed) countries.  The uniqueness of individual countries does 
bring about exceptions to this correlation: for example Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, 
for easily understood reasons, are at or above the benchmark of 4000 kWh despite the absence of 
highly developed economies.  Developing countries are generally well below the 4000 kWhrs 
per capita electricity consumption level, although with an obvious gradation among former 
Soviet Union countries, emerging economies, and the least developed countries. 
 
The underlying assumption in our scenario-building is that, while the developed countries 
continue with a small annual increase in per capita electricity use, the developing countries move 
to the 4000 kWh benchmark if at all practical.  The indicator of practicality is total expansion of 
national electricity supply.  These scenario guidelines will be presented quantitatively below.  
This approach clearly involves population projections to mid-century, and again we shall rely on 
the United Nations.  We recognize that population changes may result from success in providing 
more energy and social progress.  Nevertheless, for our purposes, broad understanding of where 
people are expected to be and of what their needs are for satisfactory quality of life is sufficient 
to frame our discussion of nuclear power and nonproliferation.  Clearly the scenario is not based 
on economic modeling or forecasting, but we shall compare the outcome to those of the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) over the next decades. 
2.1 Methodology 
The methodology consists of three basic steps that lead to the 2050 World Nuclear 
Electricity Demand Map and associated nuclear power deployments.  These steps are detailed in 
the sections below and are captured graphically in the following flowchart. 
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Electricity Projections
Assumptions:
1)  0.5 and 1% per year in Annual Per Capita 
Electricity Consumption (APEC)
2) Constant rate increase for industrialized nations 
in Urban Population from 2020-2050
3) Growth to 4000 kWhrs Annual Per Capita
Electricity Consumption
4) Factor of 10 growth cap in Total Electricity
Consumption (TEC)
Input Output
1. Tables with:
2050 Population
2050 % Urban
2050 TEC
2050 PCEC
2. Table with:
Same as above
plus
2050 High Nuclear
2050 Low Nuclear
World
Demand
Map
Nuclear Projections 
Assumptions:
1) 2050 Low and High Nuclear %’s based on:
2000 Nuclear %
2000 TEC
2000 Urban population
2000 PCEC
1. 2000/2050 
UN Pop.
by country
2. 2000 EIA 
electricity
consumption 
data
3. 2000-2030 
UN Urban 
Pop. data
4. 2000 
CIA % 
Nuc. by 
country
3. Table with:
Country 
breakout
Developed
Developing
FSU
Developing Split
Most Advanced 
Less Advanced
Least 
Country Categorization
Assumptions:
1) Neglect countries with 2050 TEC ∗ 10 Billion kWhrs
2) Neglect countries with 2050 Pop ∗ 3 Million
3) Developed countries have 2000 PCEC ] 4,000 kWhrs/capita
Note: some ] 3,500
4) Developing countries split into sub-categories:
a) More Advanced Developing-could potentially reach
2050 PCEC of ] 4,000 kWhrs/capita
b) Less Advanced Developing-could potentially reach
2050 PCEC between 1,500 and 4,000 kWhrs/capita
c) Least Developing-will by no means reach 
1,500 kWhrs/capita threshold
5) Former Soviet Union countries separated out
 
FIGURE 2-2: Electricity Demand Algorithm Flowchart 
 
2.1.1 Electricity Projections 
This step combined various data from the EIA and UN: the United Nations provides both 
estimates (2000 estimates were used) and projections (2050 medium variant projections were 
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used) for individual country populations3 based upon historical growth rates and other significant 
indicators; the Energy Information Agency provides estimates (2000 estimates used) on a 
county-by-country basis of individual electricity consumption numbers; the UN also provides 
estimates (2000 estimates used) and projections (up to 2030) of country-by-country urban 
population percentages.  The 2050 urban populations were obtained from linear extrapolation of 
the 2000-2030 UN growth projections. 
 
For countries with current annual per capita electricity consumption (APCEC) close to or 
above 4000 kWh, we take two cases: 0.5% and 1% growth in APCEC.  These rates bracket the 
EIA expectations for the United States over the next twenty years (EIA, 2001).  Over the last 
quarter century, this growth rate averaged about 2%, reaching 1.5% in 2000 and expected to 
decline further.  For developing economies, we assume that (with some exceptions detailed 
below) they reach 4000 kWh APCEC in 2050.  This yields total electricity use when combined 
with the population projection.  Consequently, the growth rate in APCEC and in total electricity 
production are products of the calculation; for example, China needs a 2.9% annual growth in 
APCEC and 3.2% annual growth in total electricity production to reach the benchmark in 2050. 
 
This algorithm would produce unreasonable rates of growth in electricity use for some of 
the least developed economies.  Consequently, a cap was imposed on total electricity 
consumption (TEC) in any country.  The EIA annual growth rate in electricity use in developing 
countries is collectively 4.2% (see Table 2-1).  We have taken 4.7%/year as the maximum 
achievable sustained growth rate for any individual country.  This is a formidable growth rate 
over a long period of time, but it should be remembered that countries for which this is an issue 
start from extremely low APCEC and generally end with a low APCEC.  Consequently, 
relatively high growth rates are more easily achieved (for example, China achieved a 10% 
growth rate in electricity production last year).  The 4.7% annual growth rate compounds to a 
factor of ten growth in TEC over fifty years.  This completes the simple algorithm used to 
construct the following tables. 
 
 The two different values for industrialized country APCEC result in 11% difference in 
2050 global electricity use.  From here on, we will employ the 1% APCEC growth rate for 
industrialized countries as a baseline.  Shown in Table Series 2-1 and 2-2, are the results of the 
application of the algorithm listing total population, urban population, current electricity 
consumption and the projected consumption for 2050 (with and without the growth cap). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3UN projections used here are from the 2000 publications, which projects World Total Population to be 9,326 
Billion for 2050, although recently issued (2002) UN publications project the World Total Population for 2050 to be 
8,919 Billion. 
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TABLE 2-2(a): Electricity Consumption Projections (0.5% growth rate base) 
Country
After 
growth 
cap
After 
growth 
cap
2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 2050 2000 2050 2050
Afghanistan 21.76 72.27 21.9 61.2 4.77 44.20 0.45 289.07 4.54 21 4,000 63
Albania 3.13 3.90 66.3 50.4 2.08 1.97 5.38 15.62 15.62 1,716 4,000 4,000
Algeria 30.29 51.18 57.1 85.1 17.30 43.54 21.85 204.72 204.72 721 4,000 4,000
American Samoa 0.07 0.17 52.7 81.7 0.04 0.14 0.12 0.69 0.69 1,787 4,000 4,000
Angola 13.13 53.33 34.2 74.6 4.49 39.77 1.11 213.31 11.07 84 4,000 208
Antigua and Barbuda 0.06 0.07 36.8 67.1 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.29 0.29 1,434 4,000 4,000
Argentina 37.03 54.52 88.2 94.7 32.66 51.64 80.81 218.09 218.09 2,182 4,000 4,000
Armenia 3.79 3.15 67.2 80.0 2.54 2.52 4.89 12.60 12.60 1,291 4,000 4,000
Aruba 0.10 0.24 50.8 74.5 0.05 0.18 0.42 1.29 1.29 4,161 5,340 5,340
Australia 19.14 26.50 90.7 100.0 17.36 26.50 188.49 334.95 334.95 9,849 12,639 12,639
Austria 8.08 6.45 67.3 82.9 5.44 5.35 54.76 56.12 56.12 6,778 8,698 8,698
Azerbaijan 8.04 8.90 51.9 66.6 4.17 5.93 16.68 35.59 35.59 2,075 4,000 4,000
Bahamas 0.30 0.45 88.5 96.7 0.27 0.43 1.43 2.71 2.71 4,708 6,041 6,041
Bahrain 0.64 1.01 92.2 98.9 0.59 1.00 5.36 10.84 10.84 8,380 10,754 10,754
Bangladesh 137.44 265.43 25.0 67.2 34.36 178.48 12.55 1,061.73 125.48 91 4,000 473
Barbados 0.27 0.26 50.0 81.2 0.13 0.21 0.69 1.05 1.05 2,573 4,000 4,000
Belarus 10.19 8.30 69.4 83.0 7.07 6.89 26.78 33.22 33.22 2,629 4,000 4,000
Belgium 10.25 9.58 97.3 99.3 9.97 9.52 78.13 93.74 93.74 7,623 9,782 9,782
Belize 0.23 0.39 48.0 67.7 0.11 0.27 0.18 1.57 1.57 789 4,000 4,000
Benin 6.27 18.07 42.3 81.5 2.65 14.72 0.52 72.28 5.23 83 4,000 290
Bermuda 0.06 0.08 100.0 100.0 0.06 0.08 0.55 0.89 0.89 8,789 11,278 11,278
Bhutan 2.09 5.57 7.1 34.3 0.15 1.91 0.38 22.28 3.81 183 4,000 684
Bolivia 8.33 16.97 62.4 87.3 5.20 14.81 3.61 67.86 36.05 433 4,000 2,125
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.98 3.46 43.0 74.8 1.71 2.59 2.58 13.83 13.83 648 4,000 4,000
Botswana 1.54 2.11 49.0 76.7 0.76 1.62 1.45 8.44 8.44 941 4,000 4,000
Brazil 170.41 247.24 81.2 99.3 138.37 245.54 360.64 988.98 988.98 2,116 4,000 4,000
Brunei Darussalam 0.33 0.56 72.2 91.8 0.24 0.52 2.06 4.56 4.56 6,289 8,070 8,070
Bulgaria 7.95 4.53 67.5 78.5 5.37 3.56 34.42 25.17 25.17 4,330 5,556 5,556
Burkina Faso 11.54 46.30 16.5 51.3 1.90 23.76 0.26 185.21 2.62 23 4,000 57
Burundi 6.36 20.22 9.0 41.0 0.57 8.28 0.17 80.87 1.67 26 4,000 82
Cambodia 13.10 29.88 16.9 64.0 2.21 19.14 0.12 119.53 1.23 9 4,000 41
Cameroon 14.88 32.28 48.9 84.0 7.27 27.13 3.37 129.14 33.69 227 4,000 1,044
Canada 30.76 40.41 78.7 89.9 24.21 36.31 499.77 842.53 842.53 16,249 20,851 20,851
Cape Verde 0.43 0.81 62.2 95.1 0.27 0.77 0.04 3.23 0.38 89 4,000 472
Cayman Islands 0.04 0.09 100.0 100.0 0.04 0.09 0.33 0.99 0.99 8,636 11,082 11,082
Central African Republic 3.72 8.19 41.2 75.6 1.53 6.19 0.10 32.78 0.97 26 4,000 118
Chad 7.89 27.73 23.8 59.1 1.88 16.39 0.09 110.93 0.86 11 4,000 31
Chile 15.21 22.22 85.8 95.5 13.05 21.21 37.90 88.86 88.86 2,491 4,000 4,000
China 1,275.13 1,462.06 35.8 89.8 456.50 1,312.95 1,206.26 5,848.23 5,848.23 946 4,000 4,000
China, Hong Kong 7.12 7.76 100.0 100.0 7.12 7.76 35.40 49.52 49.52 4,975 6,384 6,384
Colombia 42.10 70.86 75.0 96.1 31.58 68.10 40.35 283.45 283.45 958 4,000 4,000
Comoros 0.71 1.90 33.2 72.6 0.23 1.38 0.02 7.60 0.18 25 4,000 93
Congo, DR 50.95 203.53 30.3 41.8 15.44 85.08 4.58 814.11 45.75 90 4,000 225
Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville) 3.02 10.74 65.4 73.4 1.97 7.88 0.43 42.97 4.29 142 4,000 400
Cook Islands 0.02 0.03 59.0 76.1 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.11 1,138 4,000 4,000
Costa Rica 4.02 7.20 59.0 85.2 2.37 6.13 5.89 28.78 28.78 1,465 4,000 4,000
IvoryCoast 16.01 32.19 43.6 73.5 6.98 23.65 3.55 128.74 35.50 222 4,000 1,103
Croatia 4.65 4.18 57.7 82.5 2.69 3.45 12.64 16.72 16.72 2,716 4,000 4,000
Cuba 11.20 10.76 75.3 87.3 8.43 9.40 13.83 43.06 43.06 1,235 4,000 4,000
Cyprus 0.78 0.91 69.9 86.6 0.55 0.79 2.91 4.34 4.34 3,714 4,766 4,766
Czech Republic 10.27 8.43 74.5 84.0 7.65 7.08 54.70 57.60 57.60 5,325 6,834 6,834
Denmark 5.32 5.08 85.1 88.7 4.53 4.51 33.93 41.57 41.57 6,377 8,183 8,183
Djibouti 0.63 1.07 84.0 93.2 0.53 1.00 0.17 4.27 1.67 265 4,000 1,567
Dominica 0.07 0.07 71.0 88.1 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.29 0.29 883 4,000 4,000
Dominican Republic 8.37 11.96 65.4 89.5 5.48 10.70 8.81 47.84 47.84 1,052 4,000 4,000
Ecuador 12.65 21.19 63.0 85.3 7.97 18.07 9.67 84.76 84.76 764 4,000 4,000
Egypt 67.88 113.84 42.7 61.9 28.99 70.44 64.72 455.36 455.36 953 4,000 4,000
El Salvador 6.28 10.86 60.3 98.8 3.79 10.73 4.07 43.42 40.70 648 4,000 3,749
Equatorial Guinea 0.46 1.38 48.2 91.2 0.22 1.26 0.02 5.51 0.20 45 4,000 148
Eritrea 3.66 10.03 18.7 56.5 0.68 5.66 0.20 40.11 1.95 53 4,000 195
Estonia 1.39 0.75 69.4 80.2 0.97 0.60 5.36 3.71 3.71 3,848 4,938 4,938
Ethiopia 62.91 186.45 15.5 50.2 9.75 93.64 1.52 745.81 15.16 24 4,000 81
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 0.00 0.00 80.8 96.1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 5,619 7,211 7,211
Fiji 0.81 0.92 49.4 86.1 0.40 0.79 0.48 3.66 3.66 589 4,000 4,000
Finland 5.17 4.69 59.0 66.2 3.05 3.11 81.96 95.44 95.44 15,848 20,336 20,336
France 59.24 61.83 75.4 87.0 44.67 53.80 408.51 547.18 547.18 6,896 8,849 8,849
French Guiana 0.16 0.50 75.1 85.4 0.12 0.43 0.42 2.01 2.01 2,539 4,000 4,000
French Polynesia 0.23 0.37 52.7 65.6 0.12 0.24 0.38 1.49 1.49 1,626 4,000 4,000
Per Capita 
Consumption 
(kWhrs/person)
Total Population 
(Millions)
Total Urban 
Population 
(%)
Total Urban 
Population 
(Millions)
Total Electricity     
Consumption      
(Billion kWhrs)
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TABLE 2-2(b): Electricity Consumption Projections (0.5% cont.) 
Gabon 1.23 3.16 81.4 100.0 1.00 3.16 0.79 12.66 7.91 643 4,000 2,498
Gambia 1.30 2.60 30.7 72.0 0.40 1.87 0.07 10.42 0.70 54 4,000 268
Georgia 5.26 3.22 56.3 78.1 2.96 2.51 7.89 12.88 12.88 1,499 4,000 4,000
Germany 82.02 70.80 87.5 94.8 71.76 67.16 501.72 555.80 555.80 6,117 7,850 7,850
Ghana 19.31 40.06 36.1 65.2 6.97 26.10 5.48 160.23 54.84 284 4,000 1,369
Gibraltar 0.03 0.02 100.0 100.0 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.09 3,392 4,352 4,352
Greece 10.61 8.98 60.1 80.6 6.38 7.24 46.10 50.09 50.09 4,345 5,575 5,575
Greenland 0.06 0.06 82.0 92.5 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.33 0.33 4,136 5,307 5,307
Grenada 0.09 0.10 37.9 75.2 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.42 0.42 1,094 4,000 4,000
Guadeloupe 0.43 0.48 99.6 100.2 0.43 0.48 1.29 1.92 1.92 3,021 4,000 4,000
Guam 0.16 0.31 39.2 71.4 0.06 0.22 0.77 1.95 1.95 4,944 6,345 6,345
Guatemala 11.39 26.55 39.7 69.2 4.52 18.36 4.80 106.20 47.97 421 4,000 1,807
Guinea 8.15 20.71 27.5 63.8 2.24 13.22 0.72 82.84 7.16 88 4,000 346
Guinea-Bissau 1.20 3.28 31.5 77.8 0.38 2.55 0.06 13.10 0.56 47 4,000 170
Guyana 0.76 0.50 36.3 70.0 0.28 0.35 0.47 2.02 2.02 618 4,000 4,000
Haiti 8.14 13.98 35.7 75.5 2.91 10.55 0.49 55.93 4.85 60 4,000 347
Honduras 6.42 12.84 52.7 90.1 3.38 11.57 3.59 51.38 35.93 560 4,000 2,797
Hungary 9.97 7.49 64.5 83.1 6.43 6.22 35.10 33.82 33.82 3,521 4,518 4,518
Iceland 0.28 0.33 92.5 97.6 0.26 0.32 7.02 10.73 10.73 25,136 32,255 32,255
India 1,008.94 1,572.05 27.7 50.8 279.48 798.09 509.89 6,288.22 5,098.86 505 4,000 3,243
Indonesia 212.09 311.33 41.0 91.1 86.96 283.48 86.09 1,245.34 860.95 406 4,000 2,765
Iran 70.33 121.42 64.0 93.4 45.01 113.37 111.91 485.70 485.70 1,591 4,000 4,000
Iraq 22.95 53.57 67.5 77.0 15.49 41.26 25.39 214.30 214.30 1,106 4,000 4,000
Ireland 3.80 5.37 59.0 79.3 2.24 4.26 20.82 37.70 37.70 5,475 7,026 7,026
Israel 6.04 10.06 91.6 97.1 5.53 9.77 34.90 74.61 74.61 5,777 7,413 7,413
Italy 57.53 42.96 66.9 82.7 38.49 35.55 283.74 271.90 271.90 4,932 6,329 6,329
Jamaica 2.58 3.82 56.1 82.9 1.45 3.16 6.27 15.26 15.26 2,433 4,000 4,000
Japan 127.10 109.22 78.8 88.9 100.15 97.10 943.71 1,040.67 1,040.67 7,425 9,528 9,528
Jordan 4.91 11.71 78.7 88.2 3.87 10.32 7.09 46.84 46.84 1,443 4,000 4,000
Kazakhstan 16.17 15.30 55.8 70.7 9.02 10.81 48.34 61.21 61.21 2,989 4,000 4,000
Kenya 30.67 55.37 33.4 87.0 10.24 48.16 4.43 221.47 44.33 145 4,000 801
Kiribati 0.08 0.14 38.2 69.7 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.55 0.07 79 4,000 471
Korea, North (DROK) 22.27 28.04 60.2 67.8 13.41 19.02 31.06 112.15 112.15 1,395 4,000 4,000
Korea, South (ROK) 46.74 51.56 81.9 87.5 38.28 45.13 254.08 359.89 359.89 5,436 6,980 6,980
Kuwait 1.91 4.00 96.0 98.6 1.84 3.95 29.02 77.82 77.82 15,157 19,449 19,449
Kyrgyzstan 4.92 7.54 34.4 50.3 1.69 3.79 9.82 30.15 30.15 1,995 4,000 4,000
Lao People's Dem. Republic 5.28 11.44 19.3 58.1 1.02 6.65 0.69 45.75 6.91 131 4,000 604
Latvia 2.42 1.74 60.4 66.3 1.46 1.16 5.16 6.98 6.98 2,132 4,000 4,000
Lebanon 3.50 5.02 89.7 97.5 3.14 4.89 8.64 20.07 20.07 2,472 4,000 4,000
Lesotho 2.03 2.48 28.0 73.9 0.57 1.83 0.10 9.91 1.00 49 4,000 404
Liberia 2.91 14.37 44.9 79.1 1.31 11.37 0.42 57.48 4.19 144 4,000 291
Libya 5.29 9.97 87.6 95.6 4.63 9.53 18.04 43.63 43.63 3,411 4,377 4,377
Lithuania 3.70 2.99 68.5 81.9 2.53 2.45 6.90 11.95 11.95 1,866 4,000 4,000
Luxembourg 0.44 0.71 91.5 100.0 0.40 0.72 6.16 12.93 12.93 14,097 18,090 18,090
Madagascar 15.97 47.03 29.5 71.7 4.71 33.73 0.76 188.12 7.63 48 4,000 162
Malawi 11.31 31.11 14.7 49.6 1.66 15.43 0.77 124.45 7.67 68 4,000 247
Malaysia 22.22 37.85 57.4 87.1 12.75 32.96 58.59 151.40 151.40 2,637 4,000 4,000
Maldives 0.29 0.87 27.6 62.7 0.08 0.54 0.10 3.47 1.02 352 4,000 1,179
Mali 11.35 41.72 30.2 74.4 3.43 31.04 0.43 166.90 4.30 38 4,000 103
Malta 0.39 0.40 90.9 98.5 0.35 0.39 1.63 2.14 2.14 4,174 5,356 5,356
Martinique 0.38 0.41 94.9 100.0 0.36 0.41 1.05 1.65 1.65 2,729 4,000 4,000
Mauritania 2.66 8.45 57.7 100.0 1.54 8.45 0.14 33.81 1.43 54 4,000 169
Mauritius 1.16 1.43 41.3 72.4 0.48 1.03 1.20 5.70 5.70 1,029 4,000 4,000
Mexico 98.87 146.65 74.4 87.3 73.56 128.05 182.83 586.61 586.61 1,849 4,000 4,000
Moldova 4.30 3.58 41.6 62.3 1.79 2.23 3.65 14.31 14.31 851 4,000 4,000
Mongolia 2.53 4.15 56.6 72.6 1.43 3.01 2.73 16.58 16.58 1,078 4,000 4,000
Montserrat 0.00 0.01 13.0 37.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 1,240 4,000 4,000
Morocco 29.88 50.36 55.5 85.5 16.58 43.08 14.35 201.44 143.46 480 4,000 2,849
Mozambique 18.29 38.84 32.1 94.6 5.87 36.73 0.93 155.35 9.26 51 4,000 238
Myanmar 47.75 68.55 27.7 39.2 13.23 26.85 4.50 274.18 45.00 94 4,000 656
Namibia 1.76 3.66 30.9 68.5 0.54 2.51 0.89 14.65 8.91 507 4,000 2,433
Nauru 0.01 0.03 100.0 100.0 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.10 2,283 4,000 4,000
Nepal 23.04 52.41 11.8 45.6 2.72 23.91 1.43 209.66 14.31 62 4,000 273
Netherlands 15.86 15.85 89.5 94.8 14.20 15.02 100.71 129.09 129.09 6,349 8,147 8,147
Netherlands Antilles 0.22 0.26 69.2 84.3 0.15 0.22 1.09 1.69 1.69 5,076 6,514 6,514
New Caledonia 0.22 0.40 78.9 100.0 0.17 0.40 1.46 3.44 3.44 6,760 8,675 8,675
New Zealand 3.78 4.44 85.8 91.9 3.24 4.08 33.32 50.23 50.23 8,818 11,316 11,316
Nicaragua 5.07 11.48 56.1 81.0 2.85 9.29 2.18 45.91 21.76 429 4,000 1,896
Niger 10.83 51.87 20.6 61.5 2.23 31.91 0.40 207.49 4.05 37 4,000 78
Nigeria 113.86 278.79 44.1 84.4 50.21 235.23 14.77 1,115.15 147.68 130 4,000 530
Niue 0.00 0.00 32.8 62.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 1,394 4,000 4,000
Norway 4.47 4.88 74.7 88.9 3.34 4.34 112.50 157.63 157.63 25,172 32,302 32,302
Oman 2.54 8.75 76.0 95.1 1.93 8.32 7.53 35.01 35.01 2,968 4,000 4,000  
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TABLE 2-2(c): Electricity Consumption Projections (0.5% cont.) 
Pakistan 141.26 344.17 33.1 63.1 46.76 217.16 58.30 1,376.68 582.99 413 4,000 1,694
Panama 2.86 4.26 56.3 78.1 1.61 3.33 4.65 17.05 17.05 1,629 4,000 4,000
Papua New Guinea 4.81 10.98 17.4 43.1 0.84 4.74 1.53 43.92 15.35 319 4,000 1,397
Paraguay 5.50 12.56 56.0 86.3 3.08 10.84 1.95 50.26 19.50 355 4,000 1,552
Peru 25.66 42.12 72.8 89.5 18.68 37.68 18.30 168.49 168.49 713 4,000 4,000
Philippines 75.65 128.38 58.6 91.7 44.33 117.71 37.82 513.53 378.20 500 4,000 2,946
Poland 38.61 33.37 62.3 80.0 24.05 26.70 119.33 133.48 133.48 3,091 4,000 4,000
Portugal 10.02 9.01 64.4 100.0 6.45 9.04 41.15 47.48 47.48 4,108 5,272 5,272
Puerto Rico 3.91 4.83 75.2 90.5 2.94 4.38 19.06 30.21 30.21 4,869 6,249 6,249
Qatar 0.57 0.83 92.7 98.8 0.52 0.82 8.56 16.13 16.13 15,132 19,417 19,417
Reunion 0.72 1.00 71.4 94.4 0.51 0.95 1.01 4.01 4.01 1,406 4,000 4,000
Romania 22.44 18.15 55.1 74.3 12.36 13.49 45.68 72.60 72.60 2,036 4,000 4,000
Russia 145.49 104.26 72.9 80.1 106.06 83.48 767.08 705.37 705.37 5,272 6,766 6,766
Rwanda 7.61 18.52 8.2 18.2 0.62 3.36 0.17 74.09 1.74 23 4,000 94
Saint Helena 0.01 0.01 70.6 97.3 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 739 4,000 4,000
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.04 0.03 34.1 61.8 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.14 2,296 4,000 4,000
Saint Lucia 0.15 0.19 37.8 66.4 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.75 0.75 724 4,000 4,000
Saint Pierre and Miquelon 0.01 0.01 92.1 96.6 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 5,564 7,140 7,140
Saint Vincent and Grenadines 0.11 0.14 54.8 94.9 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.55 0.55 714 4,000 4,000
Samoa 0.16 0.22 22.1 100.0 0.04 0.71 0.10 0.89 0.89 604 4,000 4,000
Sao Tome and Principe 0.14 0.29 47.0 81.5 0.06 0.24 0.02 1.18 0.16 115 4,000 538
Saudi Arabia 20.35 59.68 86.2 98.4 17.54 58.73 114.86 432.33 432.33 5,645 7,244 7,244
Senegal 9.42 22.71 47.4 83.2 4.47 18.90 1.23 90.85 12.28 130 4,000 541
Seychelles 0.08 0.15 63.8 90.3 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.58 0.58 1,850 4,000 4,000
Sierra Leone 4.40 14.35 36.6 76.7 1.61 11.01 0.23 57.41 2.28 52 4,000 159
Singapore 4.02 4.62 100.0 100.0 4.02 4.62 25.95 38.28 38.28 6,458 8,286 8,286
Slovakia 5.40 4.67 57.4 78.0 3.10 3.64 25.20 28.00 28.00 4,668 5,991 5,991
Slovenia 1.99 1.53 49.2 65.6 0.98 1.00 10.62 10.47 10.47 5,342 6,855 6,855
Solomon Islands 0.45 1.46 19.7 62.2 0.09 0.91 0.03 5.83 0.30 67 4,000 204
Somalia 8.78 40.94 27.5 65.7 2.41 26.89 0.23 163.74 2.33 26 4,000 57
South Africa 43.31 47.30 56.9 90.3 24.64 42.74 181.52 254.40 254.40 4,191 5,378 5,378
Spain 39.91 31.28 77.6 89.8 30.97 28.11 201.16 202.32 202.32 5,040 6,468 6,468
Sri Lanka 18.92 23.07 22.8 58.1 4.31 13.40 6.16 92.27 61.56 325 4,000 2,669
Sudan 31.10 63.53 36.1 83.2 11.23 52.85 1.83 254.12 18.32 59 4,000 288
Suriname 0.42 0.42 74.1 94.5 0.31 0.40 1.31 1.68 1.68 3,137 4,025 4,025
Swaziland 0.92 1.39 26.4 57.6 0.24 0.80 0.90 5.57 5.57 974 4,000 4,000
Sweden 8.84 7.78 83.3 88.2 7.37 6.86 139.18 157.07 157.07 15,740 20,198 20,198
Switzerland 7.17 5.61 67.4 79.1 4.83 4.43 52.62 52.80 52.80 7,338 9,417 9,417
Syria 16.19 36.35 51.4 77.7 8.32 28.24 17.67 145.38 145.38 1,092 4,000 4,000
Taiwan 22.19 22.55 75.6 89.7 16.78 20.23 139.00 181.00 181.00 6,277 8,054 8,054
Tajikistan 6.09 9.76 27.6 47.2 1.68 4.61 12.54 39.05 39.05 2,060 4,000 4,000
Tanzania 35.12 82.74 32.3 85.3 11.34 70.60 2.62 330.96 26.16 75 4,000 316
Thailand 62.81 82.49 19.8 44.9 12.44 37.00 90.26 329.96 329.96 1,437 4,000 4,000
Togo 4.53 11.83 33.4 72.2 1.51 8.54 0.53 47.33 5.25 116 4,000 444
Tonga 0.10 0.13 32.7 100.0 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.50 0.28 282 4,000 2,230
Trinidad and Tobago 1.29 1.38 74.1 90.5 0.96 1.25 4.79 6.55 6.55 3,702 4,751 4,751
Tunisia 9.46 14.08 65.5 90.3 6.20 12.71 9.56 56.30 56.30 1,011 4,000 4,000
Turkey 66.67 98.82 65.8 86.4 43.87 85.38 114.19 395.27 395.27 1,713 4,000 4,000
Turkmenistan 4.74 8.40 44.8 69.8 2.12 5.86 7.71 33.60 33.60 1,627 4,000 4,000
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.02 0.04 45.2 76.5 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.05 278 4,000 1,205
Uganda 23.30 101.52 14.2 49.1 3.31 49.83 1.31 406.09 13.14 56 4,000 129
Ukraine 49.57 29.96 67.9 80.4 33.66 24.10 151.72 119.84 119.84 3,061 4,000 4,000
United Arab Emirates 2.61 3.71 86.7 99.3 2.26 3.68 35.99 65.74 65.74 13,811 17,723 17,723
United Kingdom 59.41 58.93 89.5 94.4 53.18 55.61 345.03 439.16 439.16 5,807 7,452 7,452
USA 283.23 397.06 77.2 90.1 218.65 357.75 3,621.00 6,514.05 6,514.05 12,785 16,406 16,406
Uruguay 3.34 4.25 91.9 98.4 3.07 4.18 7.35 16.99 16.99 2,203 4,000 4,000
Uzbekistan 24.88 40.51 36.7 52.8 9.13 21.37 41.89 162.05 162.05 1,684 4,000 4,000
Vanuatu 0.20 0.46 21.7 55.8 0.04 0.26 0.04 1.85 1.85 184 4,000 4,000
Venezuela 24.17 42.15 88.9 93.8 21.49 39.52 75.10 168.61 168.61 3,107 4,000 4,000
Vietnam 78.14 123.78 24.1 59.9 18.83 74.17 23.97 495.13 239.71 307 4,000 1,937
Western Sahara 0.25 0.60 95.4 100.0 0.24 0.60 0.08 2.39 0.84 332 4,000 1,398
Yemen 18.35 102.38 24.7 57.5 4.53 58.91 2.98 409.51 29.76 162 4,000 291
Yugoslavia 10.55 9.03 51.6 70.9 5.45 6.41 31.55 36.12 36.12 2,989 4,000 4,000
Zambia 10.42 29.26 39.6 67.2 4.13 19.67 5.84 117.05 58.38 560 4,000 1,995
Zimbabwe 12.63 23.55 35.3 77.2 4.46 18.18 10.48 94.18 94.18 830 4,000 4,000
Totals 6,072 9,326 47.4 74.3 2,877 6,928 13,710 46,404 34,983 2,258 4,976 3,751
*Table uses 0.5% per year increase in per capita electricity consumption  
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TABLE 2-3(a): Electricity Consumption Projections (1% growth rate base) 
Country
After 
cutoff
After 
Cutoff
2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 2050 2000 2050 2050
Afghanistan 21.76 72.27 21.9 61.2 4.77 44.20 0.45 289.07 4.54 21 4,000 63
Albania 3.13 3.90 66.3 50.4 2.08 1.97 5.38 15.62 15.62 1,716 4,000 4,000
Algeria 30.29 51.18 57.1 85.1 17.30 43.54 21.85 204.72 204.72 721 4,000 4,000
American Samoa 0.07 0.17 52.7 81.7 0.04 0.14 0.12 0.69 0.69 1,787 4,000 4,000
Angola 13.13 53.33 34.2 74.6 4.49 39.77 1.11 213.31 11.07 84 4,000 208
Antigua and Barbuda 0.06 0.07 36.8 67.1 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.29 0.29 1,434 4,000 4,000
Argentina 37.03 54.52 88.2 94.7 32.66 51.64 80.81 218.09 218.09 2,182 4,000 4,000
Armenia 3.79 3.15 67.2 80.0 2.54 2.52 4.89 12.60 12.60 1,291 4,000 4,000
Aruba 0.10 0.24 50.8 74.5 0.05 0.18 0.42 1.65 1.65 4,161 6,844 6,844
Australia 19.14 26.50 90.7 100.0 17.36 26.50 188.49 429.29 429.29 9,849 16,198 16,198
Austria 8.08 6.45 67.3 82.9 5.44 5.35 54.76 71.92 71.92 6,778 11,147 11,147
Azerbaijan 8.04 8.90 51.9 66.6 4.17 5.93 16.68 35.59 35.59 2,075 4,000 4,000
Bahamas 0.30 0.45 88.5 96.7 0.27 0.43 1.43 3.47 3.47 4,708 7,742 7,742
Bahrain 0.64 1.01 92.2 98.9 0.59 1.00 5.36 13.89 13.89 8,380 13,783 13,783
Bangladesh 137.44 265.43 25.0 67.2 34.36 178.48 12.55 1,061.73 125.48 91 4,000 473
Barbados 0.27 0.26 50.0 81.2 0.13 0.21 0.69 1.05 1.05 2,573 4,000 4,000
Belarus 10.19 8.30 69.4 83.0 7.07 6.89 26.78 33.22 33.22 2,629 4,000 4,000
Belgium 10.25 9.58 97.3 99.3 9.97 9.52 78.13 120.14 120.14 7,623 12,537 12,537
Belize 0.23 0.39 48.0 67.7 0.11 0.27 0.18 1.57 1.57 789 4,000 4,000
Benin 6.27 18.07 42.3 81.5 2.65 14.72 0.52 72.28 5.23 83 4,000 290
Bermuda 0.06 0.08 100.0 100.0 0.06 0.08 0.55 1.15 1.15 8,789 14,455 14,455
Bhutan 2.09 5.57 7.1 34.3 0.15 1.91 0.38 22.28 3.81 183 4,000 684
Bolivia 8.33 16.97 62.4 87.3 5.20 14.81 3.61 67.86 36.05 433 4,000 2,125
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.98 3.46 43.0 74.8 1.71 2.59 2.58 13.83 13.83 648 4,000 4,000
Botswana 1.54 2.11 49.0 76.7 0.76 1.62 1.45 8.44 8.44 941 4,000 4,000
Brazil 170.41 247.24 81.2 99.3 138.37 245.54 360.64 988.98 988.98 2,116 4,000 4,000
Brunei Darussalam 0.33 0.56 72.2 91.8 0.24 0.52 2.06 5.84 5.84 6,289 10,343 10,343
Bulgaria 7.95 4.53 67.5 78.5 5.37 3.56 34.42 32.26 32.26 4,330 7,121 7,121
Burkina Faso 11.54 46.30 16.5 51.3 1.90 23.76 0.26 185.21 2.62 23 4,000 57
Burundi 6.36 20.22 9.0 41.0 0.57 8.28 0.17 80.87 1.67 26 4,000 82
Cambodia 13.10 29.88 16.9 64.0 2.21 19.14 0.12 119.53 1.23 9 4,000 41
Cameroon 14.88 32.28 48.9 84.0 7.27 27.13 3.37 129.14 33.69 227 4,000 1,044
Canada 30.76 40.41 78.7 89.9 24.21 36.31 499.77 1,079.82 1,079.82 16,249 26,724 26,724
Cape Verde 0.43 0.81 62.2 95.1 0.27 0.77 0.04 3.23 0.38 89 4,000 472
Cayman Islands 0.04 0.09 100.0 100.0 0.04 0.09 0.33 1.27 1.27 8,636 14,202 14,202
Central African Republic 3.72 8.19 41.2 75.6 1.53 6.19 0.10 32.78 0.97 26 4,000 118
Chad 7.89 27.73 23.8 59.1 1.88 16.39 0.09 110.93 0.86 11 4,000 31
Chile 15.21 22.22 85.8 95.5 13.05 21.21 37.90 88.86 88.86 2,491 4,000 4,000
China 1,275.13 1,462.06 35.8 89.8 456.50 1,312.95 1,206.26 5,848.23 5,848.23 946 4,000 4,000
China, Hong Kong 7.12 7.76 100.0 100.0 7.12 7.76 35.40 63.46 63.46 4,975 8,182 8,182
Colombia 42.10 70.86 75.0 96.1 31.58 68.10 40.35 283.45 283.45 958 4,000 4,000
Comoros 0.71 1.90 33.2 72.6 0.23 1.38 0.02 7.60 0.18 25 4,000 93
Congo, DR 50.95 203.53 30.3 41.8 15.44 85.08 4.58 814.11 45.75 90 4,000 225
Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville) 3.02 10.74 65.4 73.4 1.97 7.88 0.43 42.97 4.29 142 4,000 400
Cook Islands 0.02 0.03 59.0 76.1 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.11 1,138 4,000 4,000
Costa Rica 4.02 7.20 59.0 85.2 2.37 6.13 5.89 28.78 28.78 1,465 4,000 4,000
IvoryCoast 16.01 32.19 43.6 73.5 6.98 23.65 3.55 128.74 35.50 222 4,000 1,103
Croatia 4.65 4.18 57.7 82.5 2.69 3.45 12.64 16.72 16.72 2,716 4,000 4,000
Cuba 11.20 10.76 75.3 87.3 8.43 9.40 13.83 43.06 43.06 1,235 4,000 4,000
Cyprus 0.78 0.91 69.9 86.6 0.55 0.79 2.91 5.56 5.56 3,714 6,108 6,108
Czech Republic 10.27 8.43 74.5 84.0 7.65 7.08 54.70 73.83 73.83 5,325 8,758 8,758
Denmark 5.32 5.08 85.1 88.7 4.53 4.51 33.93 53.28 53.28 6,377 10,488 10,488
Djibouti 0.63 1.07 84.0 93.2 0.53 1.00 0.17 4.27 1.67 265 4,000 1,567
Dominica 0.07 0.07 71.0 88.1 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.29 0.29 883 4,000 4,000
Dominican Republic 8.37 11.96 65.4 89.5 5.48 10.70 8.81 47.84 47.84 1,052 4,000 4,000
Ecuador 12.65 21.19 63.0 85.3 7.97 18.07 9.67 84.76 84.76 764 4,000 4,000
Egypt 67.88 113.84 42.7 61.9 28.99 70.44 64.72 455.36 455.36 953 4,000 4,000
El Salvador 6.28 10.86 60.3 98.8 3.79 10.73 4.07 43.42 40.70 648 4,000 3,749
Equatorial Guinea 0.46 1.38 48.2 91.2 0.22 1.26 0.02 5.51 0.20 45 4,000 148
Eritrea 3.66 10.03 18.7 56.5 0.68 5.66 0.20 40.11 1.95 53 4,000 195
Estonia 1.39 0.75 69.4 80.2 0.97 0.60 5.36 4.76 4.76 3,848 6,329 6,329
Ethiopia 62.91 186.45 15.5 50.2 9.75 93.64 1.52 745.81 15.16 24 4,000 81
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 0.00 0.00 80.8 96.1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 5,619 9,242 9,242
Fiji 0.81 0.92 49.4 86.1 0.40 0.79 0.48 3.66 3.66 589 4,000 4,000
Finland 5.17 4.69 59.0 66.2 3.05 3.11 81.96 122.31 122.31 15,848 26,064 26,064
France 59.24 61.83 75.4 87.0 44.67 53.80 408.51 701.28 701.28 6,896 11,342 11,342
French Guiana 0.16 0.50 75.1 85.4 0.12 0.43 0.42 2.01 2.01 2,539 4,000 4,000
French Polynesia 0.23 0.37 52.7 65.6 0.12 0.24 0.38 1.49 1.49 1,626 4,000 4,000
Per Capita 
Consumption 
(kWhrs/person)
Total Population 
(Millions)
Total Urban 
Population 
(%)
Total Urban 
Population 
(Millions)
Total Electricity   
Consumption     
(Billion kWhrs)
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TABLE 2-3(b): Electricity Consumption Projections (1.0% cont.) 
Gabon 1.23 3.16 81.4 100.0 1.00 3.16 0.79 12.66 7.91 643 4,000 2,498
Gambia 1.30 2.60 30.7 72.0 0.40 1.87 0.07 10.42 0.70 54 4,000 268
Georgia 5.26 3.22 56.3 78.1 2.96 2.51 7.89 12.88 12.88 1,499 4,000 4,000
Germany 82.02 70.80 87.5 94.8 71.76 67.16 501.72 712.34 712.34 6,117 10,061 10,061
Ghana 19.31 40.06 36.1 65.2 6.97 26.10 5.48 160.23 54.84 284 4,000 1,369
Gibraltar 0.03 0.02 100.0 100.0 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.12 3,392 5,578 5,578
Greece 10.61 8.98 60.1 80.6 6.38 7.24 46.10 64.19 64.19 4,345 7,146 7,146
Greenland 0.06 0.06 82.0 92.5 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.42 0.42 4,136 6,801 6,801
Grenada 0.09 0.10 37.9 75.2 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.42 0.42 1,094 4,000 4,000
Guadeloupe 0.43 0.48 99.6 100.2 0.43 0.48 1.29 1.92 1.92 3,021 4,000 4,000
Guam 0.16 0.31 39.2 71.4 0.06 0.22 0.77 2.50 2.50 4,944 8,132 8,132
Guatemala 11.39 26.55 39.7 69.2 4.52 18.36 4.80 106.20 47.97 421 4,000 1,807
Guinea 8.15 20.71 27.5 63.8 2.24 13.22 0.72 82.84 7.16 88 4,000 346
Guinea-Bissau 1.20 3.28 31.5 77.8 0.38 2.55 0.06 13.10 0.56 47 4,000 170
Guyana 0.76 0.50 36.3 70.0 0.28 0.35 0.47 2.02 2.02 618 4,000 4,000
Haiti 8.14 13.98 35.7 75.5 2.91 10.55 0.49 55.93 4.85 60 4,000 347
Honduras 6.42 12.84 52.7 90.1 3.38 11.57 3.59 51.38 35.93 560 4,000 2,797
Hungary 9.97 7.49 64.5 83.1 6.43 6.22 35.10 43.35 43.35 3,521 5,791 5,791
Iceland 0.28 0.33 92.5 97.6 0.26 0.32 7.02 13.75 13.75 25,136 41,339 41,339
India 1,008.94 1,572.05 27.7 50.8 279.48 798.09 509.89 6,288.22 5,098.86 505 4,000 3,243
Indonesia 212.09 311.33 41.0 91.1 86.96 283.48 86.09 1,245.34 860.95 406 4,000 2,765
Iran 70.33 121.42 64.0 93.4 45.01 113.37 111.91 485.70 485.70 1,591 4,000 4,000
Iraq 22.95 53.57 67.5 77.0 15.49 41.26 25.39 214.30 214.30 1,106 4,000 4,000
Ireland 3.80 5.37 59.0 79.3 2.24 4.26 20.82 48.32 48.32 5,475 9,005 9,005
Israel 6.04 10.06 91.6 97.1 5.53 9.77 34.90 95.63 95.63 5,777 9,501 9,501
Italy 57.53 42.96 66.9 82.7 38.49 35.55 283.74 348.48 348.48 4,932 8,111 8,111
Jamaica 2.58 3.82 56.1 82.9 1.45 3.16 6.27 15.26 15.26 2,433 4,000 4,000
Japan 127.10 109.22 78.8 88.9 100.15 97.10 943.71 1,333.76 1,333.76 7,425 12,212 12,212
Jordan 4.91 11.71 78.7 88.2 3.87 10.32 7.09 46.84 46.84 1,443 4,000 4,000
Kazakhstan 16.17 15.30 55.8 70.7 9.02 10.81 48.34 61.21 61.21 2,989 4,000 4,000
Kenya 30.67 55.37 33.4 87.0 10.24 48.16 4.43 221.47 44.33 145 4,000 801
Kiribati 0.08 0.14 38.2 69.7 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.55 0.07 79 4,000 471
Korea, North (DROK) 22.27 28.04 60.2 67.8 13.41 19.02 31.06 112.15 112.15 1,395 4,000 4,000
Korea, South (ROK) 46.74 51.56 81.9 87.5 38.28 45.13 254.08 460.96 460.96 5,436 8,940 6,980
Kuwait 1.91 4.00 96.0 98.6 1.84 3.95 29.02 99.74 99.74 15,157 24,927 24,927
Kyrgyzstan 4.92 7.54 34.4 50.3 1.69 3.79 9.82 30.15 30.15 1,995 4,000 4,000
Lao People's Dem. Republic 5.28 11.44 19.3 58.1 1.02 6.65 0.69 45.75 6.91 131 4,000 604
Latvia 2.42 1.74 60.4 66.3 1.46 1.16 5.16 6.98 6.98 2,132 4,000 4,000
Lebanon 3.50 5.02 89.7 97.5 3.14 4.89 8.64 20.07 20.07 2,472 4,000 4,000
Lesotho 2.03 2.48 28.0 73.9 0.57 1.83 0.10 9.91 1.00 49 4,000 404
Liberia 2.91 14.37 44.9 79.1 1.31 11.37 0.42 57.48 4.19 144 4,000 291
Libya 5.29 9.97 87.6 95.6 4.63 9.53 18.04 55.92 55.92 3,411 5,609 5,609
Lithuania 3.70 2.99 68.5 81.9 2.53 2.45 6.90 11.95 11.95 1,866 4,000 4,000
Luxembourg 0.44 0.71 91.5 100.0 0.40 0.72 6.16 16.57 16.57 14,097 23,185 23,185
Madagascar 15.97 47.03 29.5 71.7 4.71 33.73 0.76 188.12 7.63 48 4,000 162
Malawi 11.31 31.11 14.7 49.6 1.66 15.43 0.77 124.45 7.67 68 4,000 247
Malaysia 22.22 37.85 57.4 87.1 12.75 32.96 58.59 151.40 151.40 2,637 4,000 4,000
Maldives 0.29 0.87 27.6 62.7 0.08 0.54 0.10 3.47 1.02 352 4,000 1,179
Mali 11.35 41.72 30.2 74.4 3.43 31.04 0.43 166.90 4.30 38 4,000 103
Malta 0.39 0.40 90.9 98.5 0.35 0.39 1.63 2.74 2.74 4,174 6,864 6,864
Martinique 0.38 0.41 94.9 100.0 0.36 0.41 1.05 1.65 1.65 2,729 4,000 4,000
Mauritania 2.66 8.45 57.7 100.0 1.54 8.45 0.14 33.81 1.43 54 4,000 169
Mauritius 1.16 1.43 41.3 72.4 0.48 1.03 1.20 5.70 5.70 1,029 4,000 4,000
Mexico 98.87 146.65 74.4 87.3 73.56 128.05 182.83 586.61 586.61 1,849 4,000 4,000
Moldova 4.30 3.58 41.6 62.3 1.79 2.23 3.65 14.31 14.31 851 4,000 4,000
Mongolia 2.53 4.15 56.6 72.6 1.43 3.01 2.73 16.58 16.58 1,078 4,000 4,000
Montserrat 0.00 0.01 13.0 37.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 1,240 4,000 4,000
Morocco 29.88 50.36 55.5 85.5 16.58 43.08 14.35 201.44 143.46 480 4,000 2,849
Mozambique 18.29 38.84 32.1 94.6 5.87 36.73 0.93 155.35 9.26 51 4,000 238
Myanmar 47.75 68.55 27.7 39.2 13.23 26.85 4.50 274.18 45.00 94 4,000 656
Namibia 1.76 3.66 30.9 68.5 0.54 2.51 0.89 14.65 8.91 507 4,000 2,433
Nauru 0.01 0.03 100.0 100.0 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.10 2,283 4,000 4,000
Nepal 23.04 52.41 11.8 45.6 2.72 23.91 1.43 209.66 14.31 62 4,000 273
Netherlands 15.86 15.85 89.5 94.8 14.20 15.02 100.71 165.44 165.44 6,349 10,441 10,441
Netherlands Antilles 0.22 0.26 69.2 84.3 0.15 0.22 1.09 2.16 2.16 5,076 8,348 8,348
New Caledonia 0.22 0.40 78.9 100.0 0.17 0.40 1.46 4.41 4.41 6,760 11,118 11,118
New Zealand 3.78 4.44 85.8 91.9 3.24 4.08 33.32 64.38 64.38 8,818 14,503 14,503
Nicaragua 5.07 11.48 56.1 81.0 2.85 9.29 2.18 45.91 21.76 429 4,000 1,896
Niger 10.83 51.87 20.6 61.5 2.23 31.91 0.40 207.49 4.05 37 4,000 78
Nigeria 113.86 278.79 44.1 84.4 50.21 235.23 14.77 1,115.15 147.68 130 4,000 530
Niue 0.00 0.00 32.8 62.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 1,394 4,000 4,000
Norway 4.47 4.88 74.7 88.9 3.34 4.34 112.50 202.03 202.03 25,172 41,399 41,399
Oman 2.54 8.75 76.0 95.1 1.93 8.32 7.53 35.01 35.01 2,968 4,000 4,000  
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TABLE 2-3(c): Electricity Consumption Projections (1.0% cont.) 
Pakistan 141.26 344.17 33.1 63.1 46.76 217.16 58.30 1,376.68 582.99 413 4,000 1,694
Panama 2.86 4.26 56.3 78.1 1.61 3.33 4.65 17.05 17.05 1,629 4,000 4,000
Papua New Guinea 4.81 10.98 17.4 43.1 0.84 4.74 1.53 43.92 15.35 319 4,000 1,397
Paraguay 5.50 12.56 56.0 86.3 3.08 10.84 1.95 50.26 19.50 355 4,000 1,552
Peru 25.66 42.12 72.8 89.5 18.68 37.68 18.30 168.49 168.49 713 4,000 4,000
Philippines 75.65 128.38 58.6 91.7 44.33 117.71 37.82 513.53 378.20 500 4,000 2,946
Poland 38.61 33.37 62.3 80.0 24.05 26.70 119.33 133.48 133.48 3,091 4,000 4,000
Portugal 10.02 9.01 64.4 100.0 6.45 9.04 41.15 60.85 60.85 4,108 6,756 6,756
Puerto Rico 3.91 4.83 75.2 90.5 2.94 4.38 19.06 38.72 38.72 4,869 8,008 8,008
Qatar 0.57 0.83 92.7 98.8 0.52 0.82 8.56 20.67 20.67 15,132 24,886 24,886
Reunion 0.72 1.00 71.4 94.4 0.51 0.95 1.01 4.01 4.01 1,406 4,000 4,000
Romania 22.44 18.15 55.1 74.3 12.36 13.49 45.68 72.60 72.60 2,036 4,000 4,000
Russia 145.49 104.26 72.9 80.1 106.06 83.48 767.08 904.03 904.03 5,272 8,671 8,671
Rwanda 7.61 18.52 8.2 18.2 0.62 3.36 0.17 74.09 1.74 23 4,000 94
Saint Helena 0.01 0.01 70.6 97.3 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 739 4,000 4,000
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.04 0.03 34.1 61.8 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.14 2,296 4,000 4,000
Saint Lucia 0.15 0.19 37.8 66.4 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.75 0.75 724 4,000 4,000
Saint Pierre and Miquelon 0.01 0.01 92.1 96.6 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.08 5,564 9,151 9,151
Saint Vincent and Grenadine 0.11 0.14 54.8 94.9 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.55 0.55 714 4,000 4,000
Samoa 0.16 0.22 22.1 100.0 0.04 0.71 0.10 0.89 0.89 604 4,000 4,000
Sao Tome and Principe 0.14 0.29 47.0 81.5 0.06 0.24 0.02 1.18 0.16 115 4,000 538
Saudi Arabia 20.35 59.68 86.2 98.4 17.54 58.73 114.86 554.10 554.10 5,645 9,284 9,284
Senegal 9.42 22.71 47.4 83.2 4.47 18.90 1.23 90.85 12.28 130 4,000 541
Seychelles 0.08 0.15 63.8 90.3 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.58 0.58 1,850 4,000 4,000
Sierra Leone 4.40 14.35 36.6 76.7 1.61 11.01 0.23 57.41 2.28 52 4,000 159
Singapore 4.02 4.62 100.0 100.0 4.02 4.62 25.95 49.06 49.06 6,458 10,620 10,620
Slovakia 5.40 4.67 57.4 78.0 3.10 3.64 25.20 35.89 35.89 4,668 7,678 7,678
Slovenia 1.99 1.53 49.2 65.6 0.98 1.00 10.62 13.42 13.42 5,342 8,786 8,786
Solomon Islands 0.45 1.46 19.7 62.2 0.09 0.91 0.03 5.83 0.30 67 4,000 204
Somalia 8.78 40.94 27.5 65.7 2.41 26.89 0.23 163.74 2.33 26 4,000 57
South Africa 43.31 47.30 56.9 90.3 24.64 42.74 181.52 326.05 326.05 4,191 6,893 6,893
Spain 39.91 31.28 77.6 89.8 30.97 28.11 201.16 259.31 259.31 5,040 8,289 8,289
Sri Lanka 18.92 23.07 22.8 58.1 4.31 13.40 6.16 92.27 61.56 325 4,000 2,669
Sudan 31.10 63.53 36.1 83.2 11.23 52.85 1.83 254.12 18.32 59 4,000 288
Suriname 0.42 0.42 74.1 94.5 0.31 0.40 1.31 2.16 2.16 3,137 5,159 5,159
Swaziland 0.92 1.39 26.4 57.6 0.24 0.80 0.90 5.57 5.57 974 4,000 4,000
Sweden 8.84 7.78 83.3 88.2 7.37 6.86 139.18 201.31 201.31 15,740 25,887 25,887
Switzerland 7.17 5.61 67.4 79.1 4.83 4.43 52.62 67.67 67.67 7,338 12,069 12,069
Syria 16.19 36.35 51.4 77.7 8.32 28.24 17.67 145.38 145.38 1,092 4,000 4,000
Taiwan 22.19 22.55 75.6 89.7 16.78 20.23 139.00 232.77 232.77 6,277 10,323 8,054
Tajikistan 6.09 9.76 27.6 47.2 1.68 4.61 12.54 39.05 39.05 2,060 4,000 4,000
Tanzania 35.12 82.74 32.3 85.3 11.34 70.60 2.62 330.96 26.16 75 4,000 316
Thailand 62.81 82.49 19.8 44.9 12.44 37.00 90.26 329.96 329.96 1,437 4,000 4,000
Togo 4.53 11.83 33.4 72.2 1.51 8.54 0.53 47.33 5.25 116 4,000 444
Tonga 0.10 0.13 32.7 100.0 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.50 0.28 282 4,000 2,230
Trinidad and Tobago 1.29 1.38 74.1 90.5 0.96 1.25 4.79 8.39 8.39 3,702 6,089 6,089
Tunisia 9.46 14.08 65.5 90.3 6.20 12.71 9.56 56.30 56.30 1,011 4,000 4,000
Turkey 66.67 98.82 65.8 86.4 43.87 85.38 114.19 395.27 395.27 1,713 4,000 4,000
Turkmenistan 4.74 8.40 44.8 69.8 2.12 5.86 7.71 33.60 33.60 1,627 4,000 4,000
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.02 0.04 45.2 76.5 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.05 278 4,000 1,205
Uganda 23.30 101.52 14.2 49.1 3.31 49.83 1.31 406.09 13.14 56 4,000 129
Ukraine 49.57 29.96 67.9 80.4 33.66 24.10 151.72 119.84 119.84 3,061 4,000 4,000
United Arab Emirates 2.61 3.71 86.7 99.3 2.26 3.68 35.99 84.25 84.25 13,811 22,714 22,714
United Kingdom 59.41 58.93 89.5 94.4 53.18 55.61 345.03 562.85 562.85 5,807 9,551 9,551
USA 283.23 397.06 77.2 90.1 218.65 357.75 3,621.00 8,348.66 8,348.66 12,785 21,026 21,026
Uruguay 3.34 4.25 91.9 98.4 3.07 4.18 7.35 16.99 16.99 2,203 4,000 4,000
Uzbekistan 24.88 40.51 36.7 52.8 9.13 21.37 41.89 162.05 162.05 1,684 4,000 4,000
Vanuatu 0.20 0.46 21.7 55.8 0.04 0.26 0.04 1.85 1.85 184 4,000 4,000
Venezuela 24.17 42.15 88.9 93.8 21.49 39.52 75.10 168.61 168.61 3,107 4,000 4,000
Vietnam 78.14 123.78 24.1 59.9 18.83 74.17 23.97 495.13 239.71 307 4,000 1,937
Western Sahara 0.25 0.60 95.4 100.0 0.24 0.60 0.08 2.39 0.84 332 4,000 1,398
Yemen 18.35 102.38 24.7 57.5 4.53 58.91 2.98 409.51 29.76 162 4,000 291
Yugoslavia 10.55 9.03 51.6 70.9 5.45 6.41 31.55 36.12 36.12 2,989 4,000 4,000
Zambia 10.42 29.26 39.6 67.2 4.13 19.67 5.84 117.05 58.38 560 4,000 1,995
Zimbabwe 12.63 23.55 35.3 77.2 4.46 18.18 10.48 94.18 94.18 830 4,000 4,000
Totals 6,072 9,326 47.4 74.3 2,877 6,928 13,710 50,424 39,003 2,258 5,407 4,182
Table represents 1% per year increase in electricity consumption from 2000 to 2050  
 
 Note that in the table, countries like Vietnam, Turkey and Columbia (that are projected to 
be among the top 25 most populous nations) will, by the size of their population, become 
significant international players.  Interestingly, there is a decline in population of Russia, Japan 
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and Germany, while other countries that might drive future electricity expansion (e.g., United 
States, China and India), experience a significant population increase. 
 
 Although this algorithm used a very different method, it is nonetheless consistent with 
published electricity projections.  The graph below shows that in 2020 the total world electricity 
consumption, based on this projection algorithm, is slightly below EIA reference case numbers.  
The projection algorithm with a per capita increase of 1%/year (0.5%/year) in industrialized 
nations yields a 2.1% (1.9%) per year increase in global electricity while the EIA projects a 1.6%, 
2.5%, and 3.1% per year increase in global electricity consumption for their low, reference and 
high growth scenarios. 
 
World Total Electricity Consumption Projections
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Year
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
 C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
(1
0^
12
 k
W
hr
s/
yr
)
EIA High Growth
EIA Low Growth
EIA Reference Case
2050 Projection based on Algorithm
39,003 Billion kWhrs/yr
 
FIGURE 2-3: Comparison of TEC Projections (1% per year per capita increase)4 
 
2.1.2 Nuclear Projections 
 We now move on to a projection of nuclear capacity in a robust global growth scenario. 
Nuclear production (as a percent of total electricity production) for 2000 is taken from the CIA 
World Factbook (2002).  For 2050, we make a country-specific judgment for the rate of nuclear 
power’s share of total electricity production; based upon 2000 nuclear percentages, total 
electricity consumption, urban population and per capita electricity consumption.  The 
approximate algorithm, used for making these judgments, is shown in the box below (Figure 2-4).  
This algorithm assisted in systematically developing 2050 nuclear demand.  This again is not 
                                                 
4 Graph represents World Total Electricity projections each year from 2000 to 2050 and also reflects the factor of 
10-growth cap. 
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based in forecasting or economic modeling but it is simply motivated in the goal of raising the 
“quality-of-life” of each country, within “reasonable” growth rates.  Because this is an 
approximate algorithm, certain exceptions apply, for example, a country like Estonia (which is 
quite similar to Lithuania) would, based on the algorithm, reach 10% nuclear in 2050 because it 
is between 0 and 4% in 2000, but instead it remains at zero percent.  These anomalies are due to 
country specific factors.  We stress that the nuclear “market shares” represent an aggressive 
development consistent with the assumption of a robust growth scenario, i.e., that nuclear power, 
perhaps because of rising concern about global warming, is viewed as a key technology for 
meeting increased demand. 
 
Approximate Nuclear Demand Algorithm 
 
Developed World 
2000 2050 Low 2050 High 
0% to 4% 10% 20% 
5% to 9% 20% 40% 
10% to 19% 30% 50% 
20% to 50% Increase by 10% Increase by 30% 
Greater than 50 Country dependent Country dependent
 
Developing World 
4 Countries that have 0% (2000) are increased to 10% (2050 Low) and 20% (2050 High), with 
the exception of Iran, Indonesia and North Korea-which were increased to 20% (2050 Low) 
and 40% (2050 High). 
5 5 of the 7 countries with nuclear in 2000 have less than 5% nuclear and are increased to 15% 
(2050 Low) and 30% (2050 High). 
6 Remaining 2, Hungary and Romania, are increased by 10% (2050 Low) and 20% (2050 
High) each. 
 
Former Soviet Union 
4 Increase 2000 percentage by 10 (Low case) and 20 (High case) 
5 Russia and Lithuania taken separately 
 
FIGURE 2-4: Nuclear Projections Algorithm 
 
The final results of this projection algorithm are given in table 2-3.  “Nuclear Equivalent 
Capacity” here means the total number of kWh produced by nuclear power divided by the 
number of hours in a year (8760 hours)5; i.e., no correction has been made for capacity factor, 
meaning that 10-15% more installed capacity would be needed.  The tables show the annual 
increase in total electricity consumption and nuclear production required to reach the 2050 
projections.  The tables also show the percent per year increase in total electricity consumption 
(TEC) and nuclear production (for both low and high projections) required to reach these levels.  
Note also that in these tables, urban population data has been left out. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Actual capacity can be found by dividing the “nuclear equivalent capacity” by the capacity factor. 
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TABLE 2-4(a): Electricity Consumption Projections (1% case with nuclear included) 
Country
%/yr 
TEC
%/yr 
Low 
Nuc.
%/yr  
High 
Nuc.
2000 2050 2000 2050* 2000 2050* 2000 % 2050 L %L 2050 H %H 2000 2050 L 2050 H
Afghanistan 21.76 72.27 0.45 4.54 21 63 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Albania 3.13 3.90 5.38 15.62 1,716 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.2% -- --
Algeria 30.29 51.18 21.85 204.72 721 4,000 0 0% 20 10% 41 20% 0.00 2.34 4.67 4.6% -- --
American Samoa 0.07 0.17 0.12 0.69 1,787 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.5% -- --
Angola 13.13 53.33 1.11 11.07 84 208 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Antigua and 
Barbuda 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.29 1,434 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.3% -- --
Argentina 37.03 54.52 80.81 218.09 2,182 4,000 6 7% 44 20% 87 40% 0.65 4.98 9.96 2.0% 4.2% 5.6%
Armenia 3.79 3.15 4.89 12.60 1,291 4,000 2 32% 5 40% 6 50% 0.18 0.58 0.72 1.9% 2.4% 2.8%
Aruba 0.10 0.24 0.42 1.65 4,161 6,844 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.8% -- --
Australia 19.14 26.50 188.49 429.29 9,849 16,198 0 0% 43 10% 86 20% 0.00 4.90 9.80 1.7% -- --
Austria 8.08 6.45 54.76 71.92 6,778 11,147 0 0% 7 10% 14 20% 0.00 0.82 1.64 0.5% -- --
Azerbaijan 8.04 8.90 16.68 35.59 2,075 4,000 0 0% 4 10% 7 20% 0.00 0.41 0.81 1.5% -- --
Bahamas 0.30 0.45 1.43 3.47 4,708 7,742 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.8% -- --
Bahrain 0.64 1.01 5.36 13.89 8,380 13,783 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.9% -- --
Bangladesh 137.44 265.43 12.55 125.48 91 473 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Barbados 0.27 0.26 0.69 1.05 2,573 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9% -- --
Belarus 10.19 8.30 26.78 33.22 2,629 4,000 0 0% 3 10% 7 20% 0.00 0.38 0.76 0.4% -- --
Belgium 10.25 9.58 78.13 120.14 7,623 12,537 45 58% 72 60% 96 80% 5.17 8.23 10.97 0.9% 0.9% 1.5%
Belize 0.23 0.39 0.18 1.57 789 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.4% -- --
Benin 6.27 18.07 0.52 5.23 83 290 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Bermuda 0.06 0.08 0.55 1.15 8,789 14,455 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.5% -- --
Bhutan 2.09 5.57 0.38 3.81 183 684 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Bolivia 8.33 16.97 3.61 36.05 433 2,125 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3.98 3.46 2.58 13.83 648 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.4% -- --
Botswana 1.54 2.11 1.45 8.44 941 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.6% -- --
Brazil 170.41 247.24 360.64 988.98 2,116 4,000 4 1% 148 15% 297 30% 0.41 16.93 33.87 2.0% 7.7% 9.2%
Brunei Darussalam 0.33 0.56 2.06 5.84 6,289 10,343 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.1% -- --
Bulgaria 7.95 4.53 34.42 32.26 4,330 7,121 15 44% 16 50% 23 70% 1.73 1.84 2.58 -0.1% 0.1% 0.8%
Burkina Faso 11.54 46.30 0.26 2.62 23 57 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Burundi 6.36 20.22 0.17 1.67 26 82 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Cambodia 13.10 29.88 0.12 1.23 9 41 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Cameroon 14.88 32.28 3.37 33.69 227 1,044 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Canada 30.76 40.41 499.77 1,079.82 16,249 26,724 60 12% 324 30% 540 50% 6.85 36.98 61.63 1.6% 3.4% 4.5%
Cape Verde 0.43 0.81 0.04 0.38 89 472 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Cayman Islands 0.04 0.09 0.33 1.27 8,636 14,202 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.7% -- --
Central African 
Republic 3.72 8.19 0.10 0.97 26 118 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Chad 7.89 27.73 0.09 0.86 11 31 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Chile 15.21 22.22 37.90 88.86 2,491 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.7% -- --
China 1,275.13 1,462.06 1,206.26 5,848.23 946 4,000 12 1% 877 15% 1,754 30% 1.38 100.14 200.28 3.2% 9.0% 10.5%
China, Hong Kong 7.12 7.76 35.40 63.46 4,975 8,182 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.2% -- --
Colombia 42.10 70.86 40.35 283.45 958 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.0% -- --
Comoros 0.71 1.90 0.02 0.18 25 93 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Congo, DR 50.95 203.53 4.58 45.75 90 225 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Congo, Rep. 
(Brazzaville) 3.02 10.74 0.43 4.29 142 400 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Cook Islands 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.11 1,138 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.2% -- --
Costa Rica 4.02 7.20 5.89 28.78 1,465 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.2% -- --
Croatia 4.65 4.18 12.64 16.72 2,716 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.6% -- --
Cuba 11.20 10.76 13.83 43.06 1,235 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.3% -- --
Cyprus 0.78 0.91 2.91 5.56 3,714 6,108 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.3% -- --
Czech Republic 10.27 8.43 54.70 73.83 5,325 8,758 10 19% 22 30% 30 40% 1.19 2.53 3.37 0.6% 1.5% 2.1%
Denmark 5.32 5.08 33.93 53.28 6,377 10,488 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9% -- --
Djibouti 0.63 1.07 0.17 1.67 265 1,567 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Dominica 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.29 883 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.1% -- --
Dominican 
Republic 8.37 11.96 8.81 47.84 1,052 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.4% -- --
Ecuador 12.65 21.19 9.67 84.76 764 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.4% -- --
Egypt 67.88 113.84 64.72 455.36 953 4,000 0 0% 46 10% 91 20% 0.00 5.20 10.40 4.0% -- --
El Salvador 6.28 10.86 4.07 40.70 648 3,749 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Equatorial Guinea 0.46 1.38 0.02 0.20 45 148 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Eritrea 3.66 10.03 0.20 1.95 53 195 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Estonia 1.39 0.75 5.36 4.76 3,848 6,329 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.2% -- --
Ethiopia 62.91 186.45 1.52 15.16 24 81 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Nuclear Production (Billion kWhrs)
Nuclear Eq. 
"Capacity" (GWe)
Total Population 
(Millions)
Total Electricity   
Consumption     
(Billion kWhrs)
Per Capita 
Consumption 
(kWhrs/per)
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TABLE 2-4(b): Electricity Consumption Projections (cont.) 
Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 5,619 9,242 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.8% -- --
Fiji 0.81 0.92 0.48 3.66 589 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.2% -- --
Finland 5.17 4.69 81.96 122.31 15,848 26,064 23 28% 49 40% 73 60% 2.62 5.59 8.38 0.8% 1.5% 2.4%
France 59.24 61.83 408.51 701.28 6,896 11,342 315 77% 561 80% 596 85% 35.91 64.04 68.05 1.1% 1.2% 1.3%
French Guiana 0.16 0.50 0.42 2.01 2,539 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.2% -- --
French Polynesia 0.23 0.37 0.38 1.49 1,626 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.8% -- --
Gabon 1.23 3.16 0.79 7.91 643 2,498 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Gambia 1.30 2.60 0.07 0.70 54 268 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Georgia 5.26 3.22 7.89 12.88 1,499 4,000 0 0% 1 10% 3 20% 0.00 0.15 0.29 1.0% -- --
Germany 82.02 70.80 501.72 712.34 6,117 10,061 151 30% 285 40% 427 60% 17.18 32.53 48.79 0.7% 1.3% 2.1%
Ghana 19.31 40.06 5.48 54.84 284 1,369 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Gibraltar 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.12 3,392 5,578 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.5% -- --
Greece 10.61 8.98 46.10 64.19 4,345 7,146 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.7% -- --
Greenland 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.42 4,136 6,801 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.2% -- --
Grenada 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.42 1,094 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.9% -- --
Guadeloupe 0.43 0.48 1.29 1.92 3,021 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.8% -- --
Guam 0.16 0.31 0.77 2.50 4,944 8,132 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.4% -- --
Guatemala 11.39 26.55 4.80 47.97 421 1,807 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Guinea 8.15 20.71 0.72 7.16 88 346 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Guinea-Bissau 1.20 3.28 0.06 0.56 47 170 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Guyana 0.76 0.50 0.47 2.02 618 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.0% -- --
Haiti 8.14 13.98 0.49 4.85 60 347 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Honduras 6.42 12.84 3.59 35.93 560 2,797 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Hungary 9.97 7.49 35.10 43.35 3,521 5,791 14 40% 22 50% 26 60% 1.60 2.47 2.97 0.4% 0.9% 1.2%
Iceland 0.28 0.33 7.02 13.75 25,136 41,339 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.4% -- --
India 1,008.94 1,572.05 509.89 5,098.86 505 3,243 15 3% 765 15% 1,530 30% 1.75 87.31 174.62 4.7% 8.1% 9.6%
Indonesia 212.09 311.33 86.09 860.95 406 2,765 0 0% 172 20% 344 40% 0.00 19.66 39.31 4.7% -- --
Iran 70.33 121.42 111.91 485.70 1,591 4,000 0 0% 97 20% 194 40% 0.00 11.09 22.18 3.0% -- --
Iraq 22.95 53.57 25.39 214.30 1,106 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.4% -- --
Ireland 3.80 5.37 20.82 48.32 5,475 9,005 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.7% -- --
Israel 6.04 10.06 34.90 95.63 5,777 9,501 0 0% 10 10% 19 20% 0.00 1.09 2.18 2.0% -- --
Italy 57.53 42.96 283.74 348.48 4,932 8,111 0 0% 35 10% 70 20% 0.00 3.98 7.96 0.4% -- --
IvoryCoast 16.01 32.19 3.55 35.50 222 1,103 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Jamaica 2.58 3.82 6.27 15.26 2,433 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.8% -- --
Japan 127.10 109.22 943.71 1,333.76 7,425 12,212 274 29% 534 40% 800 60% 31.24 60.90 91.35 0.7% 1.3% 2.2%
Jordan 4.91 11.71 7.09 46.84 1,443 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.8% -- --
Kazakhstan 16.17 15.30 48.34 61.21 2,989 4,000 0 0% 6 10% 12 20% 0.00 0.70 1.40 0.5% -- --
Kenya 30.67 55.37 4.43 44.33 145 801 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Kiribati 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.07 79 471 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Korea, North 
(DROK) 22.27 28.04 31.06 112.15 1,395 4,000 0 0% 22 20% 45 40% 0.00 2.56 5.12 2.6% -- --
Korea, South 
(ROK) 46.74 51.56 254.08 460.96 5,436 6,980 97 38% 230 50% 323 70% 11.02 26.31 36.83 1.2% 1.8% 2.4%
Kuwait 1.91 4.00 29.02 99.74 15,157 24,927 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.5% -- --
Kyrgyzstan 4.92 7.54 9.82 30.15 1,995 4,000 0 0% 3 10% 6 20% 0.00 0.34 0.69 2.3% -- --
Lao People's Dem. 
Republic 5.28 11.44 0.69 6.91 131 604 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Latvia 2.42 1.74 5.16 6.98 2,132 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.6% -- --
Lebanon 3.50 5.02 8.64 20.07 2,472 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.7% -- --
Lesotho 2.03 2.48 0.10 1.00 49 404 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Liberia 2.91 14.37 0.42 4.19 144 291 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Libya 5.29 9.97 18.04 55.92 3,411 5,609 0 0% 6 10% 11 20% 0.00 0.64 1.28 2.3% -- --
Lithuania 3.70 2.99 6.90 11.95 1,866 4,000 5 77% 10 80% 10 85% 0.61 1.09 1.16 1.1% 1.2% 1.3%
Luxembourg 0.44 0.71 6.16 16.57 14,097 23,185 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.0% -- --
Madagascar 15.97 47.03 0.76 7.63 48 162 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Malawi 11.31 31.11 0.77 7.67 68 247 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Malaysia 22.22 37.85 58.59 151.40 2,637 4,000 0 0% 15 10% 30 20% 0.00 1.73 3.46 1.9% -- --
Maldives 0.29 0.87 0.10 1.02 352 1,179 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Mali 11.35 41.72 0.43 4.30 38 103 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Malta 0.39 0.40 1.63 2.74 4,174 6,864 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.0% -- --
Martinique 0.38 0.41 1.05 1.65 2,729 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9% -- --
Mauritania 2.66 8.45 0.14 1.43 54 169 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Mauritius 1.16 1.43 1.20 5.70 1,029 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.2% -- --
Mexico 98.87 146.65 182.83 586.61 1,849 4,000 7 4% 88 15% 176 30% 0.83 10.04 20.09 2.4% 5.1% 6.6%
Moldova 4.30 3.58 3.65 14.31 851 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.8% -- --
Mongolia 2.53 4.15 2.73 16.58 1,078 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.7% -- --
Montserrat 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 1,240 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.5% -- --
Morocco 29.88 50.36 14.35 143.46 480 2,849 0 0% 14 10% 29 20% 0.00 1.64 3.28 4.7% -- --
Mozambique 18.29 38.84 0.93 9.26 51 238 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Myanmar 47.75 68.55 4.50 45.00 94 656 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --  
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TABLE 2-4(c): Electricity Consumption Projections (cont.) 
Namibia 1.76 3.66 0.89 8.91 507 2,433 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Nauru 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 2,283 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.7% -- --
Nepal 23.04 52.41 1.43 14.31 62 273 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Netherlands 15.86 15.85 100.71 165.44 6,349 10,441 4 4% 17 10% 33 20% 0.46 1.89 3.78 1.0% 2.9% 4.3%
Netherlands 
Antilles 0.22 0.26 1.09 2.16 5,076 8,348 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.4% -- --
New Caledonia 0.22 0.40 1.46 4.41 6,760 11,118 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.2% -- --
New Zealand 3.78 4.44 33.32 64.38 8,818 14,503 0 0% 6 10% 13 20% 0.00 0.73 1.47 1.3% -- --
Nicaragua 5.07 11.48 2.18 21.76 429 1,896 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Niger 10.83 51.87 0.40 4.05 37 78 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Nigeria 113.86 278.79 14.77 147.68 130 530 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Niue 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1,394 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.8% -- --
Norway 4.47 4.88 112.50 202.03 25,172 41,399 0 0% 20 10% 40 20% 0.00 2.31 4.61 1.2% -- --
Oman 2.54 8.75 7.53 35.01 2,968 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.1% -- --
Pakistan 141.26 344.17 58.30 582.99 413 1,694 1 1% 87 15% 175 30% 0.07 9.98 19.97 4.7% 10.5% 12.1%
Panama 2.86 4.26 4.65 17.05 1,629 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.6% -- --
Papua New Guinea 4.81 10.98 1.53 15.35 319 1,397 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Paraguay 5.50 12.56 1.95 19.50 355 1,552 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Peru 25.66 42.12 18.30 168.49 713 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.5% -- --
Philippines 75.65 128.38 37.82 378.20 500 2,946 0 0% 38 10% 76 20% 0.00 4.32 8.63 4.7% -- --
Poland 38.61 33.37 119.33 133.48 3,091 4,000 0 0% 13 10% 27 20% 0.00 1.52 3.05 0.2% -- --
Portugal 10.02 9.01 41.15 60.85 4,108 6,756 0 0% 6 10% 6 10% 0.00 0.69 0.69 0.8% -- --
Puerto Rico 3.91 4.83 19.06 38.72 4,869 8,008 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.4% -- --
Qatar 0.57 0.83 8.56 20.67 15,132 24,886 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.8% -- --
Reunion 0.72 1.00 1.01 4.01 1,406 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.8% -- --
Romania 22.44 18.15 45.68 72.60 2,036 4,000 5 10% 15 20% 22 30% 0.52 1.66 2.49 0.9% -- --
Russia 145.49 104.26 767.08 904.03 5,272 8,671 115 15% 271 30% 452 50% 13.13 30.96 51.60 0.3% 1.7% 2.8%
Rwanda 7.61 18.52 0.17 1.74 23 94 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Saint Helena 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 739 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.3% -- --
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.14 2,296 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9% -- --
Saint Lucia 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.75 724 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.0% -- --
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 5,564 9,151 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.5% -- --
Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.55 714 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.9% -- --
Samoa 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.89 604 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.6% -- --
Sao Tome and 
Principe 0.14 0.29 0.02 0.16 115 538 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Saudi Arabia 20.35 59.68 114.86 554.10 5,645 9,284 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.2% -- --
Senegal 9.42 22.71 1.23 12.28 130 541 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Seychelles 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.58 1,850 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.8% -- --
Sierra Leone 4.40 14.35 0.23 2.28 52 159 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Singapore 4.02 4.62 25.95 49.06 6,458 10,620 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.3% -- --
Slovakia 5.40 4.67 25.20 35.89 4,668 7,678 12 48% 22 60% 25 70% 1.38 2.46 2.87 0.7% 1.2% 1.5%
Slovenia 1.99 1.53 10.62 13.42 5,342 8,786 4 35% 7 50% 8 60% 0.42 0.77 0.92 0.5% 1.2% 1.6%
Solomon Islands 0.45 1.46 0.03 0.30 67 204 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Somalia 8.78 40.94 0.23 2.33 26 57 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
South Africa 43.31 47.30 181.52 326.05 4,191 6,893 13 7% 65 20% 130 40% 1.45 7.44 14.89 1.2% 3.3% 4.8%
Spain 39.91 31.28 201.16 259.31 5,040 8,289 56 28% 104 40% 156 60% 6.43 11.84 17.76 0.5% 1.2% 2.1%
Sri Lanka 18.92 23.07 6.16 61.56 325 2,669 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Sudan 31.10 63.53 1.83 18.32 59 288 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Suriname 0.42 0.42 1.31 2.16 3,137 5,159 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.0% -- --
Swaziland 0.92 1.39 0.90 5.57 974 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.7% -- --
Sweden 8.84 7.78 139.18 201.31 15,740 25,887 51 37% 101 50% 141 70% 5.88 11.49 16.09 0.7% 1.3% 2.0%
Switzerland 7.17 5.61 52.62 67.67 7,338 12,069 19 37% 34 50% 47 70% 2.22 3.86 5.41 0.5% 1.1% 1.8%
Syria 16.19 36.35 17.67 145.38 1,092 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.3% -- --  
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TABLE 2-4(d): Electricity Consumption Projections (cont.) 
Taiwan 22.19 22.55 139.00 232.77 6,277 8,054 35 25% 93 40% 140 60% 3.97 10.63 15.94 1.0% 2.0% 2.8%
Tajikistan 6.09 9.76 12.54 39.05 2,060 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.3% -- --
Tanzania 35.12 82.74 2.62 26.16 75 316 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Thailand 62.81 82.49 90.26 329.96 1,437 4,000 0 0% 33 10% 66 20% 0.00 3.77 7.53 2.6% -- --
Togo 4.53 11.83 0.53 5.25 116 444 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Tonga 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.28 282 2,230 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1.29 1.38 4.79 8.39 3,702 6,089 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.1% -- --
Tunisia 9.46 14.08 9.56 56.30 1,011 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.6% -- --
Turkey 66.67 98.82 114.19 395.27 1,713 4,000 0 0% 40 10% 79 20% 0.00 4.51 9.02 2.5% -- --
Turkmenistan 4.74 8.40 7.71 33.60 1,627 4,000 0 0% 3 10% 7 20% 0.00 0.38 0.77 3.0% -- --
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.05 278 1,205 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Uganda 23.30 101.52 1.31 13.14 56 129 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Ukraine 49.57 29.96 151.72 119.84 3,061 4,000 65 43% 60 50% 72 60% 7.45 6.84 8.21 -0.5% -0.2% 0.2%
United Arab 
Emirates 2.61 3.71 35.99 84.25 13,811 22,714 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.7% -- --
United Kingdom 59.41 58.93 345.03 562.85 5,807 9,551 79 23% 169 30% 281 50% 9.06 19.28 32.13 1.0% 1.5% 2.6%
Uruguay 3.34 4.25 7.35 16.99 2,203 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.7% -- --
USA 283.23 397.06 3,621.00 8,348.66 12,785 21,026 717 20% 2,505 30% 4,174 50% 81.84 285.91 476.52 1.7% 2.5% 3.6%
Uzbekistan 24.88 40.51 41.89 162.05 1,684 4,000 0 0% 16 10% 32 20% 0.00 1.85 3.70 2.7% -- --
Vanuatu 0.20 0.46 0.04 1.85 184 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.2% -- --
Venezuela 24.17 42.15 75.10 168.61 3,107 4,000 0 0% 17 10% 34 20% 0.00 1.92 3.85 1.6% -- --
Vietnam 78.14 123.78 23.97 239.71 307 1,937 0 0% 24 10% 48 20% 0.00 2.74 5.47 4.7% -- --
Western Sahara 0.25 0.60 0.08 0.84 332 1,398 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Yemen 18.35 102.38 2.98 29.76 162 291 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Yugoslavia 10.55 9.03 31.55 36.12 2,989 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.3% -- --
Zambia 10.42 29.26 5.84 58.38 560 1,995 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.7% -- --
Zimbabwe 12.63 23.55 10.48 94.18 830 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.5% -- --
Totals 6,072 9,326 13,710 39,003 2,258 4,182 2,230 16% 8,321 21% 14,088 36% 255 950 1,608 2.1% 2.7% 3.8%
**2050 After cutoff numbers
***TEC=Total Electricity Consumption
*Table represents 1% per year increase in electricity consumption from 2000 to 2050
 
 
There are several key features of the tables that are worth mentioning at this point.  More 
specifically, the United States will have take a major lead role in the projected nuclear expansion, 
with European Nations not far behind.  Certain countries (Pakistan and Indonesia) not only 
experience significant population increases, but they are also projected to become states with 
civilian nuclear power (both of which currently have little to no nuclear infrastructure).  For 
these and other reasons, it became useful to categorize the various countries. 
 
2.1.3 Country Categorization  
 Finally, in looking ahead to our nonproliferation discussion, it is useful to bin the 
countries into various categories.  First, in order to narrow the scope of the projections, all 
countries with a 2050 TEC of less than or equal to 10 Billion kWhrs and a 2050 total population 
of less than or equal to 3 million were neglected.  Next, the countries were grouped into three 
different categories:  developed nations-countries whose 2000 PCEC was greater than or equal to 
4,000 kWhrs (with the exception of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and a number of smaller nations 
with non-industrialized economies which are placed in the developing nations category), 
developing nations-countries with 2000 PCEC less than 4,000 kWhrs per capita, and Former 
Soviet Union nations.  
 
 It is useful to further sub-divide the developing world into three categories- More 
Advanced Developing, Less Advanced Developing and Least Developed.  The More Advanced 
Developing Nations have 2050 per capita electricity consumption greater than or equal to 4,000 
kWhrs.  With modest growth rates and improvements in various economic and political sectors, 
most of these countries are good candidates for expanded use of nuclear power.  The Less 
Advanced Developing Nations were those developing nations with 2050 per capita electricity 
consumption between 1,500 and 4,000 kWhrs.  The growth rates required for this would be quite 
substantial (4.7%/year in TEC) and would require considerable investment (presumably 
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including substantial foreign investment) and good management.  Many of these countries are 
candidates for nuclear power, but will need effective strategies to meet the capital requirements.  
Finally, the remaining countries are considered Least Developing Nations and will by no means 
come close to reaching the 4,000 kWhrs per capita threshold.  They are unlikely to develop 
nuclear power.  The results of this categorization are listed in Table 2-4. 
 
TABLE 2-5(a): Electricity Consumption Projections (Developed World) 
Country
%/yr 
TEC
%/yr 
Low 
Nuc.
%/yr  
High 
Nuc.
2000 2050 2000 2050* 2000 2050* 2000 % 2050 L %L 2050 H %H 2000 2050 L 2050 H
Developed World
USA 283 397 3,621.0 8,349 12,785 21,026 717 20% 2,505 30% 4,174 50% 82 286 477 1.7% 2.5% 3.6%
France 59 62 408.5 701 6,896 11,342 315 77% 561 80% 596 85% 36 64 68 1.1% 1.2% 1.3%
Japan 127 109 943.7 1,334 7,425 12,212 274 29% 534 40% 800 60% 31 61 91 0.7% 1.3% 2.2%
Germany 82 71 501.7 712 6,117 10,061 151 30% 285 40% 427 60% 17 33 49 0.7% 1.3% 2.1%
Korea, South (ROK) 47 52 254.1 461 5,436 6,980 97 38% 230 50% 323 70% 11 26 37 1.2% 1.8% 2.4%
United Kingdom 59 59 345.0 563 5,807 9,551 79 23% 169 30% 281 50% 9 19 32 1.0% 1.5% 2.6%
Canada 31 40 499.8 1,080 16,249 26,724 60 12% 324 30% 540 50% 7 37 62 1.6% 3.4% 4.5%
Spain 40 31 201.2 259 5,040 8,289 56 28% 104 40% 156 60% 6 12 18 0.5% 1.2% 2.1%
Sweden 9 8 139.2 201 15,740 25,887 51 37% 101 50% 141 70% 6 11 16 0.7% 1.3% 2.0%
Belgium 10 10 78.1 120 7,623 12,537 45 58% 72 60% 96 80% 5 8 11 0.9% 0.9% 1.5%
Taiwan 22 23 139.0 233 6,277 8,054 35 25% 93 40% 140 60% 4 11 16 1.0% 2.0% 2.8%
Finland 5 5 82.0 122 15,848 26,064 23 28% 49 40% 73 60% 3 6 8 0.8% 1.5% 2.4%
Switzerland 7 6 52.6 68 7,338 12,069 19 37% 34 50% 47 70% 2 4 5 0.5% 1.1% 1.8%
Netherlands 16 16 100.7 165 6,349 10,441 4 4% 17 10% 33 20% 0 2 4 1.0% 2.9% 4.3%
Norway 4 5 112.5 202 25,172 41,399 0 0% 20 10% 40 20% 0 2 5 1.2% -- --
Australia 19 27 188.5 429 9,849 16,198 0 0% 43 10% 86 20% 0 5 10 1.7% -- --
New Zealand 4 4 33.3 64 8,818 14,503 0 0% 6 10% 13 20% 0 1 1 1.3% -- --
Austria 8 6 54.8 72 6,778 11,147 0 0% 7 10% 14 20% 0 1 2 0.5% -- --
Denmark 5 5 33.9 53 6,377 10,488 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 0.9% -- --
Israel 6 10 34.9 96 5,777 9,501 0 0% 10 10% 19 20% 0 1 2 2.0% -- --
Ireland 4 5 20.8 48 5,475 9,005 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.7% -- --
China, Hong Kong 7 8 35.4 63 4,975 8,182 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.2% -- --
Italy 58 43 283.7 348 4,932 8,111 0 0% 35 10% 70 20% 0 4 8 0.4% -- --
Greece 11 9 46.1 64 4,345 7,146 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 0.7% -- --
Subtotal 924 1,010 8,211 15,810 8,888 15,659 1,926 23% 5,197 33% 8,071 51% 220 593 921 1.3% 2.0% 2.9%
Per Capita 
Consumption 
(kWhrs/per) Nuclear Production (Billion kWhrs)
Nuclear Eq. 
"Capacity" (GWe)
Total 
Population 
(Millions)
Total Electricity 
Consumption   
(Billion kWhrs)
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TABLE 2-5(b): Electricity Consumption Projections (More Advanced Developing) 
Country
%/yr 
TEC
%/yr 
Low 
Nuc.
%/yr  
High 
Nuc.
2000 2050 2000 2050* 2000 2050* 2000 % 2050 L %L 2050 H %H 2000 2050 L 2050 H
Developing World
More Advanced
Kuwait 2 4 29.0 100 15,157 24,927 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 2.5% -- --
United Arab 
Emirates 3 4 36.0 84 13,811 22,714 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.7% -- --
Singapore 4 5 25.9 49 6,458 10,620 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.3% -- --
Saudi Arabia 20 60 114.9 554 5,645 9,284 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 3.2% -- --
Puerto Rico 4 5 19.1 39 4,869 8,008 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.4% -- --
Bulgaria 8 5 34.4 32 4,330 7,121 15 44% 16 50% 23 70% 2 2 3 -0.1% 0.1% 0.8%
South Africa 43 47 181.5 326 4,191 6,893 13 7% 65 20% 130 40% 1 7 15 1.2% 3.3% 4.8%
Portugal 10 9 41.1 61 4,108 6,756 0 0% 6 10% 12 20% 0 1 1 0.8% -- --
Hungary 10 7 35.1 43 3,521 5,791 14 40% 22 50% 26 60% 2 2 3 0.4% 0.9% 1.2%
Libya 5 10 18.0 56 3,411 5,609 0 0% 6 10% 11 20% 0 1 1 2.3% -- --
Brazil 170 247 360.6 989 2,116 4,000 4 1% 148 15% 297 30% 0 17 34 2.0% 7.7% 9.2%
Mexico 99 147 182.8 587 1,849 4,000 7 4% 88 15% 176 30% 1 10 20 2.4% 5.1% 6.6%
Iraq 23 54 25.4 214 1,106 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.4% -- --
Costa Rica 4 7 5.9 29 1,465 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 3.2% -- --
Ecuador 13 21 9.7 85 764 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.4% -- --
Cuba 11 11 13.8 43 1,235 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 2.3% -- --
Algeria 30 51 21.8 205 721 4,000 0 0% 20 10% 41 20% 0 2 5 4.6% -- --
Thailand 63 82 90.3 330 1,437 4,000 0 0% 33 10% 66 20% 0 4 8 2.6% -- --
Syria 16 36 17.7 145 1,092 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.3% -- --
Egypt 68 114 64.7 455 953 4,000 0 0% 46 10% 91 20% 0 5 10 4.0% -- --
Malaysia 22 38 58.6 151 2,637 4,000 0 0% 15 10% 30 20% 0 2 3 1.9% -- --
Chile 15 22 37.9 89 2,491 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.7% -- --
Mongolia 3 4 2.7 17 1,078 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 3.7% -- --
Turkey 67 99 114.2 395 1,713 4,000 0 0% 40 10% 79 20% 0 5 9 2.5% -- --
Oman 3 9 7.5 35 2,968 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 3.1% -- --
Croatia 5 4 12.6 17 2,716 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 0.6% -- --
Peru 26 42 18.3 168 713 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.5% -- --
China 1,275 1,462 1,206.3 5,848 946 4,000 12 1% 877 15% 1,754 30% 1 100 200 3.2% 9.0% 10.5%
Argentina 37 55 80.8 218 2,182 4,000 6 7% 44 20% 87 40% 1 5 10 2.0% 4.2% 5.6%
Lebanon 3 5 8.6 20 2,472 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.7% -- --
Uruguay 3 4 7.4 17 2,203 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.7% -- --
Albania 3 4 5.4 16 1,716 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 2.2% -- --
Jordan 5 12 7.1 47 1,443 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 3.8% -- --
Korea, North 
(DROK) 22 28 31.1 112 1,395 4,000 0 0% 22 20% 45 40% 0 3 5 2.6% -- --
Venezuela 24 42 75.1 169 3,107 4,000 0 0% 17 10% 34 20% 0 2 4 1.6% -- --
Dominican 
Republic 8 12 8.8 48 1,052 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 3.4% -- --
Poland 39 33 119.3 133 3,091 4,000 0 0% 13 10% 27 20% 0 2 3 0.2% -- --
Jamaica 3 4 6.3 15 2,433 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 1.8% -- --
Zimbabwe 13 24 10.5 94 830 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.5% -- --
Colombia 42 71 40.3 283 958 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.0% -- --
Tunisia 9 14 9.6 56 1,011 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 3.6% -- --
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 4 3 2.6 14 648 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 3.4% -- --
Iran 70 121 111.9 486 1,591 4,000 0 0% 97 20% 194 40% 0 11 22 3.0% -- --
Romania 22 18 45.7 73 2,036 4,000 5 10% 15 20% 22 30% 1 2 2 0.9% 2.3% 3.2%
Yugoslavia 11 9 31.5 36 2,989 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 0.3% -- --
Panama 3 4 4.7 17 1,629 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 2.6% -- --
El Salvador 6 11 4.1 41 648 3,749 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Total 
Population 
(Millions)
Total Electricity 
Consumption   
(Billion kWhrs)
Per Capita 
Consumption 
(kWhrs/per) Nuclear Production (Billion kWhrs)
Nuclear Eq. 
"Capacity" (GWe)
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TABLE 2-5(c): Electricity Consumption Projections (Less Advanced Developing) 
Country
%/yr 
TEC
%/yr 
Low 
Nuc.
%/yr  
High 
Nuc.
2000 2050 2000 2050* 2000 2050* 2000 % 2050 L %L 2050 H %H 2000 2050 L 2050 H
Developing World
Less Advanced
India 1,009 1,572 509.9 5,099 505 3,243 15 3% 765 15% 1,530 30% 2 87 175 4.7% 8.1% 9.6%
Philippines 76 128 37.8 378 500 2,946 0 0% 38 10% 76 20% 0 4 9 4.7% -- --
Morocco 30 50 14.3 143 480 2,849 0 0% 14 10% 29 20% 0 2 3 4.7% -- --
Honduras 6 13 3.6 36 560 2,797 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Indonesia 212 311 86.1 861 406 2,765 0 0% 172 20% 344 40% 0 20 39 4.7% -- --
Sri Lanka 19 23 6.2 62 325 2,669 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Bolivia 8 17 3.6 36 433 2,125 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Zambia 10 29 5.8 58 560 1,995 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Vietnam 78 124 24.0 240 307 1,937 0 0% 24 10% 48 20% 0 3 5 4.7% -- --
Nicaragua 5 11 2.2 22 429 1,896 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Guatemala 11 27 4.8 48 421 1,807 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Pakistan 141 344 58.3 583 413 1,694 1 1% 87 15% 175 30% 0 10 20 4.7% 10.5% 12.1%
Paraguay 5 13 2.0 20 355 1,552 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Total 
Population 
(Millions)
Total Electricity 
Consumption   
(Billion kWhrs)
Per Capita 
Consumption 
(kWhrs/per) Nuclear Production (Billion kWhrs)
Nuclear Eq. 
"Capacity" (GWe)
 
 
TABLE 2-5(d): Electricity Consumption Projections (Least Developed) 
Country
%/yr 
TEC
%/yr 
Low 
Nuc.
%/yr  
High 
Nuc.
2000 2050 2000 2050* 2000 2050* 2000 % 2050 L %L 2050 H %H 2000 2050 L 2050 H
Developing World
Least Advanced
Papua New Guinea 5 11 1.5 15 319 1,397 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Ghana 19 40 5.5 55 284 1,369 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
IvoryCoast 16 32 3.6 36 222 1,103 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Cameroon 15 32 3.4 34 227 1,044 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Kenya 31 55 4.4 44 145 801 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Myanmar 48 69 4.5 45 94 656 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Senegal 9 23 1.2 12 130 541 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Nigeria 114 279 14.8 148 130 530 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Bangladesh 137 265 12.5 125 91 473 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Tanzania 35 83 2.6 26 75 316 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Yemen 18 102 3.0 30 162 291 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Sudan 31 64 1.8 18 59 288 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Nepal 23 52 1.4 14 62 273 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Congo, DR 51 204 4.6 46 90 225 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Angola 13 53 1.1 11 84 208 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Uganda 23 102 1.3 13 56 129 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Ethiopia 63 186 1.5 15 24 81 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 4.7% -- --
Subtotal 4,614 7,395 4,224 21,315 916 2,882 91 2% 2,690 13% 5,347 25% 10 307 610 3.3% 7.0% 8.5%
Total 
Population 
(Millions)
Total Electricity 
Consumption   
(Billion kWhrs)
Per Capita 
Consumption 
(kWhrs/per) Nuclear Production (Billion kWhrs)
Nuclear Eq. 
"Capacity" (GWe)
 
 
TABLE 2-5(e): Electricity Consumption Projections (Former Soviet Union) 
Country
%/yr 
TEC
%/yr 
Low 
Nuc.
%/yr  
High 
Nuc.
2000 2050 2000 2050* 2000 2050* 2000 % 2050 L %L 2050 H %H 2000 2050 L 2050 H
Former Soviet Union
Russia 145 104 767.1 904 5,272 8,671 115 15% 271 30% 452 50% 13 31 52 0.3% 1.7% 2.8%
Ukraine 50 30 151.7 120 3,061 4,000 65 43% 60 50% 72 60% 7 7 8 -0.5% -0.2% 0.2%
Slovakia 5 5 25.2 36 4,668 7,678 12 48% 22 60% 25 70% 1 2 3 0.7% 1.2% 1.5%
Czech Republic 10 8 54.7 74 5,325 8,758 10 19% 22 30% 30 40% 1 3 3 0.6% 1.5% 2.1%
Lithuania 4 3 6.9 12 1,866 4,000 5 77% 10 80% 10 85% 1 1 1 1.1% 1.2% 1.3%
Slovenia 2 2 10.6 13 5,342 8,786 4 35% 7 50% 8 60% 0 1 1 0.5% 1.2% 1.6%
Armenia 4 3 4.9 13 1,291 4,000 2 32% 5 40% 6 50% 0 1 1 1.9% 2.4% 2.8%
Estonia 1 1 5.4 5 3,848 6,329 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 -0.2% -- --
Tajikistan 6 10 12.5 39 2,060 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 2.3% -- --
Kazakhstan 16 15 48.3 61 2,989 4,000 0 0% 6 10% 12 20% 0 1 1 0.5% -- --
Uzbekistan 25 41 41.9 162 1,684 4,000 0 0% 16 10% 32 20% 0 2 4 2.7% -- --
Moldova 4 4 3.7 14 851 4,000 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0 2.8% -- --
Kyrgyzstan 5 8 9.8 30 1,995 4,000 0 0% 3 10% 6 20% 0 0 1 2.3% -- --
Belarus 10 8 26.8 33 2,629 4,000 0 0% 3 10% 7 20% 0 0 1 0.4% -- --
Georgia 5 3 7.9 13 1,499 4,000 0 0% 1 10% 3 20% 0 0 0 1.0% -- --
Turkmenistan 5 8 7.7 34 1,627 4,000 0 0% 3 10% 7 20% 0 0 1 3.0% -- --
Azerbaijan 8 9 16.7 36 2,075 4,000 0 0% 4 10% 7 20% 0 0 1 1.5% -- --
Subtotal 306 261 1,202 1,598 3,925 6,118   213 18% 433 27% 677 42% 24 49 77 0.6% 1.4% 2.3%
Totals 5,844 8,666 13,636 38,723 2,333 4,468 2,230 16% 8,321 21% 14,094 36% 255 950 1,609 2.1% 2.7% 3.8%
*Table represents 1% per year increase in electricity consumption from 2000 to 2050
**2050 After cutoff numbers
***Countries ranked by 2000 Nuclear Production
Nuclear Eq. 
"Capacity" (GWe)
Total 
Population 
(Millions)
Total Electricity 
Consumption   
(Billion kWhrs)
Per Capita 
Consumption 
(kWhrs/per) Nuclear Production (Billion kWhrs)
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2.2 Discussion 
It is useful to look at the categorization as it applies to the 25 countries with the largest 
populations as projected by the UN, shown in Table 2-5. The 2050 total population for these 25 
countries is approximately three fourths of the 9.3 billion world total projected population.  This 
snapshot shows key growth countries, some of which appear surprising. 
 
TABLE 2-6: 25 Countries with Largest 2050 Population 
2050 Total 
Pop.
2050 Urban 
Percent 2050 Per Capita
(millions) (%) (billion kWhr/yr) (%/yr) (kWhr/person/yr) 2000 2050 Low 2050 High
1. India 1572 (51) 5099 (4.7%) 3243 2 87 175
2. China 1462 (90) 5848 (3.2%) 4000 1 100 200
3. United States 397 (90) 8349 (1.7%) 21026 82 286 477
4. Pakistan 344 (63) 583 (4.7%) 1694 0 10 20
5. Indonesia 311 (91) 861 (4.7%) 2765 0 20 39
6. Nigeria 278 (84) 148 (4.7%) 530 0 0 0
7. Bangladesh 265 (67) 126 (4.7%) 473 0 0 0
8. Brazil 247 (99) 989 (2.0%) 4000 0.4 17 34
9. Dem. Rep. Congo 204 (42) 46 (4.7%) 225 0 0 0
10. Ethiopia 186 (50) 15 (4.7%) 81 0 0 0
11. Mexico 146 (87) 587 (2.4%) 4000 1 10 20
12. Philippines 128 (92) 378 (4.7%) 2946 0 4 9
13. Vietnam 123 (60) 240 (4.7%) 1937 0 3 5
14. Iran 121 (93) 486 (3.0%) 4000 0 11 22
15. Egypt 114 (62) 455 (4.0%) 4000 0 5 10
16. Japan 109 (89) 1334 (0.7%) 12212 31 61 91
17. Russia 104 (80) 904 (0.3%) 8671 13 31 52
18. Yemen 102 (58) 30 (4.7%) 291 0 0 0
19. Uganda 101 (49) 13 (4.7%) 129 0 0 0
20. Turkey 99 (86) 395 (2.5%) 4000 0 5 9
21. Tanzania 83 (85) 26 (4.7%) 316 0 0 0
22. Thailand 82 (45) 330 (2.6%) 4000 0 4 8
23. Afghanistan 72 (61) 5 (4.7%) 63 0 0 0
24. Colombia 71 (96) 283 (4.0%) 4000 0 0 0
25. Germany 71 (95) 712 (0.7%) 10061 17 33 49
Notes:
1. 1%/yr/person increase in developed countries
2. 4000 kWhrs/person/yr quality-of-life target for developing countries
3. Maximum 4.7%/yr increase in national electricity consumption
4. Top 25 population = 6792 million, out of 9326 total (73%)
5. Rest of G-7 (France, U.K., Italy, Canada): population 204 million
TWENTY-FIVE COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST PROJECTED POPULATION IN 2050                                      
(UNITED NATIONS PROJECTIONS)
Equivalent Nuclear Capacity 
(GWe)
2050 Electricity 
Consumption
 
 
The only FSU country on the list is Russia, which does not need a separate discussion 
and will be included in the developed country discussion.  Although the top 25 populated 
countries do not include all potential nuclear countries (for example, France has and will have 
one of the world’s largest fleets of nuclear reactors), the list does provide valuable insight into 
the major potential proliferation concerns and also into the critical assumptions that must be true 
for the robust growth scenario to occur. 
 
Taking a closer look, however, at only the nuclear power countries yields some very 
interesting and significant results.  For example, 6 of the top 15 nuclear powers for 2050 are new 
entrants, of particular interest are Indonesia, Pakistan, Brazil, Mexico, and China all of which 
were not even among the top 20 nuclear nations in 2000 (Indonesia had no nuclear in 2000).  
Also, of the top 5 nuclear powers for 2050, only the US, Japan, and France are current leaders, 
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with new entrants of China and India.  Only 5 (France, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea, 
and Spain) of the top 15 nuclear power countries are not also in the top 25 most populous 
countries for 2050.  The table (table 2-6) below clearly illustrates these findings.  It shows an 
interesting shift from what we have today. 
 
TABLE 2-7: Top 15 Nuclear Powers in 2050 
2050 
Rank Country
2050* Nuclear Eq. 
"Capacity" (GWe)
2000 
Rank
2000 Nuclear Eq. 
"Capacity" (GWe)
1 USA 477 1 82
2 China 200 21 1
3 India 175 16 2
4 Japan 91 3 31
5 France 68 2 36
6 Canada 62 9 7
7 Russia 52 5 13
8 Germany 49 4 17
9 Indonesia 39 NR 0
10 United Kingdom 32 7 9
11 Korea, South (ROK) 37 6 11
12 Brazil 34 29 0.41
13 Mexico 20 23 0.83
14 Pakistan 20 31 0.07
15 Spain 18 10 6
*High Projection Case
NR = Not Ranked (no nuclear capacity in 2000)
Ranking of Nuclear "Powers"
 
 
Focusing the categorization (mentioned above-table 2-6) only on the top 25 most 
populous nations in 2050 also provides interesting observations.  What follows is a discussion of 
these observations. 
Developed Countries:  Among the 25 countries with the largest 2050 total population 
projections, the United States, Japan, Russia, and Germany are the only countries above the 4000 
kWh/capita/year threshold.  At an average of 1.7% increase per year, the United States sustains a 
significant increase in electricity consumption.  Due to their population decline, Japan, Russia, 
and Germany experience relatively little change in total electricity consumption.  These countries 
will almost certainly be major players in the nuclear market of 2050, and in fact must be if the 
robust growth scenario is to be realized on the necessary scale.  However, the most striking result 
is the role that the United States must play in the growth scenario.  US share of nuclear power 
likely needs to increase from its current 20% to about 50%, reflecting the combination of its 
economic strength and projected population increase. These countries are considered of little 
proliferation concern (the US and Russia are already nuclear weapons states), although the 
geopolitical situation in East Asia has led to renewed discussion about Japan in the 
nonproliferation context. 
More Advanced Developing Countries:  Eight countries would reach the 4000 
kWh/capita/year benchmark with modest growth rates in total electricity production in the 2-
3%/year range.  The countries are China, Brazil, Mexico, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand, and 
Colombia.  Most of these countries are good candidates for expanded use of nuclear power, but 
several may raise concerns about proliferation.  Of course, China, as a weapons state, is not one 
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of those of concern.  The scenario anticipates substantial nuclear infrastructure in virtually all of 
these, with several introducing nuclear power during this period (Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand). 
Less Advanced Developing Countries:  In the table, there are five countries (India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam) that will not reach the 4000 kWh per capita benchmark 
even with annual TEC growth of 4.7%, but will come within reasonable proximity.  The 
substantial growth rate would call for considerable advancements.  These countries, though 
definite candidates for nuclear expansion, will need very creative deployment strategies for the 
expansion to occur in their economies.  In this group, India and Pakistan have already 
demonstrated nuclear weapons capability and so are not of principal concern.  However, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam, as with several of the countries above, would introduce 
nuclear power in the growth scenario, inevitably raising the proliferation concern. 
Least Advanced Developing Countries:  There are also eight countries (Nigeria, Bangladesh, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Yemen, Uganda, Tanzania, and Afghanistan) among 
the 25 largest in 2050 that are very unlikely to come close to reaching the 4000 kWh per capita 
benchmark.  Indeed they typically reach only 100-500 kWh APCEC even by expanding their 
electricity production by a factor of ten. These are not good candidates for nuclear power, in 
which case proliferation associated with the nuclear fuel cycle would not be a concern. 
 
The nuclear growth scenario is summarized in Table 2-7.  The nuclear global market 
share of electricity production goes from 17% to a range of 21-36%. 
 
TABLE 2-8: Nuclear Growth Scenario Deployment 
2050 Low 2050 High 2000 2050 L 2050 H
Developed World 593 921 23% 33% 51%
USA 286 477 20% 30% 50%
Europe 167 227 31% 41% 55%
Developed East Asia 98 144 30% 42% 62%
Others (Canada, South Africa,…) 42 73
Developing World 307 610 2% 13% 25%
China, India, Pakistan 197 395 1.6% 15% 28.5%
Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico 47 93 2% 17% 34%
Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Philippines, 
Thailand, Argentina, Vietnam, 
Algeria
39 78 1% 13% 25%
Others (Libya, North Korea,…) 24 44
Former Soviet Union 50 78 18% 27% 42%
TOTAL 950 1609 16% 21% 36%
a) Nuclear share of total electricity market
Nuclear Sharea (%)Nuclear Capacity (GWe)
 
The developing world and Former Soviet Union states account for about 40% of the mid-
century scenario nuclear capacity, versus only 4% today.  Though a significant portion of this 
would be in China and India, a number of nations with relatively little nuclear infrastructure 
today are likely candidates for nuclear power; as noted above, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, 
Iran, Egypt, Turkey and Thailand are in this category.  This will no doubt raise proliferation 
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concerns as nuclear power deployment spreads into regions subject to significant geopolitical 
uncertainty.  Iran, for instance, is actively pursuing nuclear power, with Russian help, even 
though it has tremendous natural gas reserves and could easily meet its electricity needs more 
economically and quickly without nuclear power. 
 
2.3 World Demand Map 
A set of regional maps helps bring all these issues into focus.  The following maps were 
modified and electricity demand data was added.  They highlight the magnitude of the 
infrastructure changes needed in various regions throughout the world.  The maps also help to 
add perspective on regional factors that might motivate a country to pursue civilian nuclear 
power or even nuclear weapons capabilities (e.g., Countries like Iran and Israel might find it in 
the best interest of national security to pursue nuclear weapons capability if there is an increase 
in nuclear infrastructure among their neighbors, like Turkey, Libya and Egypt.  North African 
countries like Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco could conceivably find benefit in 
simultaneously developing their nuclear infrastructure.).  The maps can ultimately be used as a 
visual aid to better understand the world (and regional) trends in electricity demand and how 
expansion might occur.  Note: the tables give nuclear capacities for each country in the 
following order (2000/2050Low/2050High). 
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FIGURE 2-5: Nuclear Capacity Trends in Africa 
Nuclear Capacities (GWe) are shown for 2000, 2050 low projections and 2050 high projections.  The Map also 
includes regional information. 
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FIGURE 2-6: Nuclear Capacity Trends in Asia 
Nuclear Capacities (GWe) are shown for 2000, 2050 low projections and 2050 high projections.  The Map also 
includes regional information.  Asia is tied with Europe for having the most new nuclear countries (7).  It is number 
one, just ahead of North America (US, Canada and Mexico), in projected nuclear capacity and in population.  Only 
nuclear countries were counted in this ranking. 
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FIGURE 2-7: Nuclear Capacity Trends in Australasia 
Nuclear Capacities (GWe) are shown for 2000, 2050 low projections and 2050 high projections.  The Map also 
includes regional information. 
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FIGURE 2-8: Nuclear Capacity Trends in Europe 
Nuclear Capacities (GWe) are shown for 2000, 2050 low projections and 2050 high projections.  The Map also 
includes regional information.  Europe is tied with Asia for having the most new nuclear countries (7) ranking. 
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FIGURE 2-9: Nuclear Capacity Trends in The Former Soviet Union 
Nuclear Capacities (GWe) are shown for 2000, 2050 low projections and 2050 high projections.  The Map also 
includes regional information.  Several countries are not shown, but were calculated in totals. 
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FIGURE 2-10: Nuclear Capacity Trends in The Middle East 
Nuclear Capacities (GWe) are shown for 2000, 2050 low projections and 2050 high projections.  The Map also 
includes regional information.  The Middle East is considered the region of greatest proliferation concern.  Several 
countries are only shown for context and are not calculated into the totals. 
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FIGURE 2-11: Nuclear Capacity Trends in North America 
Nuclear Capacities (GWe) are shown for 2000, 2050 low projections and 2050 high projections.  The Map also 
includes regional information. 
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FIGURE 2-12: Nuclear Capacity Trends in South America 
Nuclear Capacities (GWe) are shown for 2000, 2050 low projections and 2050 high projections.  The Map 
also includes regional information. 
 
This scenario for robust growth of nuclear power deployment around the globe provides 
the context for addressing proliferation concerns associated with the fuel cycle during the next 
several decades.  The concern does not depend entirely upon or await realization of the scenario, 
which after all has a considerable probability of not being achieved.  Nevertheless, movement in 
this direction perhaps spurred by environmental and energy security arguments can result in the 
nuclear infrastructure developments that can present proliferation risks long before a major 
nuclear power deployment is in place. 
Proliferation Matrix and Proliferation Pathways 
3 PROLIFERATION MATRIX AND PROLIFERATION PATHWAYS 
 
3.1 Assessing Nonproliferation 
There have been numerous discussions in many countries on assessing the risks of nuclear-
weapons proliferation.  In particular, in the 1970’s, the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems 
Assessment Program (NASAP, 1978) review was carried out by the United States.  The main 
NASAP conclusions were: that there is no “purely technical” fix for the proliferation risks 
associated with nuclear fuel cycles; that there would be substantial differences in proliferation 
resistance between various fuel cycles if they were to be deployed in Non-Nuclear Weapons 
States; and that technical and institutional improvements could help increase proliferation 
resistance.  Thereafter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized the major 
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE, 1980) that involved more than 60 nations 
and international organizations.  The main conclusions of the INFCE assessment were generally 
very similar to NASAP conclusions, with an emphasis on sensitivity to the specific threat under 
consideration. 
 
Fuel cycle proliferation assessments, including those mentioned above, are primarily 
qualitative in nature given the difficulty of developing quantitative metrics and the complication 
of a broad threat spectrum.  Frameworks are being developed that aspire to quantitative analysis 
(e.g., the EIA assessment methodology (Finucane and Ledergerber, 2000); a probabilistic 
approach (Sentell, et. al., 2001); an electrical circuit model (Ko, 1998); a multi-attribute utility 
approach (Heising, 1980);…).  We will necessarily remain in a basically qualitative framework, 
using the “attributes methodology” developed originally in National Academy of Sciences 
reports (NAS, 1994, 1995, 1999) and focusing on proliferation pathways highlighted by the 
growth scenario. 
 
The attributes methodology was used and further developed by a Department Of Energy task 
force, the Technical Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian 
Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS, 2000).  The goal of the TOPS task force was to identify near-
term and long-term technical opportunities to further increase the proliferation resistance of 
global civilian nuclear power systems.  Subsequent efforts were made to apply the methodology 
to several specific nuclear power systems.  The results were considered an initial “field test” of 
the application of the attributes methodology.  More recently, J. A. Hassberger, of Lawrence 
Livermore National Labs, used the proliferation matrix and looked at several fuel cycles with a 
common basis (Hassberger, 2001).  Our approach is most similar to that of Hassberger, but with 
fuel cycles chosen specifically in the context of growth scenario proliferation concerns and as 
vehicles for formulating a set of recommendations.  
 
 
3.2 The Attributes Methodology 
3.2.1 Framework 
The assessment of overall proliferation risk posed by a given nuclear fuel system involves 
evaluations of vulnerabilities associated with each step in the nuclear fuel cycle of that system.  
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Evaluations must consider both the inherent properties1 of the materials used or produced in a 
fuel cycle and the availability of appropriate technologies and facilities for converting these 
materials into nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  Several factors are involved 
in this evaluation and assessment, these include:  
• Number, type and location of nuclear installations 
• Form, quality and quantity of fissile material used during fuel cycle operations 
• Accessibility of fissile materials during fuel cycle operations and transportation 
• Inherent design features of fuel cycle 
• Possibility of direct misuse of a nuclear facility 
• Time required for facility misuse modifications 
• Detectability of facility misuse modifications 
• Detectability of diversion or theft of fissile materials 
• Technical capabilities and expertise required to design, build and operate the nuclear 
facilities 
 
General proliferation threats arising from civilian nuclear power systems include: (1) the 
misuse of material through its diversion or theft; (2) misuse of facilities, equipment, and 
technology; and (3) transfer of nuclear skills, knowledge, and expertise useful in the weapons 
area.  Threats may be either overt or covert in nature.  The assessment includes three primary 
steps: first, identifying proliferation pathways that result from a particular threat and the linkage 
between fuel cycle activities and proliferation; then, identifying various barriers to those 
proliferation pathways; and finally, outlining the important attributes that characterize the 
effectiveness of the barriers, for each system or subsystem. 
 
3.2.2 Proliferation Pathways 
A Proliferation Pathway is defined as the nuclear fuel cycle assisted path taken to acquire 
nuclear weapons capabilities.  The key components in any proliferation pathway are materials (in 
particular, high enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium), technology (e.g., enrichment and 
reprocessing), and facilities and skills (e.g., hot fuel cell handling and separations operations) 
 
Potential proliferators are Non-Nuclear Weapons States or Sub-National Groups.  Non-
Nuclear Weapons States can be divided further between those that have very high technical 
levels of nuclear sophistication and those that do not, with all degrees in between.  Sub-National 
Groups can be divided between those that will use material or information for themselves and 
those that will transfer it to someone else.  Nuclear Weapons States already possess the facilities, 
technologies, and capabilities required to produce weapons and have little need to rely on 
civilian nuclear technologies for military purposes.  These Weapons States could transfer 
technology to Non-Nuclear Weapons States (e.g., Russia and China transferring nuclear 
technology to Iran), but the critical focus will remain on the Non-Nuclear Weapons State. 
 
The identification of proliferation threats, the understanding of pathways that enable those 
threats, and the evaluation of barriers to these threats must recognize the evolving nature of the 
problems and issues.  Many and diverse threat scenarios involve numerous actors, pathways, and 
actions.  Scenarios must be examined to determine which are most serious, involve the most 
likely threats and are therefore the most important—and then systems and subsystems must be 
                                                 
1 Those properties that make the material suitable for nuclear weapons 
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proposed to deal with the most important threats.  The technical capabilities and sophistication of 
potential proliferators will likely also increase with time.  Research and development advances 
change the nature and degree of a threat and of the fuel cycle itself and are likely to enhance the 
need for safeguards.   
 
The proliferation pathways can be captured by the event tree below, which will be used in the 
following chapter to highlight specific pathways.   
 
Proliferator Weapons Material Enabling Technology/Material Pathway
Enriching natural uranium at clandestine 
enrichment facility
Clandestine Facilities
Further enriching LEU at clandestine 
"topping" facility
HEU
Process Modifications
Further enriching LEU at misused 
"declared" facility
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from fuel 
fabrication facilities)
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
Separation of  MOX fuel (diverted from 
transportation)
Separations
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from 
power plant)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from short-
term storage (decades)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from long-
term storage (centuries)
Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
reprocessing facilties
Separated Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
transportation
Use of separated Pu diverted from fuel fab. 
facilities
Process Modifications
Producing Pu streams at facilities not 
designed for pure Pu streams
**Closed and Advanced fuel cycles typically include same proilferation concerns as OT plus additional concerns
Proliferation Pathways for Nuclear Fuel Fuel Cycles
 
FIGURE 3-12: Proliferation Pathways Diagram 
The Weapons Materials, Enabling Technology/Materials and Pathways will be 
discussed and developed in detail in chapter 4.  They are included here for 
completeness. 
 
3.2.3 Proliferation Barriers 
Material qualities, technical impediments, and institutional arrangements (including a range 
of measures known as material protection, control, and accounting or MPC&A) present barriers 
                                                 
2 Front-end: fuel cycle activities beginning at mining and ending at shipment of fresh fuel to reactor.  Back-end: fuel 
cycle activities beginning with shipment from reactor to long-term disposal of spent fuel.  Note:  all fabrication 
facilities are considered front-end activities.  HEU = High Enriched Uranium.  LEU = Low Enriched Uranium.  
MOX = Mixed Oxide. 
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that make it more difficult for proliferators to exploit civilian nuclear power systems.  These 
barriers are essentially roadblocks to proliferation pathways.  The first two types of barriers 
above are intrinsic (material and technical) and the last is extrinsic (institutional).  Extrinsic 
barriers depend on implementation protocols and processes and compensate for weaknesses in 
the intrinsic barriers.  Intrinsic barriers are those inherent to technical and related elements of a 
fuel cycle, and its facilities and equipment.  Most analyses (with the exception of the TOPS 
committee analysis) available to-date focus on the extrinsic barriers. 
 
Barriers also do not act independently, and the effect of multiple barriers can be greater than 
the sum of their individual effects.  To better understand this, a classification system was 
designed. 
 
3.3 Barriers Classification 
Various NAS panels (1994, 95, and 99) devised a classification of barriers and their 
associated attributes.  For example, material isotopic, radiological and chemical characteristics 
would be material barrier attributes.  The TOPS task force later built upon these classifications 
with slight modifications.  It was noted by the task force that proposals to analyze proliferation 
resistance using risk-based methodologies, similar to those used for reactor safety studies, 
require knowledge or estimates of the probabilities of those risks but such knowledge is lacking 
or poor, and the probability estimates required are subject to significant debate.  The barriers 
approach avoids this difficulty by requiring only an assessment of the relative effectiveness of 
individual barriers, lending it to qualitative and transparent comparisons among various system 
concepts and options. 
 
The goal of their assessment was to define a set of attributes that describe the relationship 
between the elements of a fuel cycle, the threats arising from those elements, the pathways to 
actualizing these threats, and the effectiveness of barriers to inhibit these pathways.  This process 
helps identify where technologies can advance the goal of enhancing the proliferation resistance 
of civilian nuclear power systems. 
 
The original assessment methodology and that used by the TOPS task force are fully outlined 
in (TOPS, 2000).  A brief summary of this detailed and in-depth discussion of the barrier 
classification can be found in the appendix.  In general, the process identifies all stages of the 
nuclear fuel cycle system and presents the information in a useful proliferation assessment 
matrix.  The following tables outline each barrier attribute and the matrices used to assess their 
effectiveness. 
Table 3-1 summarizes the material barriers and their effectiveness.  In the table, I represents 
an ineffective barrier, L a low barrier, M a medium barrier, H a high barrier and VH a very high 
barrier.  This scale is not linear and some qualitative differences may exist between different 
rankings.  The scale is also not comparable among the various barriers.  That is to say, the 
effectiveness of an H radiological barrier is not necessarily equivalent to an H chemical barrier in 
the overall risk evaluation. 
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TABLE 3-1: Classification of Material Barriers3 
Barrier
I L M H V
Isotopic Weapons-grade HEU (80% or greater U-235)
HEU(50-80%), Weapons-
grade Pu(>90%Pu-239), 
Typical Reactor-Grade 
Pu(60%Pu-239), HEU (35-
50%U-235), very high 
burnup reactor-grade Pu 
(40%or<Pu239)
HEU (20-35%U235) LEU Natural, depleted U
Radiological
No significant radiation 
hazard, capable of 
unlimited hands-on 
access, includes natural, 
depleted, and enriched 
uranium
Moderate radiation 
hazards, normally 
requiring glove-box 
handling, includes 
separated plutonium
Dangerous radiation 
hazards, levels fall 
below "self-protection 
standard"(100R/hr @ 
1meter)
Lethal levels of 
radiation meeting the 
self-protecting standard, 
includes most spent fuel 
and high-level wastes
Chemical Pure metals
Single compounds (requiring 
relatively few and simple 
chemical steps to extract a 
pure metal)
Mixed compounds 
(MOX fuel, dilutents 
and burnable poisons, 
but not fission 
products or other 
radiation barriers)
Spent fuel and vitrified 
wastes
Mass/Bulk
Small amounts of 
weapons usable 
materials, easily 
concealed and 
transported, with sufficient 
concentrations that 
require few trips for 
accumulation
Similar to I, but significantly 
more difficult to conceal
Large quantities must 
be transported 
(multiple trips and/or 
several individuals)
Large quantities must 
be transported, 
requiring commonly 
used equipment and 
vehicles
Large quantities, 
specialized equipment 
and/or low 
concentrations requiring 
many trips
Detectability No reliable signature for remote detection
Materials requiring active 
means of detection
Materials that can be 
reliably detected
Materials easily dected 
by passive means
Classification
Material Barriers
H
 
Table 3-2 summarizes the technical barriers and their effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Adapted from TOPS report.  Note also that while “weapons-grade HEU” is rated I, “weapons-grade plutonium” is 
rated L.  This is principally due to the isotopic characteristics of plutonium that make is more difficult to handle. 
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TABLE 3-2: Classification of Technical Barriers4 
Barrier
I L M H V
Facility Unattractiveness
Facilities that routinely 
use, handle or produce 
significant quantities of 
directly weapons-usable 
materials
Facilities that can be 
modified quickly, safely and 
easily.  With observables 
difficult to detect prior to 
accumulation of significant 
quantities of materials
Facilities that require 
expertise, expense 
and time (~month) to 
modify
Facilities capable of 
modification given 
substantial time 
(months to years), 
money and expertise. 
Safety and throughput 
issues involved
Facilities with little 
appeal for modification
Facility Access
Access to sensitive 
materials is quick and 
easy.  Frequent hands-on 
access
Access is normally 
accomplished via 
automated, remote 
processes.  Manual 
operations are limited
Access is extremely 
difficult, requiring highly 
specialized skills and 
equipment
Available Mass
Very large quantites 
(multiple critical masses) 
of potentially weapons-
usable materials present
A significant quantity (on the 
order of a critical mass) of 
potentially weapons-usable 
material is present
Small quantities (<10% 
critical mass) of 
potentially weapons-
usable materials 
present
Very small quantities 
(<1% critical mass) of 
potentially weapons-
usabe materials present
Facility Diversion 
Detectability
Facilities with no or 
minimal detection 
equipment.  Procedures 
that allow materials to 
easily move with 
detection
Facilities with detection 
equipment.  Procedures 
that make it very 
difficult for material to 
move without detection]
Skills, Knowledge, 
Expertise
Process, technology, or 
facility provides 
significant and unique 
technical expertise having 
direct weapons-
development application.  
"Dual-use skills"
Existence of skills, 
knowledge and 
expertise provide 
support valuable to 
weapons-development 
programs, but is not 
directly applicable
Only general industrial 
skills are needed to 
support the technology 
or facility.  These skills 
are well known and 
readily available
Time
Long storage time 
(decades) with oportunity 
for access to materials 
and/or equipment
Long storage time but with 
low access opportunity
Intermediate storage 
time (years) and low 
opportunity for access
Short to intermediate 
storage times with high 
opportunity for access
Short or no storage time 
(days to months) and 
low opportunity for 
access
Technical Barriers
Classification
H
 
Table 3-3 summarizes the institutional barriers and their effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Adapted from TOPS report 
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TABLE 3-3: Classification of Institutional Barriers5 
Barrier
I L M H V
Safeguards 
Effectiveness
Safeguards monitoring 
parameters are limited 
and complex.  Uncertainty 
in materials status 
increases rapidly if 
monitoring is delayed or 
restiricted.  Margins for 
error in meeting 
timeliness of detection 
goals are small
Multiple monitored 
parameters provide 
easily interpreted data.  
Uncertainty in material 
status increases slowly 
with delays or 
restrictions.  Margins for 
error are large and 
robust
Access Control, Security Materials could be easily moved without detection.
With some prior planning, 
materials could be removed 
with a small probability of 
detection.  Could be stolen 
by a small group of lightly 
armed outsiders
At most times, theft 
attempts by a single 
insider would be 
detected.  System 
vulnerabilities to 
circumstances 
(emergencies/power 
outages) are high.  
Theft by outsiders 
would require well-
trained, well-armed 
individuals properly 
equiped
Theft by a single insider 
or small group of armed 
outsiders (or both) can 
be blocked with good 
confidence.  Design 
basis threat includes 
possible use of 
equipment brought in 
by vehicles
Theft attempts by 
multiple insiders or 
large groups of armed 
outsiders (or both) can 
be blocked with high 
confidence.  Design 
basis threat also 
includes the possible 
use of helicopters
Location
Proliferation threat is 
highly dependent upon 
facility location
Facility location poses 
no additional threat to 
proliferation
Classification
Institutional Barriers
H
 
The barriers and systems are evaluated and then presented in a table similar to the matrix in 
table 3-4 below. 
                                                 
5 Adapted from TOPS report 
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TABLE 3-4: Proliferation Assessment Matrix6 
Stages of fuel cycle
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Beginning of the cycle
Mining
Transport
Miling
Transport
Conversion
Storage
Transport
Uranium Enrichment
Storage
Transport
Manufacture of fuel material (fissle material)/thorium
Production of fuel (pellets,pebbles, etc.)
Production of Fuel Assemblies, Cast
Storage
Fresh fuel transport to NPP
Operation at NPP
Storage of fresh fuel
Loading of fresh fuel into the core
Reactor irradiation
Unloading of irradiated fuel from the core
On-site pool storage of spent fuel
On-site dry storage of spent fuel
Closed cycles
Dissassembly of fuel assembly
Separation of fissile materials
Storage of highly-concentrated fissile material 
Manufacture of fresh fuel from recovered fissile 
materials
Collection, processing and storage of actinide-
containing waste
Transport of actinide-containing waste for burial
Transport of recovered fuel
End of fuel cycle (includes once-through)
Off-site transport of irradiated spent fuel
Temporary storage of irradiated fuel
Processing of irradiated fuel for storage and 
disposition
Storage of processed materials
Long-term geolgical burial of irradiated fuel and 
actinide-containing waste
Material Barriers Technical Barriers Institutional 
Proliferation Assessment Matrix
 
The matrix shows each stage of a closed fuel cycle and can be easily altered, by addition or 
removal of stages, to accommodate any nuclear fuel cycle.  It was suggested that each system be 
                                                 
6 Adapted from TOPS report 
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evaluated separately for each threat to that system (e.g., covert diversion by a Sophisticated Non-
Nuclear Weapons State,…).    In Chapter 4, we use this framework to present an assessment of 
five reactor/fuel cycle combinations that may be especially relevant for the growth scenario.  We 
start with the major deployed reactor/fuel cycle combinations, that is, light water reactors 
operated in once-through mode (open fuel cycle) or in MOX recycle mode (“closed” fuel cycle); 
widespread deployment today suggests that these technologies are likely to dominate at least the 
early parts of the growth scenario.  We then turn to two reactor concepts, high temperature gas 
reactors and long-life core reactors, that may be attractive for deployment in many countries, 
specifically including developing countries, because of their modular design; these would be 
operated in once-through mode.  Finally, we examine an advanced closed fuel cycle (fast 
spectrum reactor with recycle of plutonium and minor actinides) that is thought to have 
advantages with regard to uranium resource extension and waste management.  The gas reactor 
might be practical for significant deployment well into the growth scenario (say, twenty years).  
The others (especially the fast reactor/closed fuel cycle) face major development and cost 
challenges and are very unlikely to be deployed significantly for at least fifty years. 
Within the framework7 outlined above, we evaluate the effectiveness of the various barriers 
at different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.  Some stages of the fuel cycle may have relatively 
little influence on proliferation resistance and also do not significantly affect relative 
comparisons of most fuel cycles.  There is also substantial commonality for most fuel cycles in 
the storage and disposition of spent fuel and processed high-level radiation waste.  Our focus will 
be on proliferation pathways particular to the technology, in relation to the baseline LWR/open 
fuel cycle.  A detailed analysis of the effectiveness of each barrier (at each stage of the particular 
nuclear fuel cycle) was performed for both the threat posed by sub-national groups and non-
nuclear weapons states.  However, we only present those pathways (posed by non-nuclear 
weapons states) that are of greatest concern or relevance. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
In summary, the assessment methodology used for each reactor/fuel cycle, follows the steps 
below: 
a. Step One:  Define the proliferation pathway that a nation or organization might 
take to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.  
b. Step Two:  Using the proliferation matrix, assess the nuclear fuel cycle given each 
defined pathway. 
c. Step Three:  Highlight key vulnerabilities and barriers in the fuel cycle with 
respect to a particular pathway. 
d. Step Four:  Develop recommendations that address the key vulnerabilities. 
 
The principal focus is on non-nuclear weapons states.  We assume that sub-national 
groups would practically need to start from weapons-usable material to produce a nuclear 
                                                 
7 J. Hassberger, in his assessment noted that the framework requires consideration of two important factors: the 
effectiveness of a fuel cycle in supporting each barrier in the framework; and the importance of that barrier to each 
of the particular threats.  He pointed out that it could be very tedious and cumbersome to consider both the barrier 
effectiveness and the barrier importance for each barrier, each fuel cycle stage, and each threat.  His conclusion, was 
that the extent to which a particular fuel cycle and/or technology supports the effectiveness of a particular barrier is 
dependent only on the fuel cycle and/or technology itself and not on the threat.  Also, the importance of a particular 
barrier in overall evaluation of proliferation resistance depends mainly on the threat and the viability of the threat to 
be realized. 
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weapon, that is, that such groups do not have the capability to produce the material without the 
active support and protection of a state (in which case the problem is effectively one of state 
proliferation).  Consequently, fuel cycles that make weapons-usable material available during 
normal fuel cycle operations are singled out for special concern with respect to sub-national 
groups. 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment 
4 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ASSESSMENT 
 
The reactor/fuel cycle combinations chosen for assessment fall into three time frames:  1) 
“baseline” technologies (LWR once-through; LWR MOX) chosen because they are the dominant 
commercial nuclear fuel cycles currently operational; 2) relatively near-term technologies 
(MPBR) chosen because this represents a technology that could become a commercial option in 
the near future; and 3) long-term technologies (Lifetime Cores-Encapsulated Nuclear Heat 
Source and IFR) chosen because they represent technologies that are still in the concept stages 
but could be available for deployment by mid-century.  These are particularly appropriate for our 
nonproliferation considerations in the global growth scenario since the baseline technologies are 
those that would dominate its early stages, the once-through cycles built around next-generation 
modular reactors may be especially relevant for developing countries, and the advanced closed 
fuel cycles will generate considerable development activity over the next decades. 
 
4.1 Once Through Fuel Cycles 
The sketch below represents the typical stages of a generic once through nuclear fuel 
cycle. 
 
FIGURE 4-1: Typical Stages of Once Through Nuclear Fuel Cycle1.  
Arrows represent transportation of materials.  There are currently no operational permanent waste repository sites, 
only spent fuel storage facilities.  Note: UF6  and UO2, are notation for uranium hexaflouride and uranium oxide, 
respectively. 
 
Steps before reactor operation are considered the front end of the fuel cycle.  Those that 
follow reactor operation, which generally have high radiation levels, constitute the back end of 
the fuel cycle.  In the figure, red arrows represent transportation of materials. 
                                                 
1 Diagram courtesy of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (modified) http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-
fac/stages-fuel-cycle.html 
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The exploration process usually begins with geologic evaluation to determine potential 
uranium deposits and develop a uranium ore mapping.  Major uranium resources are located in 
Africa, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the western US, and the USSR (see figure 4-2 below).  The 
following map shows 2002 World Uranium Resources (Reasonably Assured Resources). 
 
 
FIGURE 4-2: World Uranium Resources2 
 
Uranium is mined by either open pit or underground operations.  Next, a milling process 
removes uranium from the ore by chemical and physical operations.   
 
Natural uranium is composed of two isotopes, 235U (0.711wt%) and 238U (99.3wt%), 
which cannot be chemically separated.  The ore must be converted in preparation for being 
enriched.  The conversion step begins by purifying the U3O8 (yellowcake); then chemical 
reactions with fluorine produce UF6 (uranium hexafluoride).  Most reactors in operation require 
that the 235U fraction of the total uranium be higher than 0.711wt% and it thus must be enriched 
(see figures 4-3 and 4-4).  The fabrication step of the cycle produces fuel in a form that is ready 
for power production in the reactor.  In this step, the enriched uranium hexafluoride is converted 
to uranium dioxide and then formed into thimble-sized pellets (or pebbles for high temperature 
gas reactors).  These pellets are loaded into cladding tubes and placed into final fuel assemblies 
(see figure 4-5).  The completed fuel assemblies are loaded into the reactor core for use and 
irradiation.  Since fuel assemblies are highly radioactive at discharge, they are allowed to cool 
                                                 
2 Map courtesy of World Information Service on Energy (WISE) Uranium Project (April 2003) 
http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/umaps.html 
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for a period in pools (or dry cooling storage).  In the Once-Through fuel cycle, these cooled 
spent fuel assemblies are then taken to long term waste disposal facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4-3: Centrifuge Enrichment Facility3.  The 
photo shows a typical centrifuge enrichment cascade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4-4: Gas Diffusion 
Enrichment Facility4 The photo shows 
operations at a gaseous diffusion enrichment 
facility. 
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4 Photo courtesy of USEC (2002) http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Facilities_PaducahTour02.asp 
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FIGURE 4-5: Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facility5 
 
 For the once-through fuel cycles, the major variation is with the reactor design and 
associated fuel form and enrichment. 
 
4.1.1 Light-Water-Moderated Reactors (operated in Once Through Mode) 
There are two types of light-water-moderated reactors (LWRs) commercially operational: 
the pressurized-water reactor (PWR) (see figure 4-6) and the boiling-water reactor (BWR).  
These reactors are typically designed to operate at a thermal power of about 3,900 megawatts 
(MWt) yielding electrical power of about 1,300 megawatts (MWe) (Mozley, 1998).  In both 
reactors, the uranium fuel is encased in tubing that can withstand the high temperatures and the 
high neutron flux of the reactor.  Water is circulated past the encased uranium rods to cool them, 
and the same or additional water acts as a moderator to slow down the neutrons produced by 
fissioning of uranium-2356. 
 
 
FIGURE 4-6: Pressure Water Reactor Fuel Cycle7 
 
                                                 
5 Photo courtesy of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/fuel-
fab.html 
6 For more detailed discussion of reactor types see (Knief, 1992) 
7 Photo courtesy US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2002) http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-
ref/students/animated-pwr.html 
 60
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment 
In a PWR the hot water may be under a pressure of about 2,200psi, so that its boiling 
point is higher than the temperature at which the reactor operates (over 570°F).  This hot water 
circulates past a heat exchanger where it transfers its heat to water that is under a much lower 
pressure, possibly only 60 atmospheres.  The high-pressure steam is used to power turbines to 
produce electricity.  The PWR is fueled with low-enriched uranium irradiated to moderate 
burnups, reaching perhaps 50,000 MWD/ton. 
 
The BWR, which is similar to the PWR, features a direct-cycle steam system.  Feed water 
enters the reactor vessel, has its flow adjusted by the re-circulation system, and leaves as steam.  
The high-pressure turbine stage receives steam at about 550oF and 1000psi.  By use of successive 
low-pressure stages and a condenser loop in a standard regenerative cycle, a maximum thermal 
efficiency of approximately 33% is obtained (Kneif, 1992). 
 
The LWR-OT, with institutional arrangements similar to those in force today, is generally 
considered an “acceptable” baseline from a non-proliferation point of view.  The INFCE study8 
noted that “on the whole, it appears that an adequate degree of proliferation resistance can be 
attained, at least in the short and medium term, with present thermal reactors in the once-through 
mode, provided that appropriate safeguards are applied to enrichment, fuel fabrication and 
irradiated fuel storage facilities” (INFCE, 1980) 
 
 
4.1.2 Proliferation Pathways 
The ultimate goal of any proliferation pathway is the acquisition of highly enriched 
uranium, plutonium or other weapons usable materials for the purpose of either creating nuclear 
weapons capability or creating the threat of nuclear weapons capability.  Examination of the 
LWR-OT 9  (from the context of a Non-Nuclear Weapons State with the relevant skills, 
technologies and facilities to supports its particular civilian nuclear fuel cycle) reveals several 
potential proliferation pathways.  A proliferator could acquire high-enriched uranium through 
diversion of natural uranium to a clandestine enrichment facility, through diversion of LEU to a 
clandestine topping plant, or through reconfiguring a declared fuel cycle enrichment facility to 
produce HEU.  If plutonium was the material of choice, it could be acquired through pre-disposal 
diversion of spent fuel to a clandestine reprocessing facility, or through retrieval of spent fuel 
from a long-term disposal site. 
 
Pathway A: High-Enriched Uranium 
A-1: Diversion of natural uranium 
If a non-nuclear weapons state has clandestine enrichment capabilities, there are several 
points (mining, milling, conversion, storage and transport of natural uranium) prior to the 
uranium enrichment stage, which must be closely examined to determine their effectiveness in 
preventing successful proliferation. The diversion path is illustrated in the figure below, where 
the particular path is in bold. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Discussed more in chapter 3 
9 Assessments were done using PWR characteristics, but are applicable to BWRs 
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Proliferator Weapons Material Enabling Technology/Material Pathway
Enriching natural uranium at 
clandestine enrichment facility
Clandestine Facilities
Further enriching LEU at clandestine 
"topping" facility
HEU
Process Modifications
Further enriching LEU at misused 
"declared" facility
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from fuel 
fabrication facilities)
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
Separation of  MOX fuel (diverted from 
transportation)
Separations
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from 
power plant)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from short-
term storage (decades)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from long-
term storage (centuries)
Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
reprocessing facilties
Separated Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
transportation
Use of separated Pu diverted from fuel fab. 
facilities
Process Modifications
Producing Pu streams at facilities not 
designed for pure Pu streams
**Closed and Advanced fuel cycles typically include same proilferation concerns as OT plus additional concerns
Proliferation Pathways for LWR-OT Fuel Cycles
 
FIGURE 4-7: LWR-OT Pathway A-1 (HEU: Diversion of Natural Uranium) 
In this pathway, a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (proliferator) desires to acquire HEU (weapons material) by using 
clandestine facilities to enrich natural uranium.  This pathway is quite possible, but by no means the most efficient 
or preferred pathway to nuclear weapons. 
 
At any point in the steps above, natural uranium might be diverted to a clandestine 
enrichment facility.  Mining operations and milling plants are not included in the “facilities” that 
IAEA is authorized to safeguard (INFCIRC/153, 1971).  The result, as can be seen in table 4-1, 
is that mining and milling stages not only have low material and technical barriers to 
proliferation, but they also have low institutional barriers to proliferation.  While diversion of 
natural uranium would not be a suitable route for sub-national groups to acquire nuclear weapons 
capabilities, non-nuclear weapons states could conceivably divert considerable amounts of 
material.  The danger of this pathway is further increased by the IAEA’s limitation on 
investigation of undeclared facilities.   
 
A-2: Diversion of LEU 
Although diversion of natural uranium to a clandestine enrichment facility is a potential 
proliferation pathway, it is technically and economically less demanding to produce HEU if one 
starts with low enriched uranium (LEU).  This could be diverted to a small, undeclared, 
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clandestine topping plant10  (this pathway is detailed in the High Temperature Gas Reactor 
section, because this technology is typically more vulnerable to topping plants because of the 
higher enrichment requirement—sometimes 8-11% uranium) or used in a reconfigured part of a 
declared enrichment facility. Figure 4-8 below is an illustration of this proliferation pathway. 
 
Proliferator Weapons Material Enabling Technology/Material Pathway
Enriching natural uranium at clandestine 
enrichment facility
Clandestine Facilities
Further enriching LEU at clandestine 
"topping" facility
HEU
Process Modifications
Further enriching LEU at misused 
"declared" facility
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from fuel 
fabrication facilities)
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
Separation of  MOX fuel (diverted from 
transportation)
Separations
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from 
power plant)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from short-
term storage (decades)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from long-
term storage (centuries)
Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
reprocessing facilties
Separated Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
transportation
Use of separated Pu diverted from fuel fab. 
facilities
Process Modifications
Producing Pu streams at facilities not 
designed for pure Pu streams
**Closed and Advanced fuel cycles typically include same proilferation concerns as OT plus additional concerns
Proliferation Pathways for LWR-OT Fuel Cycles
 
FIGURE 4-8: LWR-OT Pathway A-2 (HEU: Diversion of LEU) 
In this pathway, a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (proliferator) desires to acquire HEU (weapons material) either by 
using clandestine facilities to enrich LEU, or by process modification at declared enrichment facilities.  This is a 
major proliferation pathway, particularly within the context of expanding nuclear power. 
 
Typically, commercial Light Water Reactors use natural uranium enriched to 3-4wt% 
235U.  The methods of uranium enrichment range used commercially are gaseous diffusion or 
centrifuge11 (Krass, 1983).  Today’s world nominal separative work unit12 (SWU) capacity is 
close to 35 million SWU per year (Lenders, 2001).  It is estimated that a centrifuge plant requires 
                                                 
10 Topping plants are small-scale enrichment facilities that are typically configured to use enriched feed, thereby 
reducing the SWU requirement for obtaining HEU (see figure 4-9).  Topping plants are much less resource intensive 
than typical commercial enrichment facilities and thus are ideal for clandestine use. 
11 Additional detailed information on each method can be found in Krass, 1983 
12 Separative Work Unit (SWU) is defined as the amount of energy expended in enriching uranium per unit mass of 
product. 
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1/10 the energy per SWU than that required by gaseous diffusion plants (Cochran, 1999).  A 
highly efficient centrifuge plant can produce 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium using 
roughly 500,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity (Mozley, 1998, p. 102). 
 
Centrifuge plants require approximately 10 stages in an ideal cascade to enrich natural 
uranium (0.3wt% tails) to 3wt%, while on the order of 35 stages are required to enrich natural 
uranium to 90wt%.  A minimum-sized plant might involve as few as 1,000 centrifuges to provide 
a capacity of 5,000 SWU per year.  One could attain greater capacities simply by adding 
centrifuges in parallel or by using larger capacity facilities (Greenwood, 1977). 
 
It is the existence of this enriched uranium that brings the facilities under IAEA safeguard 
agreements as pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treat (NPT).  The natural or low enriched 
uranium can be considered usable, though indirectly, for nuclear weapons production.  The 
IAEA has stated, “that while the establishment of an enrichment facility…is a costly and lengthy 
process, the subsequent enrichment of LEU, once enrichment facilities have been established, 
could be achieved in less than one year (Nilsson, 1994).”  IAEA inspection goals are specified 
such that when implementing its’ safeguards system, the Agency “shall be able to detect a 
diversion of at least 75 kilograms of uranium-235 contained in LEU during a time period of one 
year. 
 
To reach their inspection goals, the IAEA created a safeguards approach that enables an 
annual evaluation and independent verification of the facility’s material balance over periods of 
time.  Routine inspections are conducted to verify the operator’s declarations of material 
accountancy, i.e. the accountancy records and supporting source documents.  At enrichment 
facilities, monthly inspections are performed.  The inspection planning is based both on 
operational information given semi-annually and advance notifications of receipts and shipments 
of nuclear material.  Weighing and sampling for subsequent chemical analysis, as well as non-
destructive assay for enrichment performance verification of nuclear material in flow.  When 
comparing the inventory as registered (book inventory) with the measured inventory (physical 
inventory) for a facility handling nuclear material in bulk form, there is always a difference.  
This difference is called material unaccounted for (MUF).  A statistical evaluation of the material 
balance leads to a conclusion of whether or not the MUF is within acceptable limits.  Though this 
system accurately verifies the correctness and completeness of a nation’s declared nuclear 
activities, it does not provide credible assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. 
 
Countries that possess enrichment technology have the skills, knowledge and expertise to 
enrich natural uranium to >90wt% 235U, which is considered weapons-grade and could do so 
clandestinely with the possibility of subverting current IAEA safeguards, which are not 
constructed to search for these clandestine activities.  The presence of this enrichment 
technology thus creates vulnerability within the Light Water Reactor Once-Through Fuel Cycles. 
 
Another point to consider is that, with the use of modified civilian facilities or “topping” 
plants, enriching to >90wt% 235U could be done using previously enriched fuel as feed.  This can 
be seen in figure 4-9, which shows the mass of feed required, given an initial feed enrichment, to 
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enrich 1kg, of uranium product, to 93wt% with 0.25wt% tails, using separative work of 200 
kgSWU13.   
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FIGURE 4-9: Required Feed Mass14 
The graph shows the amount (kg) of uranium-235 needed, given an initial feed enrichment and using 200 
kgSWU, to produce 1 kg of 93% enriched uranium that has 0.25% tails. 
 
The above figure shows that separative work of 200 kgSWU will convert 187kg of 
natural uranium feed to 1kg of 93wt% uranium with 0.25wt% tails.  It can be seen from the 
graph that the same work (200 SWU) requires only 75kg of 3wt% enriched feed to obtain the 
1kg of 93wt% enriched uranium with the same tails.   
 
A 1996 Committee on Separations Technology and Transmutation Systems found that an 
enrichment plant with a capacity of 1 million SWU/yr configured for low enrichment from 
natural uranium feed could produce 20 tonnes of 3wt% LEU fuel feed per month or 240Mg/yr 
(NRC, 1996).  The same plant reconfigured for HEU production could produce about 350kg of 
HEU per month or enough for about a dozen nuclear weapons per month (NRC, 1996).  The 
                                                 
13 Separative work can be calculated as the net increase in value (i.e., of the product and tails less that of the initial 
feed) that results from a given enrichment operation and may be reported in units of mass.  Separative Work Unit 
(SWU) is dimensionless.  Often SWU and separative work are used interchangeably. 
14 Graph was generated using the standard formula for separative work units SWU=V(p)+V(t)(F-1)-V(f)F found in 
(Kneif, 1992). 
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committee also found that “material diverted…could be further enriched in a small, covert 
‘topping’ plant, using the same or another enrichment technique, to achieve HEU from the 
combination.  The topping plant itself might be hard to locate without some intelligence 
information.” 
 
In a discussion paper, Matthew Bunn (2001) reports that the “HEU for Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons was produced at a plant using centrifuge technology stolen from a contractor for the 
civilian URENCO enterprise in Europe”.  Bunn, in his examination of the aspects of civilian 
nuclear energy that have contributed to nuclear weapons programs, also reports that Iraq 
successfully hid both large undeclared facilities and covert activities at declared facilities from 
the IAEA inspection regime.  This can be seen in the photo below: 
 
 
FIGURE 4-10: AL FURAT Manufacturing Facility15 
The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) reported that this facility was intended for the design, 
assembly and testing of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. 
 
Construction of the building depicted on this graphic was suspended in 1991. 
Construction resumed in 2001, and the building appears to be nearly complete and operational by 
September 2002. The building was originally intended to house a centrifuge enrichment cascade 
                                                 
15 Information and photo taken from www.globalsecurity.org 
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operation supporting Iraq's uranium enrichment efforts.  Global Security, from which this 
information was obtained, noted that: 
Al Furat, located 27-30 km SW of Baghdad, was intended for the design, assembly, and 
testing of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Iraq construction of an industrial-scale 
plant to manufacture centrifuges was conducted under the code-name Al Furat Project.  
The exact location of this facility remains obscure, but the location reported by 
UNSCOM appears to correlate with an area enclosed by a security perimeter noted on the 
Tactical Pilotage Chart for Baghdad, located on the west bank of the Euphrates River.  
The plant, designed to build all the components for centrifuges, was slated for completion 
by mid-1991. By various estimates, it could have been capable of manufacturing at least 
2,000 and perhaps as many as 5,000 centrifuges annually. Plans called for a 100-machine 
prototype centrifuge cascade at Al Furat by the end of 1992, with operations beginning 
by mid-1993. By late 1991, IAEA inspectors had concluded that the German firm 
Interatom GmbH and Strabag AG, a German construction firm, had worked at the 
building at al-Furat planned as the 100-centrifuge cascade hall.  Iraq was planning to 
build a 1,000-machine production cascade at Taji. Based on performance achieved by the 
Iraqis with their prototype centrifuge, IAEA estimated the potential output of a 1,000-
centrifuge cascade at about ten kilograms of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium 
annually.  All centrifuge related components were destroyed under IAEA supervision. 
 
Pathway B: Plutonium 
A large number of new radioactive species, fission products and actinides, are produced 
after a nuclear reactor has been operational for a few months.  Fresh LWR fuel consists of 235U 
and 238U in uranium dioxide and after substantial operation will have produced over 50 nuclear 
species.  Plutonium isotopes are among the numerous radionuclides generated.  This plutonium 
is produced when a 238U isotope absorbs a neutron to become 239U.  The 239U then decays in a 
short time by β- emission to become 239Np, which in turn, decays to 239Pu.  There are two 
pathways to acquiring plutonium from an LWR-OT nuclear fuel cycle.  A proliferator could 
either divert spent fuel that has not been placed in long-term disposal or, after decades, a 
proliferator could remove plutonium from “plutonium mines” created by “cooling” of spent fuel 
in terms of heat, radioactivity, and radiotoxicity.  Both pathways can be seen in the diagram 
below: 
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Proliferator Weapons Material Enabling Technology/Material Pathway
Enriching natural uranium at clandestine 
enrichment facility
Clandestine Facilities
Further enriching LEU at clandestine 
"topping" facility
HEU
Process Modifications
Further enriching LEU at misused 
"declared" facility
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from fuel 
fabrication facilities)
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
Separation of  MOX fuel (diverted from 
transportation)
Separations
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from 
power plant)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from short-
term storage (decades)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from long-
term storage (centuries)
Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
reprocessing facilties
Separated Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
transportation
Use of separated Pu diverted from fuel fab. 
facilities
Process Modifications
Producing Pu streams at facilities not 
designed for pure Pu streams
**Closed and Advanced fuel cycles typically include same proilferation concerns as OT plus additional concerns
Proliferation Pathways for LWR-OT Fuel Cycles
 
FIGURE 4-11: LWR-OT Pathway B (Diversion of spent fuel) 
In this pathway, a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (proliferator) desires to acquire plutonium (weapons 
material) by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel that was diverted from intermediate storage facilities or retrieved from 
long-term disposal sites. 
 
The plutonium isotopics of irradiated fuel at discharge, of various burn-up levels are 
listed in the table below (Pellaud, 2002).  For comparison sake, the isotopic composition of 
weapons grade plutonium is also included.  Though reactor-grade plutonium has a much lower 
fissile fraction than weapons-grade plutonium, thereby increasing the complexity of actually 
producing a weapon, multiple critical masses are still available in reactor-grade plutonium.  Even 
at the burn-ups listed in the table below, the plutonium can still be used for weapons production. 
 
TABLE 4-1: Plutonium Isotopic Compositions 
Nominal Plutonium Isotopic Composition (w/o) 
Pu-Isotope Weapons-Grade LWR-OT Spent Fuel 
(35 GWD/T) 
LWR-OT Spent Fuel 
(60 GWD/T) 
Pu-238 0.01 1.2 3.5 
Pu-239 93.6 58 44 
Pu-240 5.9 23 27 
Pu-241 1.4 14 15 
Pu-242 0.1 4 11 
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In either case, once diverted, spent fuel assemblies would have to be sent to a 
reprocessing facility to separate the plutonium from the other fission products and actinides.  The 
presence of these radionuclides generates a tremendous amount of radioactivity, radiotoxicity 
and decay heat16. 
 
Unloading these fuel elements from the reactor, storage, and reprocessing of spent 
nuclear fuel must be done remotely.  This is because of the radiation generated.  The gamma 
dose rate from a typical 15-year old spent fuel assembly is 2000 rad/hr at 1 meter from the 
assemblies’ center (NAS, 1994).  It is this gamma radiation that makes thick shielding and 
remote handling requirements both substantial and necessary.  Host countries that possess the 
skills, knowledge and expertise17 to handle these highly radioactive, radiotoxic and hot fuel 
assemblies are essentially one step (reprocessing) away from possessing directly weapons usable 
materials. 
 
Another important aspect of irradiated nuclear fuel is its’ long term characteristics.  The 
graphs below show the decay behavior of spent PWR fuel with a burnup of 33,000 MWD/MT 
(Croff, 1982). 
 
 
FIGURE 4-12: Decay Behavior of Spent PWR Fuel 
 
                                                 
16 See isotopic characteristics table in appendix 
17 These are considered “dual-use” skills (skills that can be used for both civilian and military purposes). 
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Both the radioactivity and thermal power graphs above show that as spent fuel ages 
radiation levels drop.  Gamma-emitting fission products, notably cesium-137 and strontium-90, 
that give spent fuel its initial proliferation resistance have far shorter half-lives than plutonium.  
The half-life of 137Cs is approximately 30 years; therefore even applying the “rule of thumb” that 
after 10 half-lives the material will have decayed enough to be safe, puts cesium’s protective 
effects at 300 years compared to the half-life of 239Pu, which is 24,400 years.   
 
After a few hundred years, the radioactivity and thermal power of spent fuel would have 
decayed enough to greatly ease handling requirements.  For example, after 300 years the thermal 
power of PWR spent fuel will have decreased from 104 W/MTHM to roughly 100 W/MTHM.  
Looking at the radioactivity of spent PWR fuel at 300 years out shows that it has decreased by 
more than 3 orders of magnitude.  In both cases the dominant nuclide is 241Am. 
 
More importantly, because of the cesium and strontium isotopes, most of the decrease in 
the radioactivity and decay heat of spent fuel assemblies (almost 2 orders of magnitude) will 
occur after only 30 years post-discharge18.  Though this is still not within the range of being able 
to be handled directly, it does significantly reduce the remote handling requirements thereby 
increasing access potential. 
 
Effectively plutonium mines-relatively low-cost sources of weapons-usable material for 
nuclear weapons- are created after a hundred years or so of post-irradiation storage.  These mines 
could be used by a nation or sub-national group to extract plutonium from the spent fuel 
assemblies with minimal difficulty.  In a paper on the proliferation risks of plutonium mines, 
Lyman and Feiveson (1998) make the following comments: 
The concern that repositories will become “plutonium mines” over time 
stems principally from two factors.  First, the time and effort necessary to 
recover spent fuel from a repository, although significant, may compare 
favorably with other ways that a nation may acquire spent fuel, the “ore” 
from which plutonium can be extracted.  Second, as a result of the 
relatively short (30-year) half-life of cesium-127, the spent fuel radiation 
barrier will decay to a low level within a few centuries after discharge 
from a reactor, so that older spent fuel can be handled and reprocessed 
with lower risk of injury. 
 
Thus, the presence of extractable plutonium in retrievable mines creates another proliferation 
pathway within the LWR-OT fuel cycle.  It should be noted that even if spent fuel assemblies are 
extractable, the relative plutonium isotope concentrations must also be taken into account.  The 
higher the concentration of even number isotopes the more difficult it is to create an effective 
nuclear weapon19.  This is because of the extremely high decay heat and neutron generation of 
these isotopes.  The relatively short lifetime of Pu-238 means that the quality of the plutonium 
for weapons use improves with time.  Lyman and Feiveson (1998) concluded, “the range of 
conditions under which repository mining will look attractive compared to other means of 
acquiring plutonium is extremely narrow.”  However, they also concluded that, “if spent fuel is 
                                                 
18 From 30 to a hundred years post-irradiation, the radioactivity of spent LWR fuel drops by a factor of 7 or 8, while 
the decay heat only decreases by a factor of four. 
19 Refer to appendix for discussion of plutonium isotopics and weapons usability 
 70
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment 
not put into a repository, and is instead left in retrievable storage and eventually reprocessed, 
with the plutonium and other actinides in the spent fuel separated and transmuted, that course 
will itself generate significant risks of plutonium diversion or theft.”  It is therefore important to 
examine this pathway from the perspective of an aggressive nuclear growth scenario.  A scenario, 
which would lead to, increased demands on waste facilities and could eventually lead to 
construction of short or long-term facilities in locations, which are less than ideal. 
 
4.1.3 Assessments 
Pathway A-1 Assessment 
Table 4-2 below gives an assessment of the proliferation resistance of the LWR-OT 
nuclear fuel cycle to this particular pathway and highlights the vulnerabilities mentioned above.  
The assessment includes transport between and storage within each stage.  A key is included in 
the tables and the coloring is simply to illustrate each barrier. 
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TABLE 4-2: LWR-OT Proliferation Assessment (Pathway A-1) 
Stages of fuel cycle
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Transport H I I H L I I I L I VH I L L
Conversion H I M H L I I I L I H M L L
Storage H I M H L I I I L I M M L L
Transport H I M H L I I I L I VH M L L
Uranium Enrichment
Storage
Transport
Uranium Oxide Fabrication Facilities
Production of fuel (pellets,pebbles, etc.)
Production of Fuel Assemblies, Cast
Storage
Fresh fuel transport to NPP
Operation at NPP
Storage of fresh fuel
Loading of fresh fuel into the core
Reactor irradiation
Unloading of irradiated fuel from the core
On-site pool storage of spent fuel
On-site dry storage of spent fuel
End of fuel cycle
Off-site transport of irradiated spent fuel
Temporary storage of irradiated fuel
Processing of irradiated fuel for storage and 
disposition
Storage of processed materials
Long-term geolgical burial of irradiated fuel and 
actinide-containing waste
KEY
I     =Ineffective Barrier
L    =Low Barrier
M   =Medium Barrer
H    =High Barrier
VH  =Very High Barrier
Institutional Technical BarriersMaterial Barriers
LWR Proliferation Pathway A-1: HEU (pre-enrichment natural U diversion)
 
 
 The assessment methodology was used to determine the relevant proliferation pathways 
for the LWR-OT (the same is done for the remaining technologies) fuel cycle.  The reader should 
be reminded that in assessing the nuclear fuel cycle’s proliferation resistance, we choose to focus 
on the context of a Non-Nuclear Weapons State that has in its possession the skills, knowledge, 
expertise, technology and facilities to support its particular nuclear fuel cycle.  The proliferation 
assessment tables highlight the results of the assessment for each particular pathway.  The reader 
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should also be reminded that the matrix assessment, though based on the attributes criteria 
discussed in chapter 3 and the appendix, required a certain level of subjectivity and is open for 
debate. 
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 Pathway A-2 Assessment 
The table below gives an assessment of the LWR-OT nuclear fuel cycle’s resistance to 
using modified and/or undeclared enrichment facilities. 
 
TABLE 4-3:  LWR-OT Proliferation Assessment (Pathway A-2) 
Stages of fuel cycle
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Fresh fuel transport to NPP
Operation at NPP
Storage of fresh fuel
Loading of fresh fuel into the core
Reactor irradiation
Unloading of irradiated fuel from the core
On-site pool storage of spent fuel
On-site dry storage of spent fuel
End of fuel cycle
Off-site transport of irradiated spent fuel
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Processing of irradiated fuel for storage and 
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Long-term geolgical burial of irradiated fuel and 
actinide-containing waste
KEY
I     =Ineffective Barrier
L    =Low Barrier
M   =Medium Barrer
H    =High Barrier
VH  =Very High Barrier
LWR Proliferation Pathway A-2: HEU (LEU diversion)
Material Barriers Technical Barriers Institutional 
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 Pathway B Assessment 
The table below gives the matrix assessment for LWR’s proliferation resistance to 
acquisition of plutonium. 
 
TABLE 4-4:  LWR-OT Proliferation Assessment (Pathway B) 
Stages of fuel cycle
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Transport
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Transport
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Production of Fuel Assemblies, Cast
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Fresh fuel transport to NPP
Operation at NPP
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Loading of fresh fuel into the core
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Unloading of irradiated fuel from the core L H VH H VH M I L VH I VH H M L
On-site pool storage of spent fuel L H VH H VH I I L VH I L H M L
On-site dry storage of spent fuel L H VH H VH I I L VH I L H M L
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LWR Proliferation Pathway B: Plutonium (pre and post-disposal spent fuel 
diversion)
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4.1.4 Recommendations 
Based on the vulnerabilities mentioned above, the following sets of recommendations are 
proposed. 
Recommendation 1: Enrichment facilities 
Safeguarding against reconfiguration 
The IAEA should increase its’ safeguards system for enrichment facilities.  This would 
include installation of additional containment and surveillance equipment.  It would particularly 
include safeguards involvement in the design stage to ensure that the facilities are amenable to 
monitoring, containment, surveillance and protection. 
 
Limiting technology spread 
To assist in addressing the concern brought about by the spread of nuclear enrichment 
technologies in the mid-century scenario, proposals have been made for the internationalization 
of regional enrichment facilities.  These facilities would ensure that enrichment processes are 
being operated to design and would limit the need for spreading these technologies to certain 
parts of the world.  Additional facilities needed to support world uranium demand would also fall 
under international control and monitoring.  Several international locations strategically placed 
throughout the world could service the fuel needs of many nuclear reactors within a given region.  
This would also provide increased accuracy of accounting for nuclear fuel material because the 
international community would monitor outgoing supply.   International enrichment centers in 
the growth scenario would provide assurance of fresh fuel supply to countries honoring NPT 
commitments. 
 
Recommendation 2: LEU safeguards 
Containment and Surveillance 
The IAEA should incorporate additional containment and surveillance techniques to 
points in the nuclear fuel cycle that have LEU inventories.  Additional techniques include real-
time video monitoring and additional un-scheduled inspections among others.  These increased 
measures would reduce the potential for LEU to be diverted to “topping” facilities. 
 
Recommendation 3: Additional IAEA protocols 
Authority to seek undeclared facilities 
Current IAEA protocol does not authorize inspectors to search for undeclared facilities.  
The IAEA should be allowed to search for undeclared nuclear facilities that could assist in 
nuclear weapons development. 
 
Improved tracking of Materials 
 The IAEA should develop improved methods of tracking material flows in to and out of 
various countries.  The emphasis should be on current special nuclear material and also on 
potential special nuclear material (e.g., natural uranium). 
 
Recommendation 4: International spent fuel repository and resolution of long-term 
disposal issues 
Re-examination of retrievability as a criteria 
To address the issue of spent fuel being retrieved after several hundred years from 
“plutonium mines”, geological repositories should be designed to emphasize irretrievability. This 
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is counter to the trend in recent years of emphasizing retrievability as a virtue of geologic 
repository design or, indeed, even as a criterion for licensing.  While this may act to enhance 
public acceptance, retrievability is of minimal benefit for long-term isolation (more than a couple 
hundred years) and detrimental to the nonproliferation regime. Geologic isolation in mined 
repositories is the preferred option for the disposal of spent fuel in the world (Lyman, 1998).  
The alternatives include deep bore-holes.  This approach emphasized irretrievability and may 
give added confidence for long-term isolation. 
 
International spent fuel storage 
 International spent fuel storage provides the opportunity for international monitoring 
prior to geologic disposal and for ensuring irretrievability subsequently.  It should be pursued 
vigorously in the growth scenario. 
 
 
The highest priority recommendations above for the LWR-OT based growth scenario are those 
concerning limitation of technology spread (especially enrichment), irretrievability, and 
international spent fuel storage. 
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4.2 Closed Fuel Cycles 
This section will describe the baseline closed nuclear fuel cycle.  The first part is an 
overview of closed nuclear fuel cycles with a closer look at LWRs using mixed oxide as fuel.  
This is followed by a discussion of the proliferation pathways of a MOX-PUREX fuel cycle and 
an assessment of these pathways.  Finally, recommendations to address these pathways are 
explored. 
 
 The diagram below shows the steps involved in a closed nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4-13: Typical Closed Fuel Cycle Diagram20 
 
The previous section provided a detailed discussion of the once-through fuel cycle.  For 
once-through cycles, the spent fuel is considered a waste product that would be disposed of 
without further alteration.  Closing the nuclear fuel cycle is done by extracting useful isotopes 
from the spent fuel in a step known as reprocessing, then re-fabricating and re-circulating them 
in nuclear reactors. 
                                                 
20 Diagram courtesy of The Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Academy Symposium 
November 1997 
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The main useful isotopes of irradiated fuel are those of uranium and plutonium.  Spent 
fuel contains most of the original 238U and about one third of the original 235U.  See figure below: 
 
 
Figure 4-14: Isotopic Composition of Fresh and Spent Fuel21 
Fission products and activation products (including plutonium) are generated as a result of uranium fissioning. 
 
Following reactor irradiation the 238U has activation products, fission products and 
plutonium.  The plutonium content is typically about 6 to 10g/kg, which is roughly 1% of spent 
fuel and the fission product content is roughly 3%.  Reprocessing recovers the uranium and 
plutonium isotopes, which may be used again as fuel for either thermal or fast reactors.  If the 
recovered material is going to be used in thermal reactors, the reprocessed plutonium is sent 
directly to the fuel fabrication plant.  The reprocessed uranium can be sent to the fuel fabrication 
plant, sent to the enrichment plant, or stored, depending on its intended use and needs. 
 
4.2.1 MOX Reprocessing Experience 
The key difference between open and closed fuel cycles is the reprocessing of spent 
nuclear fuel.  Reprocessing is used to separate waste from the uranium and plutonium, which can 
then be recycled into new fuel.  It effectively reduces the waste volume and reduces the need to 
mine new supplies of uranium.  In 1952, the British were among the first to engage in 
reprocessing.  They started with a plant at Windscale designated B-204.  The plant initially 
reprocessed only metallic fuel, but later went on to handle oxide fuel as well.  After satisfactory 
experience at Windscale, the United Kingdom decided to build a plant at Sellafield to reprocess 
irradiated fuel from thermal reactors.  In general, reprocessing experience has been more 
abundant in Western Europe and Japan than in the United States.  The US experience consists 
primarily of defense-related reprocessing operations.  Of the commercial plants constructed in 
the United States, only the Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) plant at West Valley, New York, ever 
operated.  Operating from 1967 until 1972, the NFS plant reprocessed approximately 600 tons of 
irradiated fuel. 
 
France and the United Kingdom are the most active Western European nations in the 
pursuit of reprocessing. The French have reprocessed fuel for defense programs, two breeder 
                                                 
21 Diagram courtesy of Nagra http://www.nagra.ch/english/lager/bkreis.htm 
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reactors and for recycling of plutonium and uranium in LWR’s.  There are currently three 
reprocessing plants in France, UP-1 at Marcoule and UP-2 and UP-3 at La Hague.  The La 
Hague facility had a design capacity of 400 ton/yr until 1981 when its’ parent company, 
Cogema, increased the capacity to 800 ton/yr.  The figure below is a simplified flow chart of the 
process used at La Hague’s reprocessing facility. 
 
 
FIGURE 4-15: Simplified Flow Sheet of PUREX Reprocessing Facility22 
 
As mentioned above, reprocessing is used to separate the waste from the uranium and 
plutonium in spent fuel.  When the uranium has been separated it can be made into fresh fuel or 
mixed with the plutonium to produce a ceramic Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel.  The fuel can then be 
used in conventional reactors.  The sections below will examine five similarities and differences 
(in front-end operations, reactor operations, reprocessing of MOX assemblies, transportation of 
special nuclear material, and current IAEA safeguards) that arise throughout the nuclear fuel 
cycle when MOX fuel is used in conventional reactors. 
 
1) Front-end Operations 
The mining, milling and conversion operations for closed fuel cycles are identical to 
those used in open fuel cycles.  In a typical MOX fuel assembly, there is approximately 4% 
plutonium oxide and the remainder is uranium oxide.  The uranium oxide may be either natural, 
depleted or enriched depending on the application.  The plutonium oxide typically comes from 
reprocessed materials.  The principal difference in the fuel fabrication process used for MOX 
fabrication and that used for fabrication of uranium oxide fuels is the radiation environment of 
these facilities.   
 
2) Reactor Operations 
Replacing uranium oxide, normally used to fuel the LWR core, by MOX fuel changes 
certain characteristics of the core because of the physical, chemical, and neutronic differences in 
                                                 
22 Diagram courtesy of http://www.ricin.com/nuke/bg/lahague.html 
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MOX fuel relative to UO2.  It is the neutronic differences that present the greatest concern, 
because it determines a materials usability for weapons production. 
 
The plutonium isotopes have relative concentrations that depend on the origin of the 
plutonium, the storage time that the plutonium experiences and the number of times the 
plutonium has been recycled.  Examples of the effect of these conditions are in the table below 
(table 4-5), which shows the relative concentrations of plutonium at various nuclear reactors 
(Pellaud, 2002). 
 
TABLE 4-5: Plutonium Concentrations 
Isotopic contents in % of total Pu  Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
Burnup - irradiated LWR uranium oxide:      
     20 MWd/kg heavy metals (Siemens) 0.7 70 18 10 1.6 
     33 MWd/ kg heavy metals (Siemens) 1.2 58 23 14 4 
     60 MWd/ kg heavy metals (Siemens) 3.5 44 27 15 11 
Burnup -  irradiated LWR mixed oxide:      
     33 MWd/ kg heavy metals (Mark) 1.9 40 32 18 8 
 
The fissile fraction—concentration of Pu-239 and Pu-241, which are the two useful 
fissile isotopes—of the irradiated LWR mixed oxide fuel above, is 58wt%.  This characteristic is 
important, as it is one determinant of the degree of difficulty a proliferator would face in making 
plutonium weapons.  Higher fissile fractions are more suitable for weapons production because 
of the reduction in even numbered isotopes (less neutron background and decay heat). 
 
A daughter of 241Pu, 241Am is, through its own daughters, a source of many gamma rays 
and also a neutron absorber.  Plutonium coming from LWR fuel irradiated to burnups of 
approximately 35,000 MWD/MT must be utilized no later than 3 years after discharge.  
Otherwise, because of the 241Am buildup, purification is necessary before it can be used in MOX 
fuel for LWRs.  LWRs irradiated with MOX fuel assemblies have operated with burnup levels 
that range from 30-50,000 MWD/MT depending upon irradiation cycles. 
 
3) Reprocessing of MOX assemblies 
Typical reprocessing operations consist of several major steps: mechanically chopping 
the spent fuel assembly into small pieces, dissolving the parts from step 1 into nitric acid, using 
solvent extraction to separate into streams containing the products of interest and the wastes, and 
handling the waste (mostly high level wastes) appropriately (see figure 4-15).  The method is 
referred to as the “chop and leach” system.  A particular plutonium-uranium recovery extraction 
process known as PUREX is used in almost all reprocessing plants in the world.  PUREX uses a 
solvent TBP (tri-n-butyl phosphate) and liquid-liquid extraction principles, combined with 
oxidation-reduction chemical reactions to separate the spent fuel into uranium-nitrate and 
plutonium oxide products.   
 
4) Transportation of Special Nuclear Material 
After the spent fuel assemblies have been reprocessed, uranium and plutonium products 
are typically stored and then transported to fuel fabrication facilities.  The transported plutonium 
is in the form of Pu(NO3)4 and this compound is first converted into PuO2 powder then 
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mechanically blended with ceramic-grade UO2 to produce mixed oxide that is later fabricated 
into pellets.  These pellets are loaded into assemblies, identical to UO2 fuel assemblies, for use in 
LWRs. 
5) Current IAEA safeguards of closed fuel cycle 
The specific Non-Proliferation Treat (NPT) safeguards objective of the IAEA is set forth 
by Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153) as being “the timely detection of diversion of 
significant quantities of nuclear material from nuclear activities…and the deterrence of such 
diversion by risk of early detection.”  Information Circular 66 (INRCIRC/66) adds that 
safeguards are to be employed “in a manner designed to avoid hampering a state’s economic and 
technological development…and safe conduct of nuclear activities.” 
 
The IAEA safeguards regime for closed fuel cycles are identical to those associated with 
open fuel cycles with the addition of safeguards for MOX fabrication facilities, reprocessing 
facilities, and transportation of plutonium23.  Outlined below are the methods, specific to closed 
fuel cycles, used by the IAEA to adhere to guidelines set forth by INFCIRC/153 and 
INFCIRC/66. 
 
MOX fabrication facilities 
In fabrication facilities, special nuclear materials can be in the form of powders, 
solutions, fuel pellets, and finished fuel assemblies.  For this reason, safeguards for fuel 
processing facilities are more complex than those for reactors where special nuclear material is 
only in the form of fuel assemblies.  The inspection program includes a combination of non-
destructive assay (NDA) capabilities and use of an IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory24.  
Isotopic ratios of plutonium in MOX fuels can be measured using high-resolution gamma-ray 
spectrometry.  This method, combined with passive neutron-coincidence counting and 
calorimetry provide very good NDA results. 
 
Reprocessing facilities 
Adequate IAEA safeguarding of reprocessing facilities depends on several things (Kneif, 
1992, p. 624).  Sampling of local inputs and outputs and of all streams that leave the plant must 
be reliable, and the inspectors must take frequent inventories with controlled clean-outs.  
Calibration of all accountancy vessels, located between the dissolution and extraction steps, must 
be extremely accurate.  There must exist rapid verification of contents of the product-output and 
waste streams (See Figure 4-15).  This is done using appropriate NDA methods.  Finally, 
containment must be maintained.  This is done by using easily checked seals or by continuous 
surveillance of the output. 
 
Transportation 
Currently, the IAEA agreements note that a State must have a system of accounting for and 
controlling of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards under the Agreement.  The system has 
to be based on a structure of material balance areas, and be able to determine the quantities of 
nuclear material received or shipped.  It must also have procedures for identifying, reviewing and 
evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements (INFCIRC/153, paragraph 32). 
                                                 
23 For more detail on IAEA procedures for nuclear fuel cycles see previous section on open fuel cycle 
24  Nondestructive assay (NDA) is based on direct physical measurements of unique signatures of fissionable 
materials, i.e., distinctive characteristics such as gamma-ray energy or spontaneous-fission half-life. 
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4.2.2 Proliferation Pathways 
As of 1996, commercial power reactors had produced over 1000 MT of plutonium and 
these stocks continued to grow at a rate of about 70 MT per year (Albright, et. al., 1996).  While 
over 80% is contained in stored spent fuel a growing amount is being separated at reprocessing 
plants in France, the UK, Russia and India.  By the end of 1995 there were some 140 MT of 
separated civilian plutonium stored in Europe and Asia.  That number is now, estimated by some, 
at over 200MT of separated civilian plutonium around the world.  This equates to well over 
20,000 significant quantities25.  These inventories are “directly” weapons usable and only small 
quantities would need to be diverted if a state or sub-national group is interested in producing 
only a few nuclear weapons. 
 
 The pathways of interest in MOX/PUREX fuel cycles involve diversion of separated 
plutonium or MOX fuel assemblies26.  Separated plutonium pathways are explored more in the 
sections below.  It should be noted that the MOX/PUREX fuel cycle would additionally have 
those proliferation pathways associated with the LWR-OT fuel cycle. 
                                                 
25 Based on UN definition (1 significant quantity is 8kg Pu-239) 
26 Use of diverted MOX fuel assemblies is not discussed because it is similar to use of diverted spent fuel assemblies, 
with the additional requirement of needing a separations facility. 
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Proliferator Weapons Material Enabling Technology/Material Pathway
Enriching natural uranium at clandestine 
enrichment facility
Clandestine Facilities
Further enriching LEU at clandestine 
"topping" facility
HEU
Process Modifications
Further enriching LEU at misused 
"declared" facility
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from fuel 
fabrication facilities)
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
Separation of  MOX fuel (diverted from 
transportation)
Separations
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from 
power plant)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from short-
term storage (decades)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from long-
term storage (centuries)
Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
reprocessing facilties
Separated Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
transportation
Use of separated Pu diverted from fuel 
fab. facilities
Process Modifications
Producing Pu streams at facilities not 
designed for pure Pu streams
**Closed and Advanced fuel cycles typically include same proilferation concerns as OT plus additional concerns
Proliferation Pathways for MOX/PUREX Fuel Cycles
 
FIGURE 4-17: MOX Pathway A (Diversion of Separated Plutonium) 
In this pathway, a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (proliferator) desires to acquire plutonium (weapons 
material) by diversion of separated plutonium from storage (at reprocessing or fuel fabrication facilities) or from off 
site transportation 
 
Pathway A: Separated plutonium 
A-1: Diversion from reprocessing facilities 
The PUREX process became the most widespread of a multitude of fuel regeneration 
methods for extraction of weapons plutonium.  Because it was developed for weapons, it leads to 
a very high purity product.  Although commercial reprocessing facilities are expensive and 
require enormous buildings and specific equipment, the process has been around for some time, 
the details of it are available in the open literature, and a batch scale operation can be fairly 
modest in scale. 
 
This issue, of separated plutonium in reprocessing facilities, is further complicated by the 
lack of IAEA experience with and high measurement uncertainty in reprocessing facilities.  The 
IAEA goal is to detect the diversion of a defined quantity of nuclear material within a defined 
timeframe.  These goals are specified based on the type of material.  It is desired to be able to 
detect one significant quantity (8kg) of plutonium within a one-month timeframe.  The one-
month comes from what IAEA considers the shortest conversion time possible to build a nuclear 
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bomb, starting with plutonium oxide, nitrate or even metallic plutonium.  Large throughputs of 
plutonium and high measurement uncertainties make it difficult for reprocessing facilities to 
meet the IAEA safeguards goals.  See table below for annual plutonium-throughput uncertainties 
in reprocessing plants: 
 
TABLE 4-6: Plutonium Uncertainties in Various Reprocessing Plants27 
Nominal 
measurement 
uncertainty
% Monthly (kg) Yearly (kg) Monthly (kg) Yearly (kg) Monthly (kg) Yearly (kg)
0.2 0.04 0.48 0.13 1.6 1.1 12.8
1.0 0.2 2.4 0.67 8 5.3 64
Note:  
Annual Plutonium-Throughput Uncertainties in Reprocessing Plants
*Uncertainties given in kilograms of plutonium, assuming 0.8 percent plutonium by weight in spent fuel 
(nominal average of commercial spent fuel from a mixture of 80% light-water reators and 20% heavy-
water reactors).  Plutonium concentrations can range from under 0.1% in very low burnup fuel to about 1% 
in high burnup spent fuel from commercial LWRs.
Small reprocessing 
plant (30 t HM/yr)
Large reprocessing plant 
(800 t HM/yr)
Medium reprocessing 
plant (100 t HM/yr)
 
 
In the table, the 64kg lost yearly (in large reprocessing plants with 1.0% nominal 
uncertainty) equals 8 significant quantities per year.  If the uncertainties in the table represent 
one standard deviation uncertainties in MUF determinations, then the amount of diverted 
plutonium that could be detected with a 95% detection probability and a 5% false alarm rate—
the nominal safeguards goal—is 3.3 times the amount given in the table.  Therefore, in a large 
reprocessing plant, more than 2 significant quantities per month and at least 25 significant 
quantities per year would be undetected.  Diversions of the amounts shown could be detected, 
but only with about 26% probability if the 5% false alarm probability is to be maintained 
(Hakkila, et. al., 1980, p. 8). 
 
A-2: Diversion in transport 
The IAEA has current rules of engagement (either explicit or implicit) for transportation 
of separated plutonium that do not meet the challenge of a small number of civilians seeking to 
peacefully make a point.  This is seen clearly in a recent Greenpeace protest28.  In February of 
this year, twenty-five greenpeace activities blocked a truck carrying 150kg of weapons-usable 
plutonium.  They chained themselves to the truck publicly to denounce the circulation of 
plutonium in France.  The truck, carrying separated plutonium, was coming from the La Hague 
reprocessing plant in northern France, and was headed to the Marcoule nuclear facility in 
southern France.  This suggests that the risk of having well-trained terrorists successfully hijack 
a shipment of weapons-usable fissile material is not negligible. 
 
4.2.3 Assessments 
Table 4-7 below gives an assessment of the proliferation resistance of the MOX/PUREX 
nuclear fuel cycle to this particular pathway and highlights the vulnerabilities mentioned above. 
                                                 
27 Reproduced from the US Office of Technology Assessment Annual Publication (1995) 
28Greenpeace, Greenpeace blocks top secret transport of plutonium in France, revealing global proliferation threat 
is not in Iraq http://www.greenpeace.org/press/release?item_id=144770&campaign_id=4023 
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TABLE 4-7: PUREX/MOX Proliferation Assessment 
Stages of fuel cycle
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Beginning of the cycle
Mining
Transport
Miling
Transport
Conversion
Storage
Transport
Uranium Enrichment
Storage
Transport
Uranium Oxide Fabrication Facilities
Production of Fuel Assemblies, Cast
Storage
Fresh fuel transport to NPP
Operation at NPP
Storage of fresh fuel
Loading of fresh fuel into the core
Reactor irradiation
Unloading of irradiated fuel from the core
On-site pool storage of spent fuel
On-site dry storage of spent fuel
Closed cycles
Dissassembly of fuel assembly H H H M H I I I M I VH M H I
Separation of fissile materials I H I M H I I I M I VH M H I
Storage of highly-concentrated fissile material I M I M H I I I M I L M H I
Collection, processing and storage of actinide-
containing waste
Transport of separated plutonium I M I M H I I I VH I VH I L I
Transport of actinide-containing waste for burial
Plutonium Oxide Fabrication I M L M H I L I L I H L H I
Production of MOX I M M H H I L L L I H L H I
Transport of MOX to NPP I M M H H I I L VH I VH I L I
End of fuel cycle (includes once-through)
Off-site transport of irradiated spent fuel
Temporary storage of irradiated fuel
Processing of irradiated fuel for storage and 
disposition
Storage of processed materials
Long-term geolgical burial of irradiated fuel and 
actinide-containing waste
KEY
I     =Ineffective Barrier
L    =Low Barrier
M   =Medium Barrer
H    =High Barrier
VH  =Very High Barrier
PUREX/MOX Proliferation Pathway A: Separated plutonium 
Material Barriers Institutional Technical Barriers
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4.2.4 Recommendations 
Recommendation 1: PUREX reprocessing 
Because the PUREX process was created specifically for production of a pure plutonium 
product, there should be no further geographic spread of PUREX reprocessing technology within 
the mid-century growth scenario.  This recommendation does not exclude research on alternative 
reprocessing technologies, such as UREX, pyroprocessing.  The US should work with the 
international community to promulgate this policy and to enforce it through export controls, 
diplomatic and other means. 
 
Recommendation 2: Co-location 
Separations and MOX fuel fabrication facilities should be co-located, thereby eliminating 
the need for transportation of separated plutonium. 
 
Recommendation 3: Minimal working plutonium inventory 
The US should work with nations engaged in the MOX fuel cycle to reduce separated 
plutonium inventories to the minimal working level needed for process operation.  The current 
distribution of 345 GWe LWR-OT and 9GWe MOX worldwide would have a plutonium 
inventory of 6.3 MT29.  That is, at any given point in time, no more than 6.3 MT of separated 
plutonium would need to be in storage.  This is less than 5% of the current 200 MT separated 
plutonium inventory.  For these calculations, the mass flow of separated plutonium needed to 
keep the system in equilibrium is 12.6 metric tonnes per year.  The practical equilibrium minimal 
working inventory needs detailed analysis using process-specific information that may not be 
publicly available, and may be substantially larger than this amount; nevertheless, there may be 
an opportunity to substantially reduce stocks of separated plutonium without compromising fuel 
cycle operation.  A first step towards the minimal working inventory would be to prevent further 
accumulation of separated plutonium, a goal that should be achievable in the near term (with the 
possible exception of certain British fuels). 
 
 
 
Recommendations 1 and 3 deserve immediate attention for US engagement of the international 
nuclear community. 
                                                 
29 Calculation done by Etienne Parent for the MIT Nuclear Energy Study.  It assumes 1) that the time from the point 
where plutonium is separated in the PUREX process to the point where it is mixed back with uranium in the MOX 
fabrication plant is 6 months; 2) that the average plutonium content of the UOX fuel in the reactor is taken as 0.9% 
(the actual plutonium content goes from 0% to 1.33% during irradiation); and 3) that the average plutonium content 
of MOX fuel in the reactor is 6% (the plutonium content goes from 7% to 4.9% during irradiation). 
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4.3 High Temperature Gas Reactors 
High temperature gas reactors (HTGR) have been developed, and even deployed, since 
the 1960’s.  Coated fuel particles and helium coolants are the common aspects of gas reactors 
being designed today.  The fuel used in gas reactors has enrichment levels between 8 and 20% 
U-235, and the reactor will typically operate to burn-ups of about 100,000 MWD/MT.   
 
There are essentially two fundamental HTGR design options under active consideration 
today.  One is a small “pebble bed” core and the other is a large, annular prismatic carbon block 
core.  Various countries are investing in active HTGR programs.  For example, China (10MWth 
pebble bed), South Africa (250 MWth pebble bed) and Japan (40 MWth prismatic) to name a few.  
Two gas reactors have operated in the United States; Peach Bottom-which was a small, 
experimental 40 MWe HTGR and Fort St. Vrain-which was a 365 MWe plant.   
 
4.3.1 Modular Pebble Bed Reactor 
MIT is currently doing research on a small modular pebble bed reactor (MPBR), which 
will be the HTGR model for this thesis, although our nonproliferation considerations are not 
sensitive to the specific choice.  The diagram below is a schematic of the reactor.  The figure 
below is an illustration of the MPBR design. 
 
 
FIGURE 4-18: The Modular Pebble Bed Reactor30 
 
                                                 
30 Diagram courtesy of MIT Department of Nuclear Engineering 
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The MPBR design has a thermal power of 250 MW.  Its’ core height and diameter are 10 
and 3.5 meters respectively.  There will be some 360,000 pebbles irradiated in the reactor core to 
burn-ups of up to 90,000 MWD/MT.  Roughly 3,000 pebbles will be handled by the fuel 
handling system each day, with approximately one discharged every 30 seconds and about 350 
pebbles discarded daily The average pebble will cycle through the core 15 times.  Each pebble is 
60mm in diameter with 11,000 microspheres (1mm diameter) inside a graphite matrix.  There is 
7-8 grams of uranium, enriched to 8-11% U-235, in each pebble.  The uranium is in a UO2 kernel 
inside the microsphere and covered by silicon carbide, pyrocarbon, and a porous buffer.  The 
figures below show the TRISO31 coated fuel pebble. 
 
 
FIGURE 4-19: Fuel Pebble32 
 
 
FIGURE 4-20: TRISO Fuel Particle33 
                                                 
31 The TRISO fuel particles contain a small kernel of nuclear fuel encapsulated by alternating layers of C and a 
barrier layer of SiC. 
32 Photo courtesy of ESKOM 
http://www.eskom.co.za/education/randdcenter/pebblebedmodularreactor_content.html 
33 Taken from A. Kadak “MIT/INEEL Modular Pebble Bed Reactor” presentation at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge MA, March 22, 2000. 
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4.3.2 Proliferation Pathways 
From a proliferation pathways point of view, the Modular Pebble Bed Reactor is 
qualitatively similar to the Light Water Reactor operated in Once-Through mode.  Both nuclear 
fuel cycle systems follow identical processes from mining to waste disposal.  The differences are 
found in enrichment levels, fuel forms, reactor operations (e.g., burn-up levels) and spent fuel 
isotopics. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the MPBR will require uranium enriched to 8-11% U-235.  This is 
more than twice the enrichment used in the LWR-OT.  The higher enrichment levels present 
proliferation disadvantages because non-commercial enrichment technologies, that may be 
difficult to detect and monitor, can be used. 
 
The MPBR fuel form (pebbles) offers some proliferation advantages over typical LWR-
OT fuel.  Each MPBR pebble only contains a tiny fraction of the total reactor fuel.  Lebenhaft 
(2000, pp. 138, 139) did an analysis of a reference pebble bed core and found that a diversion of 
258,000 first pass (on average it takes each pebble 73 days to pass through the core) pebbles is 
needed to obtain 6kg of Pu-239.  Also, according to the same analysis, 157,000 spent fuel 
(discharged after being irradiated to 80 MWD/kgU) pebbles would be needed to obtain that same 
6kg of Pu-239.  Even if a proliferator were able to divert sufficient pebble quantities, removal of 
the graphite coating would leave an easily detectable signature. 
 
The MPBR differs most from typical LWR’s in enrichment required for its fuel.  With 
enrichment levels reaching 8-11%, an even greater amount of work has been done to reach HEU 
than from LWR-OT’s 4.5% enrichment.  This difference is worth examining closer.  The figure 
below sketches the principal proliferation pathway for MPBRs. 
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Proliferator Weapons Material Enabling Technology/Material Pathway
Enriching natural uranium at clandestine 
enrichment facility
Clandestine Facilities
Further enriching LEU at clandestine 
"topping" facility
HEU
Process Modifications
Further enriching LEU at misused 
"declared" facility
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from fuel 
fabrication facilities)
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
Separation of  MOX fuel (diverted from 
transportation)
Separations
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from 
power plant)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from short-
term storage (decades)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from long-
term storage (centuries)
Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
reprocessing facilties
Separated Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
transportation
Use of separated Pu diverted from fuel fab. 
facilities
Process Modifications
Producing Pu streams at facilities not 
designed for pure Pu streams
**Closed and Advanced fuel cycles typically include same proilferation concerns as OT plus additional concerns
Proliferation Pathways for MPBR Fuel Cycles
 
FIGURE 4-21: MPBR Pathway A: (HEU: Diversion of LEU) 
In this pathway, a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (proliferator) desires to acquire HEU (weapons material) by 
enriching LEU at clandestine “topping” facilities.  Qualitatively, this fuel cycle is the same as LWR-OT only due to 
the increased enrichment requirements it is somewhat more vulnerable to non-commercial enrichment technologies. 
 
Pathway A: HEU 
The MPBR nuclear fuel cycle does not present a qualitatively new proliferation pathway 
but, because of higher enrichment levels, it does increase the vulnerability of a previously 
discussed pathway.  A potential proliferator could divert the 8-11% enriched uranium to topping 
plants for enrichment to HEU levels.  These topping facilities could be developed from non-
commercial enrichment technologies.  For example, laser enrichment of uranium vapor has been 
under development for decades in many countries, with major unresolved issues remaining with 
respect to the continuous high-throughput operation needed for economic competitiveness; 
however, batch operation could suffice for a small number of weapons, and furthermore much of 
the needed technology (such as appropriate lasers) has developed dramatically since the early 
developments.  Non-commercial enrichment technologies offer a unique challenge in that 
import/export controls of the component dual use items will often be very difficult.  Further, 
civilian applications such as medical isotope separation can provide cover for a proliferator’s 
intentions. 
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4.3.3 Assessments 
Table 4-8 below gives an assessment of the proliferation resistance of the MPBR nuclear 
fuel cycle to this particular pathway and highlights the vulnerabilities mentioned above.   
 
TABLE 4-8: MPBR Proliferation Assessment 
Stages of fuel cycle
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Beginning of the cycle
Mining
Transport
Miling
Transport
Conversion
Storage
Transport
Uranium Enrichment L I M M L I I I VH I H M L L 
Storage L I M M L I I I VH I M M L L
Transport L I M M L I I I H I VH M L L
Uranium Oxide Fabrication Facility L I M M L I I I H I H M L L
Production of fuel (pellets,pebbles, etc.)
Production of Fuel Assemblies, Cast
Storage
Fresh fuel transport to NPP
Operation at NPP
Storage of fresh fuel
Loading of fresh fuel into the core
Reactor irradiation
Unloading of irradiated fuel from the core
On-site pool storage of spent fuel
On-site dry storage of spent fuel
End of fuel cycle (includes once-through)
Off-site transport of irradiated spent fuel
Temporary storage of irradiated fuel
Processing of irradiated fuel for storage and 
disposition
Storage of processed materials
Long-term geolgical burial of irradiated fuel and 
actinide-containing waste
KEY
I     =Ineffective Barrier
L    =Low Barrier
M   =Medium Barrer
H    =High Barrier
VH  =Very High Barrier
Institutional Technical BarriersMaterial Barriers
MPBR Proliferation Pathway A: HEU (LEU diversion)
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4.3.4 Recommendations 
Recommendation 1: Enrichment technologies 
The Nuclear Supplier Group, the IAEA, and other organizations charged with impeding 
nuclear proliferation should re-examine the control regime for a broader set of technologies 
applicable to non-commercial uranium enrichment approaches (i.e., beyond the centrifuge supply 
chain focus that is the principal concern today) that could be very effective and inconspicuous 
when starting with LEU to produce HEU. 
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4.4 Lifetime Core Reactors 
There are many demands for small energy sources, especially in developing nations with 
relatively little energy infrastructure.  These demands have led to research and design into 
reactors that are safe, simple, small, portable, have long-life and are proliferation-resistant.  A 
key is that no fueling or fuels infrastructure is needed in the country of use. The Encapsulated 
Nuclear Heat Source, invented by David Wade, director of Argonne's Reactor Analysis Division, 
and Ehud Greenspan of the University of California at Berkeley, is one of these new reactor 
designed and is the basis for analysis below. 
4.4.1 Encapsulated Nuclear Heat Source 
The Encapsulated Nuclear Heat Source (ENHS) is a reactor concept that was selected in 
1999 by the Department of Energy to be studied as one of the Generation IV reactors.  It is a 
concept based on the idea of encapsulating the reactor core inside its own vessel as a module, 
with no external piping connections.  The ENHS features modularity, it is to be factory fuelled, 
inserted into an in-place power reactor, run for 15 effective full power years without refueling, 
and replaced by another module (Greenspan, et. al., 2000).  In the ENHS, the fission-generated 
heat is transferred from the primary coolant to the secondary coolant through the reactor vessel 
wall.  This reactor type has never been built and is only a design concept. 
 
There are many possible embodiments of the reactor concept.  The figure below shows a 
schematic of one embodiment, having a single ENHS module. 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4-22: Single ENHS 
Module34 
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October 2002. 
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The reactor consists of ten modules:  one ENHS, three steam generators, three re-heaters 
and three secondary coolant loops.  The concept features 100% natural circulation.  Two 
structural walls and a confinement wall in between make up the three walls to the ENHS reactor 
vessel. 
 
Figure 4-23 shows an alternate ENHS concept being considered.  It uses a cover-gas lift-
pump that circulates the cover gas from the plenum above the coolant level in the ENHS and 
injects it into the coolant in the riser through nozzles located at certain levels above the core.  
The cover-gas bubbles reduce the effective density of the coolant in the riser, thus increasing the 
head for coolant circulation. 
 
 
FIGURE 4-23: Cover-Gas ENHS design35 
 
The ENHS does not include an intermediate heat exchanger, decay heat removal systems, 
and mechanical or electromagnetic pumps.  Its confinement wall serves as the intermediate heat 
exchanger and the decay heat removal system.  The ENHS will be manufactured and fueled in 
the factory.  It will then be shipped, as a sealed unit, to the power plant site.  The sealed unit will 
have Pb or Pb-Bi filling the vessel to the upper level of the fuel rods.  Hot Pb or Pb-Bi will be 
pumped into the ENHS vessel upon insertion into the reactor pool.  This hot Pb, along with the 
hot Pb in the pool, will melt the solid Pb at the lower part of the vessel. 
 
                                                 
35 E. Greenspan, et. al., The Encapsulated Nuclear Heat Source Reactor Concept for Developing and for Industrial 
Counties 
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After the 15 effective full power years operation, the ENHS will be removed from the 
reactor pool and stored on-site until the decay heat drops to a level that will let the Pb or Pb-Bi 
solidify.  The ENHS with the solidified Pb or Pb-Bi will then serve as the shipping cask. 
 
The ENHS fuel is a metallic alloy of U-Pu (the uranium will range from depleted to 
15wt% enriched and the plutonium initial composition is that of LWR spent fuel) with 10wt% Zr.  
Two power levels and two linear heat rates have been considered:  125 and 250 MWth, and 80 
and 120 W/cm.  The peak burnup of these cores is approximately 100 GWD/tHM. 
 
4.4.2 Proliferation Pathways 
 The Encapsulated Nuclear Heat Source was designed with proliferation issues as the 
primary motivation; therefore the proliferation pathways that exist for this fuel cycle are in the 
area of process modifications.  The figure below (figure 4-24) highlights this pathway. 
 
Proliferator Weapons Material Enabling Technology/Material Pathway
Enriching natural uranium at clandestine 
enrichment facility
Clandestine Facilities
Further enriching LEU at clandestine 
"topping" facility
HEU
Process Modifications
Further enriching LEU at misused 
"declared" facility
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from fuel 
fabrication facilities)
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
Separation of  MOX fuel (diverted from 
transportation)
Separations
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from 
power plant)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from short-
term storage (decades)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from long-
term storage (centuries)
Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
reprocessing facilties
Separated Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
transportation
Use of separated Pu diverted from fuel fab. 
facilities
Process Modifications
Producing Pu streams at facilities not 
designed for pure Pu streams
**Closed and Advanced fuel cycles typically include same proilferation concerns as OT plus additional concerns
Proliferation Pathways for ENHS Fuel Cycles
 
FIGURE 4-24: ENHS Proliferation Pathway 
In this pathway, a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (proliferator) desires to acquire HUE or plutonium 
(weapons material) by process modifications. 
 
 The concept includes having all access to fuel (both fresh and spent fuel) only in the 
supplier state and/or at an internationally monitored nuclear park.  Consequently, this reactor/fuel 
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cycle has excellent nonproliferation characteristics.  Unfortunately, it is likely to take a long time 
to make this approach economic. 
4.4.3 Assessments 
Table 4-9 below gives an assessment of the proliferation resistance of the ENHS nuclear 
fuel cycle to this particular pathway and highlights the vulnerabilities mentioned above. 
 
TABLE 4-9: ENHS Proliferation Assessment 
Stages of fuel cycle
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Beginning of the cycle
Mining
Transport
Miling
Transport
Conversion
Storage
Transport
Uranium Enrichment L I M M L I I I H I H VH VH L
Storage L I M M L I I I H I M VH VH L
Transport L I M M L I I I H I VH VH VH L
Uranium Oxide Fabrication Facilities L I M M L I I I H I H VH VH L
Production of fuel (pellets,pebbles, etc.)
Production of Fuel Assemblies, Cast
Storage
Fresh fuel transport to NPP
Operation at NPP
Storage of fresh fuel
Loading of fresh fuel into the core
Reactor irradiation
Unloading of irradiated fuel from the core
On-site pool storage of spent fuel
On-site dry storage of spent fuel
End of fuel cycle (includes once-through)
Off-site transport of irradiated spent fuel
Temporary storage of irradiated fuel
Processing of irradiated fuel for storage and 
disposition
Storage of processed materials
Long-term geolgical burial of irradiated fuel and 
actinide-containing waste
KEY
I     =Ineffective Barrier
L    =Low Barrier
M   =Medium Barrer
H    =High Barrier
VH  =Very High Barrier
Institutional Technical BarriersMaterial Barriers
Encapsulated Heat Source Proliferation Pathway A: HEU (LEU diversion)
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4.4.4 Recommendations 
Recommendation 1: International nuclear fuel supply and waste disposal centers 
A strong limitation on the number of countries dealing with fresh fuel and spent fuel 
infrastructures, as offered by the long-life core reactor, should be pursued in the growth scenario. 
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4.5 Fast Reactors  
Breeder reactors provide full fuel reproduction in the core (core breeding ratio ≥ 1).  These 
can be fast reactors with high-density fuel (U-Pu or Th-U cycle) and thermal reactors with Th-U 
cycle.  The discussion below is based on the Integral Fast Reactor/pyroprocessing fuel cycle. 
 
4.5.1 Integral Fast Reactor 
The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) reactor concept is a liquid-metal-cooled reactor using a 
sodium-bonded uranium-plutonium-zirconium alloy fuel capable of operating at very high fuel 
burnups.  Beyond the traditional advanced reactor objectives of increased safety, improved 
economy and more efficient fuel utilization, the IFR is designed to simplify waste disposal and 
increase resistance to proliferation (Wade and Hill, 1997). 
 
Separated plutonium is never present in normal operation of the IFR fuel cycle.  
Pyroprocessing is a fuel processing method that utilizes high temperatures, molten salt, and 
molten-metal solvents to produce a uranium-plutonium metal allow that is suitable for immediate 
fabrication into new fuel elements.  This “fresh fuel” product is always highly radioactive and 
self-protective in the safeguards sense. (See figure 4-25 below) 
 
 
FIGURE 4-25: Integral Fast Reactor Concept36 
 
                                                 
36 Diagram courtesy of University of California, Berkeley Department of Nuclear Engineering 
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The IFR is being designed such that it could be operated in a zero-release plant mode, where 
essentially nothing leaves the site except energy, heat and engineered waste products.  
Assessment was done assuming this mode. 
 
It is not anticipated that advanced fuel cycles of this general type can be deployed for many 
decades, for both technical37 and economic reasons.  However, there is much discussion of 
aggressive international R&D programs to look at resolving the technical and economic 
challenges.  Consequently, for the near and intermediate term, such R&D programs will the 
focus of proliferation concerns, as considerable facilities (hot cells,…) and expertise (actinide 
metallurgy,…) relevant to weapons production is developed. 
 
4.5.2 Proliferation Pathways 
 Operated in zero-release plant mode, the IFR would primarily be susceptible to process 
modifications by a potential proliferator.  This key vulnerability here is with misuse of know-
how or process modifications.  This is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
                                                 
37 Technical feasibility was extensively explored in the Argonne IFR program that was stopped by Congress several 
years ago. 
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Proliferator Weapons Material Enabling Technology/Material Pathway
Enriching natural uranium at clandestine 
enrichment facility
Clandestine Facilities
Further enriching LEU at clandestine 
"topping" facility
HEU
Process Modifications
Further enriching LEU at misused 
"declared" facility
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from fuel 
fabrication facilities)
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
Separation of  MOX fuel (diverted from 
transportation)
Separations
Separation of MOX fuel (diverted from 
power plant)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from short-
term storage (decades)
Reprocessing irradiated fuel from long-
term storage (centuries)
Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
reprocessing facilties
Separated Plutonium
Use of separated Pu diverted from 
transportation
Use of separated Pu diverted from fuel fab. 
facilities
Process Modifications
Producing Pu streams at facilities not 
designed for pure Pu streams
**Closed and Advanced fuel cycles typically include same proilferation concerns as OT plus additional concerns
Proliferation Pathways for IFR Fuel Cycles
 
FIGURE 4-26: IFR Proliferation Pathway 
In this pathway, a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (proliferator) desires to acquire plutonium (weapons material) by 
process modifications. 
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4.5.3 Assessments 
Table 4-10 below gives an assessment of the proliferation resistance of the IFR nuclear 
fuel cycle to this particular pathway and highlights the vulnerabilities mentioned above. 
 
TABLE 4-10: IFR Proliferation Assessment 
Stages of fuel cycle
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Analysis and Research I I
Design and Development I I
Beginning of the cycle
Mining
Transport
Miling
Transport
Conversion
Storage
Transport
Uranium Enrichment
Storage
Transport
Uranium Oxide Fabrication Facilities
Production of fuel (pellets,pebbles, etc.)
Production of Fuel Assemblies, Cast
Storage
Fresh fuel transport to NPP
Operation at NPP
Storage of fresh fuel
Loading of fresh fuel into the core
Reactor irradiation
Unloading of irradiated fuel from the core
On-site pool storage of spent fuel
On-site dry storage of spent fuel
Closed cycles
Dissassembly of fuel assembly L I H H VH I I L H I VH L VH I
Separation of fissile materials L I H H VH I I L H I VH L VH I
Storage of highly-concentrated fissile material L I M H VH I I L H I M L VH I
Metallic fuel fabrication facilities L I M H VH I I L M I H M H I
Transport of recovered fuel L I M H VH VH M L VH VH VH H H VH
Collection, processing and storage of fission product 
waste
Transport of actinide-containing waste for burial
End of fuel cycle (includes once-through)
Off-site transport of irradiated spent fuel
Temporary storage of irradiated fuel
Processing of irradiated fuel for storage and 
disposition
Storage of processed materials
Long-term geolgical burial of irradiated fuel and 
actinide-containing waste
KEY
Institutional Technical BarriersMaterial Barriers
IFR Proliferation Pathway A-1: Plutonium 
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4.5.4 Recommendations 
Recommendation 1:  Integrated Safeguards for Advanced Separations Plants 
The international safeguards community should be engaged in the design and cnstruction 
phases of fuel cycle separations plants for advanced closed fuel cycles (including pilot and 
demonstration plants).  This will facilitate integration of safeguards and real-time surveillance 
with the process design so as to flag immediately any process modification aimed to producing 
pure plutonium streams. 
 
 Recommendation 2: Constraints on International Research and Development Cooperation 
The near and intermediate term proliferation risk associated with advanced closed fuel 
cycles lies with the research facilities that may be built and the expertise developed in a variety 
of countries that take part in an international fuel cycle development program.  Such a program 
should be guided jointly by government nuclear and nonproliferation experts. 
 
 
The following tables summarize all the pathways and recommendations mentioned in this 
chapter. 
 103
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment 
TABLE 4-11: Summary of Proliferation Pathways 
The letters in parenthesis indicate the corresponding recommendations 
1 Enriching Natural Uranium to HEU at a Clandestine Enrichment 
Facility (B, D, E, L)
2 Enriching LEU to HEU at a Clandestine "Topping" Facility 
(B, C, D, K, L)
3 Enriching LEU to HEU at a Misused "Declared" Facility (A, B, C, L)
4 Separation of MOX Fuel (Diverted from Storage) (D, H, M)
5 Separation of MOX Fuel (Diverted during Transport) (D, H, M)
6 Reprocessing Spent Fuel (Diverted from Short-Term Storage) (D, G, L)
7 Reprocessing Spent Fuel (Diverted from Long-Term Disposal) 
(D, F, G, L)
8 Use of Separated Plutonium (Diverted from Storage) (H, J)
9 Use of Separated Plutonium (Diverted during Transport) (H, I, J)
10 Producing Plutonium Streams at Facilities Not Designed for 
Pure Plutonium Streams (N)
PROLIFERATION PATHWAYS
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TABLE 4-12: Summary of Recommendations 
The numbers in parenthesis indicate the corresponding pathways 
A Safeguarding against Reconfiguration of Enrichment Facilities (3)
B Limiting Spread of Enrichment Technologies (1, 2, 3)
C Containment and Surveillance of LEU(2, 3)
D IAEA Authority to Seek Undeclared Facilities (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7)
E IAEA Tracking of Material Flow from Country to Country (1)
F Re-examination of Waste Retrievability as a Criteria (7)
G International Spent Fuel Storage (6, 7)
H PUREX Reprocessing Restrictions (4, 5, 8, 9)
I Co-location of Separations and MOX Fuel Fabrication Facilities (9)
J Minimal Working Plutonium Inventory (8,9)
K Re-examine Control Regime for Enrichment Technologies (2)
L International Nuclear Fuel Supply and Waste Disposal Centers (1,2,3,6,7)
M Integrated Safeguards for Advanced Separations Plants (4,5)
N Constraints on International Research and Development Cooperation (10)
RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Summary and Conclusions 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The possible major expansion of nuclear power globally in response to climate change 
and electricity supply drivers re-opens the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the fuel 
cycle.  There has been much discussion about advanced nuclear technologies that minimize the 
proliferation risk and about the participation of developing countries in a global nuclear power 
growth scenario.  We have examined these issues so as to understand both what the pattern of 
nuclear power deployment would likely be at mid-century in a robust growth scenario and what 
technology pathways and associated proliferation concerns might be.  This has led to a number 
of recommendations for near term consideration and action. 
 
 The nuclear power growth scenario starts with an examination of electricity demand.  Our 
scenario is built in a somewhat unconventional way that we believe captures a rational strategy 
for national expansion of electricity supply.  At its core, the strategy focuses on providing 
electricity supply aimed at a level that empirically brings individuals to a suitable quality of life 
as indicated by the Human Development Index/electricity consumption correlation; with overall 
growth constrained by limits associated with electricity supply expansion rates.  Thus, per capita 
consumption together with the United Nations population and urbanization projections were 
central to development of the  “demand map”.  The growth in global electricity production and 
use that emerges from this approach is consistent with various projections; for example, it lies 
between the “business-as-usual” and “low growth” results of the EIA.  However, it also provides 
an important texture to the projections in various groupings of countries: 
 
*Developed countries (such as the United States, Japan, Germany):  In the aggregate, these 
countries have modest population growth.  However, because of their current high per capita 
consumption of electricity, even modest growth rates in use lead to significant new electricity 
production capacity.  These countries today have most of the world’s deployed nuclear capacity. 
  
*FSU:  The former Soviet Union countries generally show little population growth, or even 
reductions.   Thus they show relatively little growth in electricity use. 
 
*Developing world – more advanced (such as China, Brazil, Mexico, Iran, Egypt, Turkey):  
These countries are projected to have modest population growth to mid-century (perhaps 25% or 
so).  Electricity growth will be very considerable, drawing upon the rapidly increasing economic 
strength anticipated (for example, China’s electricity production increased more than 10% last 
year).  These countries will be major contributors to a nuclear growth scenario. 
 
*Developing world – less advanced (such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam):  
These countries are anticipated to have a much more significant increase in population by mid-
century (more than 50%) and will strive to increase electricity production considerably.  Some 
will have access to investment capital and may participate significantly (e.g., India) in expanding 
nuclear power deployment. 
 
*Developing world – least developed (such as Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
Afghanistan):  These countries are predicted to have explosive population growth, approaching a 
factor of three.  These nations have very little infrastructure or access to capital on the scale 
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needed to develop nuclear power.  We do not anticipate participation by these countries in the 
global growth scenario during this time period. 
 
This categorization led to some important conclusions for our nonproliferation 
considerations.  First is the leading role that must be played by the developed countries, 
generally not considered a major risk for fuel cycle-driven proliferation, if nuclear power is at 
least to retain its global market share and thereby contribute significantly to greenhouse gas 
emission mitigation.  Further, the United States specifically must be the leader in that scenario.  
This is based not only on the size of the US economy and associated energy demand, but also on 
its unique position among large developed countries of having a major population increase 
projected by the UN.  This is a significant conclusion from the scenario with obvious 
nonproliferation implications.  This is the converse of the conclusion that the least developed 
countries are unlikely to develop nuclear power and are thus also not the focus of 
nonproliferation concerns. 
 
Consequently, the principal focus falls upon the more advanced and less advanced 
countries in the categorization above.  Among them, China, India and Pakistan already possess 
nuclear weapons and so also are of less importance to our considerations; indeed we anticipate 
that both China and India will need very substantial nuclear power expansions (following only 
that of the US) if the mid-century scenario is to be realized. 
 
This finally takes us to the relatively small number of countries whose situations shape 
our thinking about the growth scenario and proliferation.  A good example of the concerns is 
provided by the recent developments in Iran which, as an NPT signatory, has been actively 
pursuing nuclear power and nuclear fuel cycle development, despite its immense fossil fuel 
resources.  They have been assisted most recently by Russia.  However, recent revelations show 
that Iran has developed fuel cycle facilities, most importantly a centrifuge enrichment plant, 
alleged to be intended for commercial fuel production but nevertheless outside of IAEA 
oversight.  Clearly such a capability, together with the domestic uranium mining industry being 
developed, provides a relatively straightforward path to nuclear weapons.  This is the type of 
pattern of nuclear cycle development that needs to be addressed in the growth scenario. 
 
Fuel cycle related proliferation pathways will be dependent on the reactor/fuel cycle 
technology, as well as institutional arrangements.  We examined these pathways for five 
particularly relevant examples.  For at least twenty years, the only credible candidates for 
substantial deployment are the reactor/fuel cycle combinations that dominate today; principally 
LWR’s operated with once-through spent fuel disposal, or LWR’s operated with MOX fuel.  The 
former provides a nonproliferation resistance benchmark.  The issues raised concern control of 
enrichment technology and “closing” the back end by implementing geological disposal.  In 
contrast, the MOX fuel cycle has the distinguishing characteristic, quite negative from a 
nonproliferation standpoint, of making “directly usable” weapons material (i.e., separated 
plutonium) available during normal operations. 
 
The envisioned deployment of nuclear power to developing nations within the robust 
growth scenario has been a motivation for modular reactor development.  High temperature gas 
reactors and long-life core reactors are possibilities for the intermediate and long term, 
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respectively.  Both have attractive proliferation resistant features, with the latter aiming to 
remove all fueling operations from the nation employing the reactor.  The only drawback with 
respect to the LWR once-through baseline is the higher enrichment of the LEU fresh fuel, which 
potentially allows for easier clandestine “topping off” to HEU. 
 
For the long term, mid-century and beyond, there is the possibility of deployment of fast 
spectrum reactors in a closed fuel cycle that recycles plutonium along with minor actinides 
and/or fission products.  Considerable R&D is needed to overcome both technical and economic 
barriers.  Any closed fuel cycle raises the issue of plutonium diversion, although these 
approaches are superior to the MOX approach in that separated plutonium is not available in 
normal operation.  Thus, appropriate process safeguards and international institutional 
arrangements could result in an adequate level of proliferation resistance in the overall system. 
 
These five reactor/fuel cycle combinations by no means represent all possible 
technologies of interest.  However, we believe that they capture the essential generic elements 
for moving on to a set of recommendations appropriate to the global growth scenario.  Some of 
the key recommendations are: 
 
1. The international safeguards regime needs strengthening in several ways in anticipation 
of robust growth and spread of nuclear power, such as 
a. IAEA access to undeclared sites for all states subject to IAEA safeguards 
b. Integration of safeguards surveillance and security functions with fuel cycle 
facility design and operation 
 
2. Enhanced focus should be placed on tracking and control of enrichment technology, 
specifically including non-commercial technologies that can be used for batch operation 
and may now be enabled by the spread of technology (materials, lasers, design tools,…) 
and of industrial capacity.  The difficult issue of strengthening cooperation between 
national intelligence agencies with the IAEA should be addressed. 
 
3. Timely closure of the back end of the fuel cycle with respect to spent fuel management 
has important nonproliferation implications, both to support expansion of the once-
through fuel cycle and to avoid significant degradation of the spent fuel radiation barrier 
that impedes access to plutonium.  The long-term (several hundred years) retrievability 
criterion that has been imposed on geological repository design should be reexamined 
from a nonproliferation perspective. 
 
4. International fuel cycle R&D collaboration and assistance for nuclear power development 
should be confined to reactor/fuel cycle combinations that support nonproliferation 
objectives.  This should specifically exclude fuel cycles, notably the MOX fuel cycle, that 
make separated plutonium available in normal operation.  This should be pursued 
energetically by US diplomacy.  Any international R&D program on advanced reactors 
and fuel cycles should itself be subject to stringent constraints that minimize proliferation 
concerns due to research facilities and transfer of expertise.  Nonproliferation experts in 
the government should have a strong role in framing and execution of such programs. 
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5. Suitable international fuel cycle architectures will be essential in the global growth 
scenario, such as co-location of sensitive facilities in internationally supervised locations.  
Fresh fuel supply and spent fuel return to such sites would be a very positive 
nonproliferation step.  International spent fuel storage facilities should be pursued in the 
near term, preparatory to global growth and spread of nuclear power. 
 
 
Virtually all of these recommendations suggest the need for a fundamental reexamination of the 
nonproliferation framework established under the Nonproliferation Treaty if the robust global 
growth scenario is to be realized responsibly.  That framework has already been taxed on many 
occasions in the very recent past.  Thus, while such a reexamination is clearly a major complex 
undertaking, the magnitude of the challenges presented in the global growth scenario is equally 
significant. 
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Proliferation Matrix Appendix 
PROLIFERATION MATRIX APPENDIX 
Attributes of Each Barrier 
Barrier attributes must be assessed based on the same set of metrics.  The system used by the 
TOPS task force to indicate the effectiveness of each barrier attribute, was adopted.  Below is a 
brief description of the criteria used to determine barrier effectiveness, most of which was taken 
directly from information presented in the TOPS annex report. 
 
MATERIAL BARRIERS 
The civilian nuclear fuel cycle involves materials that either are, or could potentially be 
processed into weapons-usable1 materials.  Though all isotopes are capable of being assembled 
into a fast critical mass can be considered a proliferation concern, the principal isotopes 
considered here are those of uranium and plutonium. 
 
The effort required to use any isotope is highly dependent upon the isotopic properties and 
the skills of the potential proliferator because the isotopes properties vary (half-life, neutron 
generation, heat generation, and critical mass).  The nuclear properties, of fissile materials and 
fertile Th-233 and U-238 (which can produce U-233 and Pu-239 respectively), are listed in the 
table below. 
 
                                                 
1 Materials that can be assembled into a fast critical mass and are capable of undergoing an explosive fissionable 
reaction).  This does not include the dispersal of environmentally hazardous nuclear material. 
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TABLE A-1: Nuclear Properties of Fissile Isotopes 
Isotope Half-life    
(y)
Neutrons/       
sec-kg
Watts/    
kg
Critical Massa         
(kg)
Pa-231 32.8 x 103 nil 1.3 162
Th-232 14.1 x 109 nil nil infiniteb
U-233 159 x 103 1.23 0.281 16.4
U-235 700 x 106 0.364 6 x 10-5 47.9
U-238 4.5 x 109 0.11 8 x 10-6 infiniteb
Np-237 2.1 x 106 0.139 0.021 59
Pu-238 88 2.67 x 106 560 10
Pu-239 24 x 103 21.8 2.0 10.2
Pu-240 6.54 x 103 1.03 x 106 7.0 36.8
Pu-241 14.7 49.3 6.4 12.9
Pu-242 376 x 103 1.73 x 106 0.12 89
Am-241 433 1540 155 57
Am-243 7.38 x 103 900 6.4 155
Cm-244 18.1 11 x 109 2.8 x 103 28
Cm-245 8.5 x 103 147 x 103 5.7 13
Cm-246 4.7 x 103 9 x 109 10 84
Bk-247 1.4 x 103 nil 36 10
Cf-251 898 nil 56 9
aBare sphere
bNot potentially weapons-usable material
*Taken from Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (TOPS) Annex October 2000
Table of Nuclear Properties 
 
 
The table indicates that several materials can be physically assembled into a fast critical mass 
and are therefore weapons-usable.  Because of its high heat generation, plutonium with more 
than 80% Pu-238 is not weapons-usable. 
 
More specifically, material barrier attributes are the qualities of materials that relate to the 
inherent desirability of the material by a potential proliferator.  The barriers include the isotopic 
composition of the material, the radiation hazard and signature associated with each material, the 
difficulty of moving the mass and/or bulk of the material, and the inherent detectability of the 
material. 
 
Isotopic 
Attributes of the isotopic barrier indicate how difficult it may be to construct a weapon from 
a particular fissile material once the material is available in an acceptable chemical form.  
Determining the effectiveness of the isotopic barrier requires understanding the critical mass, 
degree of isotopic enrichment, spontaneous neutron generation, heat-generation rate, and 
radiation of the particular material.  The critical mass is the minimum amount of material 
needed to achieve fast-neutron criticality.  The barrier effectiveness is directly proportional to the 
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size of the critical mass (larger critical masses represent a higher barrier than smaller masses).  
The degree of isotopic enrichment is inversely proportional to the size of the barrier 
effectiveness.  Natural and low-enriched uranium (which are not directly weapons-usable, but 
can be converted into high enriched uranium) yield a high isotopic barrier.  High enriched 
uranium and most plutonium isotopic mixes are considered “directly weapons-usable”.  
Spontaneous neutron generation affects the design of a reliable explosive devise.  Lower 
barriers have a lower spontaneous neutron generation.  If the material is plutonium, then this is 
highly dependent on the concentration of the even numbered plutonium isotopes (see table A-1).  
Higher heat generation rates represent higher barriers.  The heat produced complicates weapon 
operations and design (see table A-1).  The radiation released by isotopes interferes with 
handling of nuclear devices.  This deals with the difficulty of weapons design.  For plutonium 
this depends on the even numbered isotope concentrations and for uranium it depends on the U-
232 and U-233 concentrations. 
 
The critical mass, for plutonium, varies less among the different isotopes than do those for 
uranium.  “Weapons-grade” plutonium has a Pu-239 content of greater than 90wt%.  Typical 
“reactor-grade” plutonium has approximately 60wt% Pu-239, and “very-high-burnup reactor-
grade” plutonium has approximately 40wt% or less Pu-239.   
 
Radiological 
Radiation barriers affect the difficulty of theft or diversion and they can also complicate 
chemical processing.  The characteristics that are included in the radiological attribute include: 
specific does rates, the time required to accumulate a significant dose, the degree of remote 
handling required (e.g., hand-on access, remote handling, fully shielded facilities).  Some 
materials have a radiation barrier in their elemental form and others have it only as a result of 
mixtures.  Because the radiological barrier decays with time, after a few decades, the barrier of 
spent fuel has decayed to a level where it may be reasonably handled with less sophisticated 
techniques2. 
 
Chemical 
The chemical barrier refers to the extent and difficulty of chemical processing required to 
separate the weapons-usable materials from diluents and contaminants.  The characteristics of 
chemical barriers relate to the degree of technical difficulty needed to refine materials into the 
appropriate form, the existence of admixtures, the number of separate processing steps needed to 
obtain materials of sufficient purity for weapons, and the general availability of the necessary 
processing techniques. 
 
Mass and Bulk 
This barrier refers to the amount and size of materials that have to be handled to obtain 
weapons materials.  If the material is dilute, then the total amount of material to obtain, transport, 
and process is large, and the mass barrier is significant.  If the material is concentrated, then less 
bulk is needed and the barrier would be much lower.  Materials are also often contained in bulky 
items or configurations that are themselves not easy to obtain or transport. 
                                                 
2 More detail about spent fuel decay characteristics in chapter 4. 
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Detectability 
Nuclear material is inherently detectable, and this facilitates proliferation resistance through 
various arrangements.  Some characteristics that contribute to detectability are:  the degree to 
which materials can be passively detected (type and intensity of spontaneous emissions, the 
degree to which active methods (e.g., neutron stimulation) are necessary, the hardness of 
radiation signatures, the uniqueness of material signatures, and the uncertainties in detection 
equipment. 
 
The table below summarizes the material barriers and their effectiveness.  In the table, I 
represents an ineffective barrier, L a low barrier, M a medium barrier, H a high barrier and VH a 
very high barrier.  This scale is not linear and some qualitative differences may exist between 
different rankings.  The scale is also not comparable among the various barriers.  That is to say, 
the effectiveness of an H for radiological barrier is not necessarily equivalent to a chemical 
barrier with an effectiveness of an H. 
 
TABLE A-2: Classification of Material Barriers3 
Barrier
I L M H V
Isotopic Weapons-grade HEU (80% or greater U-235)
HEU(50-80%), Weapons-
grade Pu(>90%Pu-239), 
Typical Reactor-Grade 
Pu(60%Pu-239), HEU (35-
50%U-235), very high 
burnup reactor-grade Pu 
(40%or<Pu239)
HEU (20-35%U235) LEU Natural, depleted U
Radiological
No significant radiation 
hazard, capable of 
unlimited hands-on 
access, includes natural, 
depleted, and enriched 
uranium
Moderate radiation 
hazards, normally 
requiring glove-box 
handling, includes 
separated plutonium
Dangerous radiation 
hazards, levels fall 
below "self-protection 
standard"(100R/hr @ 
1meter)
Lethal levels of 
radiation meeting the 
self-protecting standard, 
includes most spent fuel 
and high-level wastes
Chemical Pure metals
Single compounds (requiring 
relatively few and simple 
chemical steps to extract a 
pure metal)
Mixed compounds 
(MOX fuel, dilutents 
and burnable poisons, 
but not fission 
products or other 
radiation barriers)
Spent fuel and vitrified 
wastes
Mass/Bulk
Small amounts of 
weapons usable 
materials, easily 
concealed and 
transported, with sufficient 
concentrations that 
require few trips for 
accumulation
Similar to I, but significantly 
more difficult to conceal
Large quantities must 
be transported 
(multiple trips and/or 
several individuals)
Large quantities must 
be transported, 
requiring commonly 
used equipment and 
vehicles
Large quantities, 
specialized equipment 
and/or low 
concentrations requiring 
many trips
Detectability No reliable signature for remote detection
Materials requiring active 
means of detection
Materials that can be 
reliably detected
Materials easily dected 
by passive means
Classification
Material Barriers
H
 
                                                 
3 Adapted from TOPS report 
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TECHNICAL BARRIERS 
Technical barriers are the intrinsic technical elements of the fuel cycle, its facilities, 
processes, and equipment that serve to make it difficult to gain access to materials and/or to use 
or misuse facilities to obtain weapons-usable material.  The intrinsic technical barrier 
characteristics include: the unattractiveness (lack of utility for weapons use) of facilities, 
equipment, and processes for producing potentially weapons-usable material; the extent to which 
facilities and equipment inherently restrict access to fissile material; the amount of attractive 
material; facility detectability and material accountability; applicability of skills, knowledge and 
expertise; and timing. 
 
 Facility Unattractiveness 
The extent to which facilities, equipment, and processes are resistant to the production of 
weapons-usable materials is an important technical barrier.  Those that can directly produce 
weapons-usable material have a negligible barrier to proliferation and those that cannot be 
modified have a high barrier.  Among the characteristics involved in this barrier are:  the 
complexity of modifications needed to obtain potentially weapons-usable material; the cost of 
modifying the facility or process; the safety implications of such modifications; the time required 
to perform the modifications; facility throughput; and the existence and effectiveness of 
observables (e.g., environmental signatures that can be remotely sensed or observed) associated 
with facility modification and misuse. 
 Facility Access 
The extent to which facilities and equipment inherently restrict access to fissile material 
represents an important barrier.  This barrier is considered independent from institutional barriers 
including security and access controls.  The characteristics that are involved with this barrier 
include: the difficulty and time required to perform operations leading to access to materials, 
equipment, and processes of concern (e.g., time required to remove a reactor head for refueling); 
the need for an availability of specialized equipment, skills, and knowledge to gain access; the 
extent of manual vs. automatic, remote or autonomous operations; and the frequency of 
operations potentially supporting a proliferator’s goal (e.g., refueling-which may provide access 
to fuel). 
 
 Available Mass 
At least a critical mass of appropriate weapons-usable material must be available in order for 
a proliferator to construct nuclear weapons.  Insufficient materials represent a larger barrier to 
proliferation.  Although, material availability is affected by the physical characteristics of the 
process, technology, and facility, and also by the security and safeguards measures implemented, 
these aspects are discussed under other barriers.  The available mass barrier specifically deals 
with the amount of material in existence at a point in the nuclear fuel cycle, expressed in terms of 
critical masses (see Table A-1). 
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 Facility Diversion Detectability 
Diversion detectability is a measure of the extent to which diversion of materials from 
processes and facilities can be detected.  Facility detectability describes the extent to with 
undesirable modification to the facilities can themselves be detected.  The characteristics 
involved include: the type of material and processes involved and the extent to with the process 
supports accurate materials accountability; the uncertainties in detection equipment, including 
screening for dummy items; and the whether or not the form of the material is amenable to item 
counting. 
 
 Skills, Knowledge and Expertise 
Nuclear fuel cycle activities involve varying degrees of skills, knowledge and expertise that 
may be applied to support a nuclear weapons program.  Characteristics important to determining 
the extent to which such information could support a program include:  the level of specialized 
skills and knowledge necessary to support specific elements of the fuel cycle (i.e., the 
availability of “dual-use” skills—skills that serve both civilian and weapons programs); the 
extent to which such information is directly applicable to weapons development; the extent to 
which such information is generally available; the time required to achieve some level of 
expertise from available sources; and the general availability and alternate sources of applicable 
skills. 
 
 Time 
The time that materials are available to potential proliferators is also a determinant to the 
overall effectiveness of the barriers to proliferations.  In general, the storage of materials and 
equipment represents the greatest time-related proliferation threat (long storage times for 
materials and equipment typically provide potential proliferation plenty of opportunities for 
access). 
 
Table A-3 summarizes the technical barriers and their effectiveness. 
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TABLE A-3: Classification of Technical Barriers4 
Barrier
I L M H V
Facility Unattractiveness
Facilities that routinely 
use, handle or produce 
significant quantities of 
directly weapons-usable 
materials
Facilities that can be 
modified quickly, safely and 
easily.  With observables 
difficult to detect prior to 
accumulation of significant 
quantities of materials
Facilities that require 
expertise, expense 
and time (~month) to 
modify
Facilities capable of 
modification given 
substantial time 
(months to years), 
money and expertise. 
Safety and throughput 
issues involved
Facilities with little 
appeal for modification
Facility Access
Access to sensitive 
materials is quick and 
easy.  Frequent hands-on 
access
Access is normally 
accomplished via 
automated, remote 
processes.  Manual 
operations are limited
Access is extremely 
difficult, requiring highly 
specialized skills and 
equipment
Available Mass
Very large quantites 
(multiple critical masses) 
of potentially weapons-
usable materials present
A significant quantity (on the 
order of a critical mass) of 
potentially weapons-usable 
material is present
Small quantities (<10% 
critical mass) of 
potentially weapons-
usable materials 
present
Very small quantities 
(<1% critical mass) of 
potentially weapons-
usabe materials present
Facility Diversion 
Detectability
Facilities with no or 
minimal detection 
equipment.  Procedures 
that allow materials to 
easily move with 
detection
Facilities with detection 
equipment.  Procedures 
that make it very 
difficult for material to 
move without detection]
Skills, Knowledge, 
Expertise
Process, technology, or 
facility provides 
significant and unique 
technical expertise having 
direct weapons-
development application.  
"Dual-use skills"
Existence of skills, 
knowledge and 
expertise provide 
support valuable to 
weapons-development 
programs, but is not 
directly applicable
Only general industrial 
skills are needed to 
support the technology 
or facility.  These skills 
are well known and 
readily available
Time
Long storage time 
(decades) with oportunity 
for access to materials 
and/or equipment
Long storage time but with 
low access opportunity
Intermediate storage 
time (years) and low 
opportunity for access
Short to intermediate 
storage times with high 
opportunity for access
Short or no storage time 
(days to months) and 
low opportunity for 
access
Technical Barriers
Classification
H
 
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS 
Institutional barriers are those practices, controls, and arrangements designed to protect 
against various threats, compensating in whole or in part for weaknesses of material or technical 
barriers, or for the potential of other aspects of the nuclear energy system to contribute to 
proliferation.  These practices, controls, and arrangements include international safeguards, 
MPC&A5, highly effective and well-integrated safeguards measures based substantially on real-
time monitoring, and other measures such as controls over sensitive information, export controls, 
etc.  Institutional barriers may also include the economic and political stability of the region or 
nation where the nuclear system (or certain parts) is located. 
 
 Safeguards 
Safeguards are those extrinsic measures implemented to assist in the monitoring, detection, 
and deterrence of facility misuse and/or of material diversion or theft.  Safeguards specifically 
relate to extrinsic measure and therefore they are materially different from the intrinsic 
                                                 
4 Adapted from TOPS report 
5 Complex measures known as material protection, control, and accounting 
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“diversion detection” and “materials detectability” barriers.  Safeguards are effective to the 
extent that they can:  provide a credible and effective deterrent to proliferation; provide effective 
transparency; and reliably detect illicit activities as early as possible.  The barrier characteristics 
include:  availability of and access to relevant information; minimum detectability limits for 
materials; existence of conspicuous signatures and the ability to detect illicit activities; response 
time of detectors and monitors; existence, precision, and frequency of material and process 
inventory and control procedures; and incorporation of safeguards measures into facility and 
process design and operation. 
 
 Access Control and Security 
Access-control and physical-security measures are different from facility access in being 
institutional additions not inherent to the system.  The characteristics of this barrier include:  
administrative steps necessary to obtain access; physical protection and security arrangements; 
existence of effective backup support; and how effective access control and security are 
implemented and supported if needed (e.g., whether the technology supports co-location of 
sensitive activities). 
 
 Location 
Location represents a problematic barrier in many ways.  For example, in that site remoteness 
may make a facility harder to attack, but it can also make it difficult to defend and increase the 
defenders’ response time.  Operations at widely dispersed locations require transport of materials 
between them, and transport involves increased risk.  Oppositely, co-located facilities may only 
require on-site transport.  The effectiveness of the location barrier requires careful evaluation of 
the threat and location implications to determine the net value of the location barrier.  This 
makes characterization of the barrier difficult to impossible.  The characterization in the 
following table is a zero to first order approximation of the necessary evaluation of the location 
barrier. 
 
Table A-4 summarizes the institutional barriers and their effectiveness. 
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TABLE A-4: Classification of Institutional Barriers6 
Barrier
I L M H V
Safeguards 
Effectiveness
Safeguards monitoring 
parameters are limited 
and complex.  Uncertainty 
in materials status 
increases rapidly if 
monitoring is delayed or 
restiricted.  Margins for 
error in meeting 
timeliness of detection 
goals are small
Multiple monitored 
parameters provide 
easily interpreted data.  
Uncertainty in material 
status increases slowly 
with delays or 
restrictions.  Margins for 
error are large and 
robust
Access Control, Security Materials could be easily moved without detection.
With some prior planning, 
materials could be removed 
with a small probability of 
detection.  Could be stolen 
by a small group of lightly 
armed outsiders
At most times, theft 
attempts by a single 
insider would be 
detected.  System 
vulnerabilities to 
circumstances 
(emergencies/power 
outages) are high.  
Theft by outsiders 
would require well-
trained, well-armed 
individuals properly 
equiped
Theft by a single insider 
or small group of armed 
outsiders (or both) can 
be blocked with good 
confidence.  Design 
basis threat includes 
possible use of 
equipment brought in 
by vehicles
Theft attempts by 
multiple insiders or 
large groups of armed 
outsiders (or both) can 
be blocked with high 
confidence.  Design 
basis threat also 
includes the possible 
use of helicopters
Location
Proliferation threat is 
highly dependent upon 
facility location
Facility location poses 
no additional threat to 
proliferation
Classification
Institutional Barriers
 
 
                                                 
6 Adapted from TOPS report 
DON’T QUIT 
 
When things go wrong 
As they sometimes will 
When the 
Road you’re trudging 
Sees all uphill, 
When the funds are low 
And the debts are high, 
And you want to smile,  
But you have to sigh, 
When care is pressing you 
Down a bit, 
Rest if you must 
But don’t you quit. 
Life is queer 
With its twist and turns, 
As every one of us 
Sometimes learns, 
And many a 
Failure turns about, 
When you might have won 
Had you stuck it out. 
Don’t give up, 
Though the pace 
Seems slow- 
You may succeed with 
Another blow. 
Success is failure turned 
Inside out— 
The silver tint of the 
Clouds of doubt. 
And you never can tell 
How close you are; 
It may be near when it seems so far. 
So stick to the fight 
When you’re hardest hit 
It’s when things seem worst 
That you must not quit. 
-Author Unknown 
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